


# REDESIGN OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ARMY

## Phase II Final Report

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## Institutional/TDA Army Axis Force XXI Campaign, Phase II

This report reflects the results of Phase II, the concluding phase of the Institutional/TDA Army axis of the Force XXI Campaign. It provides a historical record of the Institutional Army's continuing efforts to re-invent itself to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. It tells the story of almost three years of dedicated analysis based on business process reengineering principles. What emerges is the culmination of a thoughtful process that, together with Phase I results, has placed a major portion of the Institutional/TDA Army on the path of organizational change.

In Phase II, we made important strides toward our objective of institutional redesign. We leveraged the institutional vision developed in Phase I while assessing core processes like installation management and organizational training. In Phase II we also acknowledged the integral relationships between the operational and institutional force and assessed, concurrently, functions like intelligence that are resident in each dimension of the force.

Effecting institutional change is not easy and requires sustained commitment. Much has been accomplished but more must be done. Readers are encouraged to use this report as a reference point for continued progress. Many creative proposals were generated in Phase II. Some were approved for implementation; others remain for future consideration. It is intended that these ideas serve to stimulate further innovation. The transformation of today's Army into Army XXI relies on such constructive effort.

Just as the May 18, 1998, Phase I Report, this report in its entirety has been archived at the Pentagon Library, the National Defense University Library, the Army War College Library and the Command and General Staff College Library. It is also available through the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) and may be accessed electronically from the US Army Force Management School web site at [www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil](http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil).

Robert Bartholomew  
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary  
(Force Management, Manpower  
and Resources)

BENJAMIN S. GRIFFIN  
Brigadier General, GS  
Director, Force Programs

Enclosure

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This report provides the results of Phase II of a three-phase effort to reengineer the Institutional Army in support of the Operational Army of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Key Functional Area Assessments (FAAs) are highlighted and depict the means by which core Army processes are being redesigned to produce a more efficient, effective institutional force.

### ***E.1 Background and Purpose***

The changing strategic environment and presence of major political influences created a requirement for the Army to determine what strategy would be necessary for it to continue to be an effective warfighting force as it transitions into the next century. Included was the requirement to effectively adopt national level guidance emanating from such sources as the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Report of the National Performance Review (NPR) and the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces. A senior defense official noted that the Army would be challenged in responding to policies and recommendations because it had not done as much as the other services in reducing infrastructure and overhead.

The Force XXI Campaign Plan was developed in response to these challenges as an initiative to design organizations and develop capabilities to ensure that the Army was prepared to execute a doctrine of "full-dimensional operations" in the next century. A Board of Directors (BOD) meeting in August 1994, endorsed the requirement to assess the Institutional Army, or sustaining base structure, through the analysis of the core processes which were central to force support. Institutional forces were to be assessed as one of the axes of the Force XXI campaign.

The Secretary of the Army assured the Secretary of Defense that the Army would respond to the CORM recommendations by undertaking a review by which the Army would:

- divest Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) of non-essential functions;
- remove unnecessary layering and expand the power of field commanders;
- eliminate unnecessary duplication;
- consolidate some Army Staff (ARSTAF) and Secretariat functions;
- focus HQDA on policy making, not execution;
- reduce the numbers of major commands (MACOMs);
- reallocate resources in support of core capabilities; and
- explore privatization or outsourcing of administrative support functions.

In January 1995, the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) and the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) signed a charter for the Institutional/Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) Axis campaign plan that required reduction in the headquarters and its support agencies; reduction in the numbers of major commands; and seeking efficiencies for recapitalization. Principles guiding the effort included a recognition that any reorganization would continue civilian control of the military; that the Secretariat and ARSTAF each have important separate roles; and that operational functions belong in the field. Criteria specific to HQDA included:

- satisfying of all Title 10, United States Code (USC) requirements;
- leveraging the benefits of advanced technologies; and

- operating effectively in Congressional, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) environments.

The Force XXI Campaign Plan was comprised of three axes that combined the concurrent review of the Institutional Army with two other segments. One, Joint Venture, was intended to redesign the operational force comprised of units organized under Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). The other, the Army Digitization Office (ADO), was to establish information architecture for the Army, streamline acquisition and ensure the assimilation of information age technologies into the operational force. The charter for the Institutional /TDA axis called for a redesigned Institutional Army by the year 2000 through the:

- reengineering of departmental Title 10 processes; and
- redesign of the Institutional Army as part of Force XXI.

## **E.2            *Methodology and Scope***

The scope of the Institutional/TDA Axis plan consisted of four efforts.

- internal reengineering of major commands;
- functional area assessments;
- redesign of HQDA, its field operating agencies and staff support activities; and
- Umbrella Group redesign (e.g., independent, parallel assessments distinct from proponent efforts).

A three-phased approach was used which coincided with Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycles.

- Phase I had an objective of creating a baseline organization for the Army (POM 98-03).
- Phase II's objective was to provide a revised organization from the Phase I baseline (POM 00-05);
- Phase III's objective concludes the effort by producing a final design in support of Army XXI and a dynamic methodology by which to provide future programmatic response to changing environments.

Phase II consisted of six FAAs, beginning with Installation Management FAA in June 1996 and concluding with the Support to Organizational Training FAA in July 1997.

The concepts of redesign and reengineering formed the basis for reform of the Institutional Army. These methodologies were highly successful in the civilian sector and were intended to provide radical and dramatic improvements in critical measures of performance such as quality, cost and service. The fundamental reengineering hypothesis for the Army held that an understanding of the institution's core competencies and related processes, combined with key insights from Joint Venture, would allow for the application of information age technologies to creating a better product. Reengineering the TDA would obtain near term structure and budget reductions while a study of TDA requirements would size the TDA over the long term.

Army core capabilities and competencies were identified and served as the basis for the identification of the core processes implicit in Title 10, USC. These processes in turn formed the basis for the review of the Institutional Army. Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM) 100-1, Force XXI Institutional Army Redesign was published as a part of Phase II, provides a vision and conceptual framework for institutional redesign and discusses the Army's capabilities and core processes in the context of the 21<sup>st</sup>

century. It proffers design principles and models for future command support, while promoting the leverage of strategic elements in seeking a common basis for structural and doctrinal reform.

A Department of Defense (DoD) standard for process modeling and reengineering called the Enterprise Model served to underlie the redesign effort. This model focused on business methods and processes, with the ultimate goal of service to the customer through the activities of providing direction, acquiring assets, providing capability and producing a product.

### **E.3            Guidance**

In order to ensure adherence to the Institutional/TDA Axis goals and to provide relative consistency of presentation, FAA briefing principles and objectives, as well as a common format for presentation were established. Objectives included identifying paramount elements of each core process function performed, the most effective organization for performing the function and issues and proposed alternatives for resolution. Principles to be applied included the Army's enduring values and imperatives, the inclusion of information age technologies, cost effectiveness and linkage to the NMS.

Each FAA was to present three alternatives:

- an organization significantly smaller than the current total Army organization of the function;
- a total revision of the current management structure (i.e., MACOM) for the function Army-wide; and
- a "dealer's choice" alternative which would reflect the process proponent's preferred organization if starting from scratch.

An operating organization to facilitate the progress of the Force XXI Campaign and to allow for senior-level expertise and decision making was established, with specific responsibilities for the Army leadership to assume during the review. The Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) provided oversight to the entire Institutional Army redesign effort was delegated approval authority of major issues and initiatives. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA(M&RA)) were responsible for coordinating the effort and integrating the results of the institutional redesign. The Army Commander's Conference (ACC) provided corporate guidance to the effort and approved recommendations to the SECARMY and CSA. A General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) supervised the development and implementation of the Institutional/TDA Army Campaign Plan; identified and tracked axis studies, assessments, and issues; and prioritized recommendations to the ACC. Proponents (generally MACOM commanders or agency heads) and sponsors (HQDA agencies) presented the FAAs. The Analysis and Experimentation Planning Group (AEPG) was to provide oversight of the analysis and experimentation process used to support key decisions. An Umbrella Group was also established with the responsibility for coordinating all four efforts; scheduling and monitoring FAAs; and providing "out of the box" alternative thinking on all issues.

### **E.4            Discussion**

The following subsections contain a summary of key recommendations for each FAA.

#### **E.4.1    Installation Management**

Forces Command (FORSCOM) conducted the installation management FAA. The objective of the FAA was two-fold. First, identify the most effective base operations (BASOPS) command and control organization and second, determine the optimum method for delivering BASOPS services for the Total Army. In the command and control section of this FAA, FORSCOM presented four options: retain the

structure “as is”; remove MACOMs from BASOPS; reduce HQDA BASOPS role; and establish BASOPS command. Of these four options, FORSCOM recommended reducing HQDA’s BASOPS role because: achieves dollar and manpower savings; maintains link between commanders’ responsibility and authority; supports DA PAM 100-1 vision of HQDA role; and could be implemented relatively quickly. To determine the optimum method for delivery of BASOPS services, eight methods were defined. FORSCOM recommended that the best approach to service delivery is to direct HQDA proponents to issue policy guidance to implement BASOPS FAA service delivery method recommendations where applicable.

#### E.4.2 Law Enforcement

A combined Operation and Institutional Law Enforcement FAA was presented by the Commandant, Military Police (MP) School and the Commander, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC). This FAA combined an assessment of the Military Police Corps’ capability to support the Force XXI Commander (Operational FAA) with MP and USACIDC reengineering to enhance the Institutional Army’s ability to perform security, law enforcement and criminal investigation. The MP proponent suggested three alternatives: a significantly smaller military police organization; a reorganized military police organization; and a “dealers’ choice. The third MP FAA alternative, an eclectic approach that the MP FAA proponent produced looking at four different types of approaches: elimination, reorganization and consolidation, conversion and civilianization, is the recommended alternative. For the CID portion of the Law Enforcement FAA, three alternative courses of action, similar to the MP portion of the FAA, were presented. The first alternative, divesting the Army’s Major Procurement Fraud Unit (MPFU) would result in major Army losses. Similarly, alternative 2, a reorganization of the CID, is not the best option because Army commanders lose flexibility in performing important CID tasks. It was therefore recommended that the third alternative, the dealer’s choice, be the preferred CID XXI organization.

#### E.4.3 Health Care

The Health Care FAA was presented by the Medical Command (MEDCOM) Chief of Staff. The objectives of the health care FAA were to redesign the optimal health care delivery system and to ensure a ready and trained force to support the Army of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Major briefing areas included a description of the current process, Army Medical Department’s (AMEDDs) top readiness challenges, the medical reengineering initiative and then four alternative structures to deliver the Army’s health care requirements: 1 -Specialized Command; 2 -Disestablish MEDCOM; 3 a and b - U.S. Medical Command and 4 a and b -U.S. Medical Service. MEDCOM recommended the adoption of Alternative 1. The rationale for this alternative was that the Army would retain a specialized command as a single source provider for all U.S. Army health care. At the conclusion of the FAA the VCSA requested a follow-up In Progress Review (IPR) in six months on the following subject areas: Combat Lifesaver Training; Flight Surgeon Utilization; Congressional Fellows; Graying of RC Physicians; Satisfaction with Joint Medical Training; Recruitment of Dental Officers; Evacuation Update; MEDCOM Reorganization Update; AMEDD Center and School (C&S) to Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); TDA Hospitals to TOE; and Total Army Analysis (TAA) Hospital Status.

#### E.4.4 Intelligence

The Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School presented the Military Intelligence (MI) FAA. The objectives were: to present a MI Branch overview; describe how MI is evolving to meet Army Force XXI requirements; provide an MI Force assessment; and identify issues needing resolution. The presentation was a combined TDA and TOE FAA deemed to be necessary because of the increasing integration of MI elements from the national to operational level under evolving technologies and modernization. Major briefing areas included: doctrine; training; leader development; organization;

material; and soldiers. Major issues identified concerned: the need for realistic and relevant simulation-driven combined arms training capability; the field-grade shortfall in MI majors and recommended methods to address shortages; reductions in both civilian and military personnel and attendant increase in risk factors, particularly at division level; reduction in MI systems and platforms and increasing need for precision sensors on the battlefield, particularly All Source Analysis System (ASAS)- Remote Work Station (RWS); and the need for MI noncommissioned officers (NCO) restructure. A major issue identified was the need to redesignate Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) from that of a MACOM due to decreasing organization and structure. Alternatives included designation of INSCOM as: a specialized command; a major subordinate command (MSC) of FORSCOM; and a Field Operating Agency (FOA) of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT). The specialized command option was recommended in order to maximize critical functions, reduce structure and provide simpler coordination with national intelligence agencies. Other recommendations included the need for a seamless MI architecture; support to ASAS-RWS Unfinanced Requirement (UFR) of \$65.33M beginning in Fiscal Year 98; acquisition of corps Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) if necessary; and elimination of some MI personnel requirements and reduction in fill. Guidance provided by the VCSA was to: focus on reducing MI field-grade requirements, particularly in the joint arena; work to upgrade equipment rather than purchase new where this is feasible; convert INSCOM to a specialized command with maximum conversion of TDA units to TOE; emphasize training rather than purely technical solutions to information warfare; compete ASAS as a UFR; create an increased appreciation of commander intent by MI personnel; and, under split-based operations, avoid a requirement for increased personnel. Upon further review, the CSA approved a recommendation by the DCSINT to conduct a comprehensive review of intelligence structure; that review is on-going.

#### E.4.5 Support to Organizational Training (SOT)

Forces Command (FORSCOM) presented the active component (AC) to reserve component (RC) training support portion of the SOT FAA, while the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) presented the TDA training support section. The FORSCOM portion reviewed the command and control (C2) structure and manpower to support RC unit training. The purpose of this briefing was to: determine the optimum C2 structure for AC to RC training support; determine how much AC (and RC) manning is required; and apportion AC (and RC) manning properly within the support structure. FORSCOM concluded that:

- there should be an integrated synergism which will optimize each component's expertise, which has tri-component potential and which establishes a "Total Army" example;
- a more efficient structure would optimize Title XI spaces and will save other spaces in Active Component and Active Guard Reserve;
- a more unified command for training support places Continental U.S. Army (CONUSA) in charge of RC training support and improves standardization;
- the Active Component mentor relationship with RC must be improved;
- more flexibility will enhance ability to surge, to focus on needed areas, to task organize (as required) and to seek assistance through the chain of command; and
- balances have an impact on AC units.

Associated AC units will continue Section 1131 support and will provide mentorship (in designated relationships). FORSCOM will task AC units for support as or if needed (considering Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO)/ PERSTEMPO). The VCSA directed a hybrid alternative to be done immediately and an integrated organization established as an end state. TRADOC's FAA included the overall findings that: SOT is fragmented and stovepiped; has duplicative support organizations; and has limited feedback to management. TRADOC recommended that there be only one training GOSC one acquisition process and one warehouse management system. Also, it recommended a regionalized, outsourced and consolidated Army wide video, film graphics fabrication and Training Support Center support.

#### **E.4.6 Finance**

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller ((ASA(FM&C))) conducted the Financial Management (FM) FAA. The objectives of the FAA primarily revolved around recommended improvements in financial management processes and efficiencies in operations. Those included proposals for maximizing information technology and identifying tools to effect improvements, enhancing workforce effectiveness and optimizing resource management. The briefing emphasized the need to involve all echelons of the FM community in process improvements and used workshops and professional development sessions to identify issues and solutions. Two off-site sessions consisting of a wide-range of FM and associated personnel and conducted by the firm of Booz Allen and Hamilton resulted in identification of optimum solutions to issues existing in the FM community and served as a basis for areas to be addressed in the FAA. These were primarily divided into the areas of the planning process, manpower and management analysis. Current defense trends toward downsizing and outsourcing were acknowledged as greatly influencing resource management. Objectives included the need to integrate FM systems at all levels, reduce the labor-intensiveness of systems and properly define the roles of FM personnel from HQDA to installation level. It was suggested that improvements could be accomplished by maximizing information technology, particularly as applied to Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) transactions; consolidating FM functions at HQDA and in the field; reducing and consolidating certain FM civilian career series; reducing restrictions on use of funds; and using Army-wide standard businesses practices within the FM community. One-time costs of \$11.42M were identified to achieve the improvements cited with no resulting steady state or manpower savings.

#### **E.5 Decisions**

In October 1997, the DCSOPS was presented a briefing of significant findings from the Phase II FAAs and residual Phase I issues. He concluded that the results, and associated decisions and guidance provided by the VCSA in the conduct of the individual FAAs was sufficient and no final decision briefing was required.

#### **E.6 Conclusions**

The commands and agencies responsible for FAAs generally adhere to guidance to reduce redundancy; create smaller, more efficient organizations; reduce MACOMs; and introduce and enhance common information systems for reporting, tracking and controlling core processes. The FAAs recommended implementation of courses of action which would modify or reduce the size and/or numbers of organizations; introduce information technologies as a means of enhancing core processes; and reduce layering and control in order to encourage field responsibility for operational matters.



### **1.1 Phase II Report**

#### **1.1.1 Purpose of Report**

The purpose of this report is to provide the results of Phase II of the Institutional/TDA Axis of the Force XXI Campaign Plan, that is, to develop a reengineered Institutional Army to support the Operational Army of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

#### **1.1.2 Scope**

The scope of the report includes a consideration of the Army's changing strategic and organizational environments, the major Phase II initiatives that were undertaken to redesign and reengineer the Army of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and the results of Phase II reengineering briefings and FAAs.

A three-phased approach was used which coincided with POM cycles.

- Phase I had an objective of creating a baseline organization for the Army (POM 98-03).
- Phase II's objective was to provide a revised organization from the Phase I baseline (POM 00-05);
- Phase III's objective concludes the effort by producing a final design in support of Army XXI and a dynamic methodology by which to provide future programmatic response to changing environments.

The scope of Phase II of the Institutional/TDA Axis campaign includes six FAAs:

- Installation Management
- Security/Law Enforcement/Criminal Investigation
- Health Care
- Intelligence
- Support to Organizational Training
- Finance

The concepts of redesign and reengineering formed the basis for reform of the Institutional Army. This was true of both Phase I and Phase II. These methodologies have proved highly successful in the private sector and were intended to provide radical and dramatic improvements in critical measures of performance such as quality, cost and service. The fundamental reengineering hypothesis for the Army held that an understanding of the institution's core competencies and related processes, combined with key insights from Joint Venture, would allow for the application of information age technologies to creating a better product.

Army core capabilities and competencies were identified and served as the basis for the identification of the core processes implicit in Title 10, USC. These processes formed the basis for the review of the Institutional Army. DA PAM 100-1, Force XXI Institutional Army Redesign, provided a vision and conceptual framework for institutional redesign and discussed the Army's capabilities and core processes in the context of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It proffered design principles and models for future command support, while promoting the leverage of strategic elements in seeking a common basis for structural and doctrinal reform.

A DoD standard for process modeling and reengineering called the Enterprise Model served to underlie the redesign effort. This model focused on business methods and processes, with the ultimate goal of

service to the customer through the activities of providing direction, acquiring assets, providing capability and producing a product.

### 1.1.3 Report Organization

This report is divided into 9 chapters. Chapter 1, Introduction, includes background information on the Institutional Force Axis of the Force XXI Campaign Plan and it provides the scope of methodology for Phase II efforts. Chapter 2 provides a guideline to understanding and interpreting the FAA briefings. Chapters 3 through 8 provide a summation of each reengineering effort and FAA conducted during Phase II, major issues associated with each, and outcomes realized and decisions made.

## 1.2 Background

### 1.2.1 The Changing Strategic Environment

The changing strategic environment of the 1980's and 1990's has had vast implications. Global competition created a new enterprise system resulting in refined business processes, more streamlined organizations, operational cost cutting and workforce downsizing. These changes have also affected the government and the Army. For the Army, a major shift in the world order from a Cold War environment to one lacking a clearly defined threat raised the critical question of what the guidelines should be for the warfighting force in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The emergence of the information age clearly indicated that the Army of the future would be required to take advantage of new technology in order to develop systems that could provide rapid information, interconnection and coordination across the spectrum of Army missions.

### 1.2.2 Major Influences

Major influences within the government were providing guidance on how to approach these changes and these influences were taken into consideration when proceeding with the Army XXI project. These influences are listed below:

#### 1.2.2.1 The National Military Strategy (NMS)

Responding to the new geopolitical order, the NMS continued to recognize vital global interests, obligations and risks, and the need to retain adequate military forces to be employed either in war or in operations short of war. In a shift from the past, the NMS strategy emphasized a reduced forward presence and more dependence upon force projection in executing operations. These reductions resulted in a significant decline in approved defense expenditures.

#### 1.2.2.2 The Report of the National Performance Review (NPR)

The NPR was a six-month effort chaired by the Vice President that sought both to reduce government costs and to change how government operates. It proposed that for government to work better it must put customers first, empower employees, reduce red tape and cut back to basic requirements.

#### 1.2.2.3 The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM)

The CORM was tasked to look at how the services could conduct effective military operations in the new strategic environment, how they could be assured of productive and responsive support and how improved management and direction of the forces could be achieved. The CORM recommended strengthening joint doctrine and operations, improving performance cost-cutting by outsourcing activities not required to be performed by the government, improving the processes by which DoD is managed in the areas of the PPBS and organizational changes that included personnel reductions, improved career civilian personnel management and reduced numbers of political appointees.

### **1.3 Force XXI Campaign Plan**

#### **1.3.1 Background**

In late 1993, a DoD senior official suggested that the Army was not feeling the impact of reductions as much as the other services because the Army had not made the required installation and overhead reductions or modifications in infrastructure. In March 1994, General Gordon R. Sullivan, CSA, announced his intention to create an Army focused on the national security interests of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The plan to accomplish this was Force XXI. He acknowledged that the Army needed to move from the 1990's into the next century in response to the requirements set forth in the NMS and results of the NPR and CORM reviews. He also recognized the need to equip the Army with the latest communications and digitization technology. The Force XXI Campaign Plan (Phase I Report, Appendix A) was intended not only to meet the demands of a changing geopolitical arena, but also to take advantage of advances in information technology. In November 1994, after conferring with the general officer BOD established to provide advice and counsel on Force XXI, General Sullivan issued a message to all four-star commanders with his guidance on a draft campaign plan to reengineer and redesign the Institutional Army (also referred to as the TDA Army) as part of the Force XXI initiative (Phase I Report, Appendix U). The Force XXI Campaign Plan had as its objective to:

Redesign the Army's tactical forces with emerging technology in the form of digitization, while reengineering the Army's institutional force by the year 2000, to be fielded by 2010.

In January 1995, the CSA and the SECARMY issued a charter (figure 1-1) for the Institutional Axis of the Force XXI campaign (Phase I Report, Appendix B). The objective of the Institutional Axis was to:

- reengineer departmental Title 10, USC processes; and
- redesign the Institutional Army as part of Force XXI.

The Institutional Axis represented an attempt to reengineer the TDA Army as one of three axes that were being coordinated simultaneously under the Force XXI Campaign (figure 1-2). The three axes of effort were:

- Joint Venture (e.g., redesign of the Operating Force) overseen by the Commanding General (CG), TRADOC;
- ADO (e.g., acquisition and assimilation of information age Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) capabilities into the Operational Force) overseen by the VCSA; and
- Institutional Army Redesign (e.g., creation of a TDA Army capable of supporting the Operational Force) also overseen by the VCSA with ASA(M&RA) and DCSOPS in direct support.




Figure 1-1. Institutional Army Redesign Charter




Figure 1-2. Force XXI Campaign Plan

Objectives of the Institutional/TDA axis campaign plan included a reduction in HQDA and its agencies, a reduction in the number of MACOMs, and other efficiencies that could be recapitalized (See Phase I Final Report. HQDA and MACOM reduction plans were concluded during Phase I and were not carried over for review during Phase II). The VCSA emphasized that the primary effort should concentrate on creating better organizations rather than simply accruing savings.

Accordingly, in October 1995, the SECARMY sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) that outlined his commitment to respond to the CORM recommendations, particularly those focused on restructuring the departmental staff. He indicated the principles that would guide the effort included eliminating unnecessary duplication, divesting functions that were not essential and providing commanders greater autonomy by removing layers in the organization. Related objectives were to reduce

the numbers of MACOMs, reallocate resources, and the privatize and outsource a number of administrative support functions.

### 1.3.2 Doctrine

Initial Force XXI efforts concentrated on the development of the Operational Army and the integration of information technology into a doctrine of full-dimensional operations. That doctrine would significantly influence the way in which the Institutional or TDA Army would sustain the Operational Force. The Army model for the future (figure 1-3) recognized that the common linkage between the Operational Army and the Institutional Army was doctrine. Each contributed to a means by which the total Army was able to satisfy its core competence of prompt, sustained operations on land.




Figure 1-3. Army Model

### 1.3.3 Methodology

The Army looked to both the corporate sector and defense to identify a methodology that could properly assess the structure and processes of the Institutional Army.

#### 1.3.3.1 Redesign and Reengineering

The concepts of **redesign** and **reengineering** formed the basis for the revision of the institution. Such concepts were being successfully used in the private sector, which was also undergoing dramatic change. The Army adopted the definition of reengineering from Reengineering the Corporation, A Manifesto for Business Revolution:

The fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance such as cost, quality, service and speed (Hammer and Champy, page 32).

#### 1.3.3.2 DoD Enterprise Model

In response to the NPR, the OSD created the Enterprise Model, Provide for the Common Defense, to serve as a foundation for the reengineering and restructuring of business methods and processes within DoD. The ultimate objective of the model was customer satisfaction. When applied to the Institutional Army, the model identified those processes intended to provide direction, acquire assets, provide

capability and produce a product for the customer (figure 1-4). The customer in this case the employed force.




Figure 1-4. Defense Enterprise Model

#### 1.3.3.3 Core Competencies and Capabilities

The 1994 Army Posture Statement stressed the importance of maintaining the Army's core competencies and enduring values and emphasized that they must not change despite the need to redesign the Institutional Army. It stressed that the Army's core competency is to conduct prompt and sustained operations on land—later refined by the CSA and VCSA to be: **soldiers, and those who support them, capable of prompt and sustain operations on land**. The Army's core competency served as the basis for the Institutional Army's core competency **to create, provide and sustain the land component of the Combatant Commander's joint/multinational force**, as well as the Institutional Army's core capabilities to: **direct, acquire and resource the force; develop the force; generate and project the force; and sustain the force**. Supported by core processes, these core capabilities became the basic framework for redesign (figure 1-5). These Institutional Army concepts were first introduced at a DCSOPS Force Program briefing to the BOD in July 1995 (Phase I Report, Appendix V).




Figure 1-5. Framework for Redesigning the Institutional Army

### 1.3.3.4 Core Processes

The basic responsibilities of the Army as outlined in Title 10, USC formed the basis for the processes to be reviewed. The core processes of the Institutional Army were derived from the core capabilities and include: **planning and developing policy; directing and assessing, developing requirements; developing doctrine; acquiring, training and sustaining people; identifying and developing leaders; tailoring, mobilizing and projecting land power; supporting organizational training; acquiring, maintaining and sustaining equipment; maintaining and sustaining land operations; acquiring and sustaining infrastructures; and operating installations** (figure 1-6). Two other, cross-functional processes, were also determined to be financial and information management.




Figure 1-6. Institutional Army Core Processes

### 1.3.3 Force XXI Literature

Two primary documents guided Force XXI Campaign efforts: TRADOC PAM 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and DA PAM 100-1, Force XXI Institutional Army Redesign.

### 1.3.3.1 TRADOC PAM 525-5, Force XXI Operations

This document outlines a doctrine of **full-dimensional operations** for the new strategic Operational Army. It recognizes an international environment that is absent a fixed strategic condition and one that relies on learning and understanding the principles of war. It serves as a baseline for more definitive concepts and considers scenarios that represent the full spectrum of war.

### 1.3.3.2 DA PAM 100-1, Force XXI Institutional Army Redesign

This document provides a vision of and conceptual framework for the evolutionary design of the Institutional Army. DA PAM 100-1 defines the institution's core capabilities and related processes and discusses those in the context of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It postulates design principles and models for future major commands and institutional support, and promotes redesign and reengineering of the Army to leverage strategic factors and technologies in seeking common doctrine and structural reform. In addition, it provides rationale for eliminating uni-functional MACOMs and MACOM-like field operating agencies (FOAs) and staff support agencies (SSAs).

### 1.3.4 Analysis and Experimentation Planning Group (AEPG)

The AEPG was a group established to oversee the process of analysis and experimentation of key decisions made concerning Force XXI. It supported the creation of the baseline TDA by overseeing the development of new ideas, concepts and technology and validating those that were consistent with doctrine, organization and technical architecture. The AEPG consisted of a Senior Advisory Group (SAG) comprised of members representing the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research) (DUSA(OR)), Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Research and Development (SARD), DCSOPS, TRADOC, Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC), and others, as needed.

## 1.4 *The Institutional Force Axis*

### 1.4.1 The Fundamental Hypothesis

The fundamental "reengineering" hypothesis for review of the Institutional Axis was that if the Institutional Army's core competencies and related processes and the insights derived from Joint Venture were understood, then information age technology and management practices for reengineering the processes could be used to deduce an organization that produces a better product.

### 1.4.2 Objective

The objective of the Institutional Axis of the Force XXI Campaign Plan was to:

Redesign the Institutional Army by the year 2000 to efficiently and effectively perform Title 10 functions to support redesigned Army warfighting organizations in order to ensure a trained and ready Army, fully capable of doing its part in executing the National Military Strategy, in joint and combined operations, while maintaining timeless Army values and ethics.

### 1.4.3 Segments of the Institutional Axis

The Institutional Axis required three simultaneous efforts.

#### 1.4.3.1 Internal Reengineering of Major Commands

This effort was already in progress and required MACOM commanders to review their reengineering efforts with the VCSA beginning in January 1995 and annually thereafter to include their progress in implementing results and any changes or modifications resulting from the Force XXI Campaign recapitalization (See Phase I Final Report. HQDA and MACOM reduction plans were concluded during Phase I and not carried over for review during Phase II).



#### 1.4.3.2 Functional Area Assessments (FAAs)

The FAAs were to be conducted by functional proponents, essentially but not exclusively MACOM commanders, in coordination with department principals **as the primary means of developing and processing redesign issues for Title 10 functions.**

#### 1.4.3.3 Umbrella Redesign Efforts

This was a separate, independent redesign effort under the direction of the ASA(M&RA) and the DCSOPS **to integrate the results of FAAs and interface with the overall redesign and digitization of the warfighting Army.**

#### 1.4.4 Phases of Execution

The charter for the redesign effort called for a three-phase approach, each totaling from 18 to 24 months, and each coinciding with POM development timelines as seen in figure 1-7.




Figure 1-7. Institutional Army Redesign Axis

##### 1.4.4.1 Phase I

This phase commenced with the approval of the Institutional Army Redesign Charter. It established the baseline redesign for the Institutional Army by capturing MACOM reengineer efforts, conducting initial FAAs, redesigning HQDA/FOA/SSA and establishing an umbrella redesign process (POM 98-03).

##### 1.4.4.2 Phase II

Phase II began when Phase I was integrated into POM 98-03 in the spring of 1996. It provided integrated results and a revised organization stemming from the Phase I baseline. It continued the initial FAA redesign and conducted additional FAAs (POM 00-05). Based on the original Joint Venture Axis, it coincides with the fielding of Brigade XXI.

##### 1.4.4.3 Phase III

Phase III began with the submission of POM 00-05 with an objective to produce a final Force XXI institutional design for inclusion in POM 02-07 in the spring of 2000. It will include a dynamic

methodology that is programmatically capable of accommodating changing environments well into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This is to coincide with Joint Venture's fielding of Division XXI.

#### 1.4.5 Operating Organization

The operating organization structured to manage the Institutional Army reengineering effort is depicted in figure 1-8.

##### 1.4.5.1 The Senior Army Commander's Conference (ACC)

The ACC provided corporate guidance to the Force XXI Institutional Army effort and approved recommendations for submission to the SECARMY and CSA for approval.

##### 1.4.5.2 Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA)

The VCSA provided oversight of the entire Institutional Army redesign effort.




Figure 1-8. Operating Organization

##### 1.4.5.3 ASA(M&RA) and DCSOPS

The ASA(M&RA) and the DCSOPS coordinated the overall effort. The Director, Force Programs, Office of the DCSOPS, reviewed the progress of the campaign effort with the VCSA on a monthly basis as well as scheduled FAA presentations by sponsors and proponents.

##### 1.4.5.4 Board of Directors (BOD)

The BOD consisted of four-star general officers and equivalent Secretariat principals who were periodically briefed by each axis and reviewed recommended changes to Title 10 USC and Force XXI Campaign issues.

##### 1.4.5.5 General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC)

The GOSC was co-chaired by the Director, Force Programs and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Force Management, Manpower and Resources. They met bi-monthly and supervised the development and implementation of the Institutional Army Redesign Campaign Plan; tracked axis progress; monitored Force XXI issues, activities, efforts, experiments, studies and assessments for inclusion in FAAs; and prioritized recommendations to the ACC.

#### 1.4.5.6 Council of Colonels (COC)

The COC was co-chaired by the Chief, Force Integration and Management Division and Assistant Deputy for Force Management, Manpower and Resources. It was responsible for reviewing, developing and preparing alternatives for presentation to the GOSC.

#### 1.4.6 Sponsors and Proponents

The tasks and responsibilities required under the Institutional Axis were to be carried out by a team of proponents and sponsors. Proponents were predominately MACOM commanders with Army-wide responsibility for the function being reviewed. Sponsors were HQDA principals at both the ARSTAF and Secretariat levels who had policy oversight for a particular functional area. Proponents were responsible for integrating the results of the reengineering effort into Force XXI and in that capacity became an arm of the department. Sponsors were responsible for providing policy guidance and for supporting proponent efforts. A list of Title 10, USC explicit and implicit functions, and their sponsors and proponents is detailed in figure 1-9.

TITLE 10 FUNCTIONS	SPONSORS	PROONENTS
MOBILIZE/DEMOBILIZE	DCSOPS/ASA(MRA)	FORSCOM
DEPLOY/REDEPLOY	DCSOPS/ASA(ILE)	FORSCOM/MTMC
DOCTRINE & ORGANIZE	DCSOPS/ASA(MRA)	TRADOC
TRAIN & LEADER DEVELOPMENT	DCSOPS/ASA(MRA)	TRADOC
EQUIP/SCIENCE & TECH (R&D)	DCSOPS/ASA(RDA)/DUSA(OR)	AMC
SUPPLY	DCSLOG/ASA(ILE)	AMC
SERVICE	DCSLOG/ASA(ILE)/ASA(RDA)	AMC
MAINTAIN	DCSLOG/ASA(ILE)	AMC
RECRUIT	DCSPER/ASA(MRA)	DCSPER
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT	DCSPER/ASA(MRA)	DCSPER
CONSTRUCT	ACSIM/ASA(ILE)	USACE
FINANCE	ASA(FM)	TRADOC
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT	DCSOPS/DISC4	DISC4
INTELLIGENCE	DCSINT/OGC	INSCOM/USAIC&FH
SECURITY/LAW ENFORCEMENT	DCSOPS/ASA(MRA)	TRADOC
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION	DCSOPS/ASA(MRA)	CIDC
HEALTH	TSG/ASA(MRA)	MEDCOM
HQDA/FOA/SSA	ASA(MRA)	DAS/AA
UMBRELLA REDESIGN	DCSOPS/ASA(MRA)	DCSOPS
INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT	ACSIM/ASA(ILE)/ASA(MRA)	FORSCOM
JOINT/DEFENSE	DCSOPS/ASA(MRA)	DCSOPS

Figure 1-9. Functions and Sponsors/Proponents

## 2.1 Functional Area Assessments (FAAs)

### 2.1.1 Reengineering Briefings

Reengineering briefings were presented to the VCSA as a prelude to the FAA process. The reengineering briefings represented process improvements undertaken by commands and agencies during development of the 1996 budget, prior to initiation of the Force XXI Campaign. The intent of the reengineering briefings was to link past initiatives to future campaign efforts. Not all commanders provided reengineering briefings but the results from those that did served as baseline data for their respective FAAs.

### 2.1.2 FAAs

Six FAAs were to be conducted during Phase II as shown at figure 2-1.




Figure 2-1. Functional Area Assessments

All FAAs were to be crosswalked with the Army core processes (figure 2-2).

### 2.1.3 FAA Objectives

The objectives of each FAA were to:

- identify the basis for performing the function;
- describe the core processes currently employed in performing the function;
- describe the enabling processes that support the core processes;
- identify the skills required to perform the function;
- identify the costs/resources required to perform the function;
- develop standards to assess whether the function is being performed satisfactorily;
- develop a methodology for prioritizing requirements to be resourced;

- define the key drivers influencing performance of the function;
- identify the fundamental programming assumptions and required data and sources for the function;
- determine the most effective organization for performing the function; and
- develop and resolve issues, or propose issue resolution to the appropriate authority.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS

## Crosswalk (FAAs & Core Processes)

### FAA LEGEND

I = PHASE I

II = PHASE II/III

(Phase II & III TBD based on Phase I decisions)

1 - Plan, Provide Direction & Obtain and Allocate Resources

2 - Manage Information

3 - Develop Doctrine

4 - Develop Requirements

5 - Acquire & Sustain People

6 - Identify & Develop Leaders

7 - Tailor, Mobilize & Project Land Power

8 - Support Organizational Training

9 - Acquire, Maintain & Sustain Equipment

10 - Maintain & Sustain Land Operations

11 - Acquire & Sustain Facilities

12 - Manage Installations

FAA's	P R O C E S S E S											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Health					II							
Intelligence	II	II								II		
Finance	II											
Scty, Law Enf & CI					II							II
Installation Mgmt												II
Joint/Defense	II	II								II		
Power Projection							I (a)	II				
Train/Ldr Devel					I	I						
Doctrine/Org	I		I	I								
Info Mgmt		I										
Pers Mgmt/Recruit					I	I						
Construct											I	I
Equip				I					I			
Sup/Svc/Maint									I-II (b)	I		
HQDA/FOA/SSA	I											
Umbrella	I-II	I	I	I	I	I	I	II	I	I	I	I-II

NOTES: (a) - Tailor will not be covered by the Power Projection FAA. It will be addressed in the Umbrella FAA

(b) - Services will be addressed by the Equip/Sup/Svc/Maint FAA in Phase II

11/21/96

Figure 2-2. Crosswalk (FAAs and Core Processes)

### 2.1.4 FAA Principles

The principles identified at figure 2-3 were to be employed in reengineering the Institutional Army.

- **Values.** Enduring Army values and ethics as detailed in FM 100-1, The Army, will guide the redesign effort.
- **Imperatives.** The six Army imperatives continue to be the bedrock of the Institutional/TDA Army.
- **National Military Strategy.** Link the Institutional/TDA Army to the National Military Strategy and be consistent with the Army's role as a power projection Total Army that operates increasingly within a joint environment.
- **Conformity.** Redesign efforts ~~will conform to National Performance Review principles.~~ Strive to reduce the size of HQDA and ~~reduce the number of FOA and SSA.~~ ~~Reduce the number of MACOM HQ.~~
- **Competency.** The Army's ~~core competencies~~ will serve as the foundation of the Institutional Army.
- **Leverage.** Information age technology, management practices and processes, and emerging results from the redesign and digitization of the operational force will be leveraged to improve effectiveness and efficiencies.
- **Shared Vision.** Functional redesign will be within a ~~shared vision of the~~ Total Army leadership.
- **Resourcing.** Functions will be resourced in the most cost effective manner.
- **Manpower Requirements.** Organizations and associated manpower requirements will be established in accordance with these principles and information age management practices. We will capitalize on the strengths of each component -- active, reserve and civilian.
- **Experimentation.** As required, experimentation will be conducted in General Headquarters Exercises and other advanced warfighting experiments to test and refine proposed redesign efforts.

Figure 2-3. Principles

### 2.1.5 FAA Format

Each FAA was to be presented utilizing a specified format discussed below.

#### 2.1.5.1 Organization

Organization refers to HQDA, intermediate and installation level command. The FAA requirement was to define three alternative organizations for each level with the advantages and disadvantages of each.

- One alternative must reflect an organization significantly smaller than the current, authorized total Army organization of the function.
- One alternative must represent a total revision of the current management structure (i.e. MACOM) for the function Army-wide.
- One alternative would be “dealers choice” and would reflect what proponents of the function would do if they were starting from scratch.

#### 2.1.5.2 Basis

The aim was to identify policy, law (in addition to Title 10, USC), directive, custom, or other basis that defines the requirements/work of the function.

#### 2.1.5.3 Skills

Skills encompassed education, schools, programs and any other structure necessary to provide and sustain the proficiency necessary to perform the function.

#### 2.1.5.4 Management

This criterion addressed the required structure to manage the function (related to each alternative noted in the “organization” paragraph above).

#### 2.1.5.5 Resources

Resources consisted of manpower (AC/RC/civilian/contract), dollars or other resources that may be used to perform the function, and where one type of resource is required or preferred over another. As issues were developed in the FAAs, resources and manpower were defined and displayed at Program Budget Decision (PBD) level of detail, and, where possible, with appropriate Management Decision Packages (MDEPs) identified.

#### 2.1.5.6 Publications

Publications referred to documentation produced by or required to perform the function.

#### 2.1.5.7 Standards

Standards were the performance measures used to assess functional effectiveness.

#### 2.1.5.8 Priorities

This criterion established the method for prioritizing requirements to be resourced.

#### 2.1.5.9 Issues

Issues equated to recommended alternatives, with advantages and disadvantages, and recommendations for resolution of each unresolved FAA issue.

#### 2.1.5.10 Assumptions

This criterion was defined as assumptions made during the conduct of the FAA that were necessary to be able to perform the function (e.g., the size of the force stationed overseas).

### 2.1.5.11 Data

Finally, the format called for consideration of data and sources required to manage the function.

### 2.1.6 Umbrella Group

As a complementary effort to the six FAAs, an ODCSOPS TDA Axis Umbrella Group was designated to assist the VCSA in his duties as the Chair of the Institutional Axis. The group consisted of a small core of HQDA representatives supported by members of industry and ad hoc members on an as-needed basis. The Umbrella Group was tasked with assessing Army core processes and providing an alternative view and parallel assessment of each proponent FAA area to the VCSA prior to each proponent FAA briefing. The umbrella assessment was to explore unconventional approaches for redesign based on "out of the box" thinking. The Umbrella Group had all of the same general operational objectives as other FAA proponents except it was also required to:

- synthesize the results of all FAAs;
- provide resourcing recommendations concerning issues to be addressed at the PBD level of detail;
- coordinate FAA briefings;
- synchronize efforts with Joint Venture; and
- facilitate the sharing of ideas from related efforts such as the CORM Report.

## 2.2 **Conclusions**

### 2.2.1 FAA Briefing Schedule

During Phase II the six FAAs were conducted, beginning in June 1996, with the Installation Management FAA, and concluding in July 1997 with the Support to Organizational Training FAA. Chapters 3 through 8 contain a detailed review of each of the six FAAs.

### 2.2.2 Decisions

In October 1997, the DCSOPS was presented a briefing of significant findings from the Phase II FAAs and residual Phase I issues. He concluded that the results, and associated decisions and guidance provided by the VCSA in the conduct of the individual FAAs was sufficient and no final decision briefing was required.

### 2.2.3 Recapitalization

It was anticipated that Phase II initiatives would save a minimum \$539 million from FAA efforts, at a cost of \$35 million. Other savings not tallied include informal estimates. For example, the establishment of a Joint Medical Command, based on informal estimates, could produce a net savings of one third of each service's health care structure if merged. A total of 3,936 military and 1,085 civilian spaces would be saved.

### 2.2.4 Follow-on Requirements

Sponsors responsible to lead follow-up actions were required to maintain and report the status of all assigned tasks to the Umbrella Group on a bi-monthly basis and in the Army Executive Summary (EXSUM) format. These tasks were also to be reported out in the bi-monthly Institutional Axis GOSCs. Additionally, during the period December 1996 and July 1997, this MACOMs, ARSTAF and Secretariat were to prepare a report of progress, work yet to be done, and completion of issues addressed and recommended during Phase I FAAs. However, as Phase II began, follow-up reporting was suspended and the conduct of GOSCs discontinued; follow-up actions were managed on an exception basis; Phase II proponents were empowered to conduct required FAAs without the oversight of a HQDA chaired GOSC.

#### 3.1 Background

The purpose of the Installation Management FAA was to present the reengineering concepts and recommendations for redesigning the Force XXI core process **operate installations**. As the Army proponent for that core process, FORSCOM presented a briefing of the Installation Management FAA to the VCSA and ASA(M&RA) on June 11, 1996. A copy of that briefing is at Appendix A.

In addition, the Umbrella Group, under the sponsorship of the DCSOPS, conducted a parallel assessment of the operate installations process and presented the results of that assessment to the VCSA and ASA(M&RA) on June 7, 1996. Their findings are discussed later in this chapter (section 3.5). The briefing can be found at Appendix B.

#### 3.2 Objective

The FAA had the following objectives:

- Identify the most effective BASOPS command and control organization that would enable the Army to optimize the management and execution of BASOPS services; and
- Determine the optimum method for delivering BASOPS services for the Total Army (active, and reserve component) to achieve substantial improvements in critical performance measures such as cost, quality, service, and speed.

#### 3.3 Methodology

The FAA was developed through the efforts of a core study group, with input from MACOM process action teams (PAT), and other FAA and studies (See Figure 3-1). The PATs were chartered to address specific, narrow-focus issues identified by the proponent during other FAAs. Areas addressed included quality of life (QOL), off-post support and services prioritization.




Figure 3-1. Analysis Structure

The review process for accomplishing the objectives was to:

- analyze all BASOPS services;



- examine options which would save resources and provide an acceptable level of service;
- identify the level best suited for optimum execution of installation management/BASOPS services;
- consider all components and types of installations; and
- focus on Continental United States (CONUS)—consider outside of the Continental United States (OCONUS) implications.

### 3.4 Installation Management Assessment

The broad magnitude of the BASOPS function was stressed during initial portions of the FAA (Figure 3-2). It was noted that BASOPS involves over 80,000 personnel (military and civilian) and represents nearly 16 percent, or about \$10 billion, of the Army's Total Obligation Authority (TOA). The analysis did not include non-appropriated funds (NAF) nor the Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA). Following the introduction, the briefing covered five major sections: command and control; service delivery methods; "toolbox" capabilities; inhibitors to change; and recommendations.




Figure 3-2. Magnitude of BASOPS Issue

#### 3.4.1 Command and Control

During the command and control section of the FAA, FORSCOM presented four options:

- retain the structure "as is";
- remove MACOMs from BASOPS;
- reduce HQDA BASOPS role; and
- establish a BASOPS command.

##### 3.4.1.1 Retain the Structure "As Is"

This option proposed a traditional command and control structure. Army-wide policy and resource distribution would be set by HQDA, while priority, guidance, oversight and implementation would be set by the MACOM and executed by the installation.

- HQDA remains involved in some operations (e.g., Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR), environmental, etc.);

- the garrison commander works for the installation commander and garrison and installation property is owned by the MACOM;
- the installation commander receives all resources; and
- both BASOPS and operational money flow from HQDA through the MACOMs to the installation.

This option should result in as much as a 10% C2 reduction in the full-time equivalent (FTE) manning, while the majority of the savings are realized from changing service delivery methods. Figure 3-3 displays the advantages and disadvantages of this option.




Figure 3-3. Advantages/Disadvantages of "AS IS" Option

#### 3.4.1.2 Remove MACOM from BASOPS

This alternative calls for divestiture of BASOPS control and management by the MACOM.

- HQDA is responsible for policy, resources distribution (BASOPS money only, not mission money), priority, guidance, oversight and implementation.
- The installation is responsible for execution.
- The garrison commander is responsible directly to the Office Assistant Chief of Staff, Installation Management (OACSIM) or regional headquarters.
- All units on the installation would be tenants.
- All garrison and installation property is owned by ACSIM and that office would determine an equitable distribution for all installations based on established priorities.

Figure 3-4 indicates resource distribution under this option. Figure 3-5 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of this option.




Figure 3-4. Remove MACOM from BASOPS Resource Distribution




Figure 3-5. Advantages/Disadvantages of Remove MACOM from BASOPS

### 3.4.1.3 Reduce HQDA BASOPS Role

This option is a traditional command and control structure.

- Army-wide policy and resource distribution is set by HQDA.
- Priority, guidance, oversight and implementation is set by the MACOM and executed by the installation. This alternative:
- Removes HQDA from operational aspects of BASOPS (i.e., MWR, environmental, etc.).
- The garrison commander works for the installation commander and all garrison and installation property is owned by the MACOM.
- Both OPTEMPO and BASOPS resources flow through the MACOMs to the installation.
- Figure 3-6 displays the resource distribution and Figure 3-7 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of this option.




Figure 3-6. Reduce HQDA BASOPS Role Resource Distribution




Figure 3-7. Advantages/Disadvantages of Reduce HQDA BASOPS Role

### 3.4.1.4 BASOPS Command

This option creates a separate MACOM solely responsible for BASOPS, which includes community and family support center (CFSC) and other FOAs.

- Army-wide policy and resource distribution are the functions that remain with HQDA.
- Only BASOPS money flows through the BASOPS command.
- OPTEMPO would continue to flow through the MACOMs.

The resource distribution of the BASOPS command is summarized in Figure 3-8 and the advantages and disadvantages of this option are shown in Figure 3-9.




Figure 3-8. BASOPS Command Resource Distribution




Figure 3-9. Advantages/Disadvantages of BASOPS Command

A comparative assessment of the four options is depicted at Figure 3-10.

ADVANTAGE/DISADVANTAGE COMPARISON				
ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES	AS IS	REMOVE MACOM	REDUCE HQDA ROLE	BASOPS COMMAND
CHAIN OF COMMAND				
AUTHORITY & RESPONSIBILITY	+	-	+	-
COMMANDER CAN BALANCE \$\$	+	-	+	-
SPAN OF CONTROL	+	-	+	-
ACHIEVE SAVINGS	-	+	+	+
POLICY STANDARDIZATION	-	+	-	+
MISSION/BASOPS LINK	+	-	+	-
FACILITATES "BEST BUSINESS" PRACTICE	-	+	-	+
NET SCORE	+ 1	- 1	+ 3	- 1

+ ADVANTAGE  
 - DISADVANTAGE

FORSCOM

Figure 3-10. Advantage/Disadvantage Comparison

### 3.4.1.5 Conclusions

The FAA recommended reducing HQDA's BASOPS role because this option:

- achieves dollar and manpower savings;
- maintains link between commanders' responsibility and authority;
- supports DA PAM 100-1 vision of HQDA role; and
- could be implemented relatively quickly.

FORSCOM recommended including the results of this FAA in the HQDA redesign FAA in order to transfer operational missions from HQDA to MACOM headquarters.

### 3.4.2 Service Delivery Methods

After defining the eight BASOPS service delivery methods (See Figure 3-11), the FAA identified key considerations of service delivery.

- Estimated potential savings/FTEs should not be removed from the POM until detailed functional analyses have been conducted.
- Recommended service delivery methods were chosen because they can be accomplished under current law, offer potential savings and/or are the smartest way to do business.
- The recommended delivery method for a service is a "center of gravity Army-wide" recommendation. Best methods of delivery may vary based on the situation at specific installations.
- Delivery methods at the sub-activity level may vary from the delivery method suggested for the service as a whole.
- Service cost is not well supported by the Army accounting and budgeting system.
- Legislation may be required for some service delivery changes.
- Fifty-four percent of BASOPS services are already contracted out.
- NAF employees do not save FTEs, but will save dollars.
- Resources are not adjusted to account for saving in other FAAs.
- Numbers are not validated by all MACOMs.
- Service delivery does not include borrowed military manpower (BMM) and special duty (SD) manpower.




Figure 3-11. Average Savings by Service Delivery Method

### 3.4.2.1 Methodology

FORSCOM then used the following methodology to determine which delivery method was best for each service.

- Identified 122 services by Army Management Structure Code (AMSCO);
- Identified dollars and FTEs by service;
- Determined alternative methods of delivery were based on computed savings, proponent input research-demonstrated savings, and conservative audited results;
- Dollar savings were computed as total dollars expended by service, minus existing contracted cost, times Army Audit Agency (AAA) validated savings percent, which equals potential dollar savings.
- FTE savings were computed using total FTEs expended by service, minus ten percent for overhead, times AAA average savings, by method, which equals potential FTE (civilian/military) savings.

Figure 3-12 lists all 122 services arrayed against the eight delivery methods.

SERVICE DELIVERY METHOD			SERVICE DELIVERY METHOD (CONT)		
CE RESERVE COMPONENT SUPPORT	CO ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION	CO SNOW AND SAND REMOVAL	NC NAF PERSONNEL SUPPORT	PA FAMILY ADVOCACY	PR BLDG MAINT - NONMEDICAL
CE INTERNAL REVIEWS	CO RETAIL SUPPLY-CE	CO IMPROVED GROUNDS MAINT	NC INSTALLATION OPERATOR MGMT	PA YOUTH LEISURE/RECREATION	PR BLDG MAINT - INDUSTRIAL/PROP
CE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS	CO PUBLICATIONS SERVICES	CO FLIGHT SIMULATOR	NC HOME-BASED CHILD CARE	PA YOUTH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS	PR ARI BASE OPERATIONS
CO DATA PROCESSING SERVICES	CO RECORDS MANAGEMENT	CO CONTRACTING	NC CONTINUING EDUC SVCS	PA INFORMATION, REFERRAL, & FOLLOW	PR BLDG MAINT/DANCE - RETIRE
CO FOOD SERVICES	CO ASSET MANAGEMENT	CO MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING	NC INSTALLATION SAFETY OFFICE	PA FAMILY MEMBER EMPLOYMENT POM	PR BLDG MAINT - STORAGE/WARE
CO MATERIALS SUPPORT MAINT	CO COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT	CO ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE	NC LEGAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES	PA SCHOOL ACCLATH KEY PROGRAMS	PR RELOCATION SERVICES
CO RETAIL SUPPLY	CO OUTDOOR PEST CONTROL	CO INMPO SERVICES	NC CONNECTIONAL CUSTODY SVC	PA COMMUNITY OUTREACH	PR C-E EQUIPMENT SUPPORT SERVICE
CO TRANSPORTATION SERVICES	CO INFUSE REMOVAL	CO TRAINING SUPPORT	NC ARMY EMERGENCY RELIEF	PR INPR PROGRAM SERVICES	PR FACILITIES ENG SERVICES MGMT
CO CUSTOMAL SERVICES	CO LAUNDRY AND DRY-CLEANING SVC	CO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY OFFICE SVC	NC COMMAND INFORMATION	PR BLDG MAINT - ADMIN & TRNG	PR MINOR CONSTRUCTION
CO DISTRICT COOLING	CO CHILD DEVELOPMENT SVCS MGMT	CO COMMAND INSPECTIONS	NC COMMUNITY RELATIONS	PR BLDG MAINTENANCE-FAMILY HOUSING	PR FACILITIES ENG SERVICES MGMT
CO DISTRICT HEATING	CO ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION PREVENT	CO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY	NC RELIGIOUS SERVICES	PR BLDG FACILITY MAINT - OTHER	PR RECRUITMENT/PLACEMENT
CO ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES MGMT	CO RETAIL PROPERTY DEMOLITION	CO TRAINING OPERATION SUPPORT	NC PASTORAL CARE	PR BLDG MAINTENANCE UPH	PR BUDGETING/PROGRAMMING
CO FIRE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE SVC	CO INDOOR PEST CONTROL	CO PURCHASING	NC MEDIA RELATIONS/PUBLIC INFO	PR ELECTRICITY	PR TASC
CO MASTER PLANNING	CO CANERER TRANSITION SERVICE	CO CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION	NC NC TRAINING SUPPORT	PR FAMILY HOUSING MANAGEMENT	PR ADDITIONAL MEDIA SERVICES
CO MISCELLANEOUS ENGINEER SVC	CO EQUIPMENT IN PLACE SERVICES	CO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SERVICES	PA ENVIRONMENT - RECYCLING	PR OTHER UTILITY SERVICES	PR PORTION MANAGEMENT
CO SPACE MAINT	CO EDUC FOR FOR CHILD CARE PROVIDR	CO AMMUNITION SUPPLY	PA SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAM	PR NATURAL GAS	PR MANAGEMENT/EMPL RELATIONS
CO LAW ENFORCEMENT SVC	CO PHYSICAL SECURITY	CO SECURITY PROGRAM SUPPORT	PA YOUTH SPORTS AND FITNESS	PR WATER	PR REAL ESTATE & COMM ADMIN
CO CLUSTER-BASED CHILD CARE SVC	CO COMPLAINT/ASSISTANCE SVC	CO CRIMINAL LAW SERVICE	PA EXCEPTIONAL FAMILY MEMBER POM	PR SURFACE AREA MAINT	PR FACILITIES ENGR SVC MGMT
CO SPN MANAGEMENT	CO RAILROAD MAINTENANCE	CO COMMAND INVESTIGATIONS	PA YOUTH DEVELOPMENT SVCS MGMT		PR MINOR SVC EXEC MGMT
CO EQUIPMENT MGMT			PA FINANCIAL PLANNING		
SERVICE AREA PA=PARTNER PR=PRIVATE CO=CONTRACT OUT CE=CENTRALIZE NC=NO CHANGE GIN=GOVERNMENT IN NATURE RE=REGIONALIZE			SERVICE AREA PA=PARTNER PR=PRIVATE CO=CONTRACT OUT CE=CENTRALIZE NC=NO CHANGE GIN=GOVERNMENT IN NATURE RE=REGIONALIZE		
FORSCOM			FORSCOM		

Figure 3-12. Service Delivery Methods

### 3.4.2.2 Conclusions

FORSCOM recommended that the best approach to service delivery is to direct HQDA proponents to issue policy guidance to implement BASOPS FAA service delivery method recommendations, where applicable, because the changes in delivery methods offer significant potential cost and FTE BASOPS savings.

Other QOL issues were recommended as points of departure for future HQDA studies. These issues included identifying potential savings in NAF, identifying and prioritizing QOL services by installation, and identifying and prioritizing what BASOPS services should be provided at each of the seven types of Army installations. It was recommended that QOL standards be developed and that they be prioritized as high, mid, and low priority, and that commanders determine what additional services can be offered based on available resources.

### 3.4.3 Tool Box

The toolbox section of the briefing discussed systems and process tools that were currently available and those that were needed to improve BASOPS efficiency. Available tools included the Standard Army

Retail Supply System-Objective (SARSS-O); the prime vendor concept; an assessment program; and contract regionalization. Needed tools included:

- Activity based costing (ABC);
- Commercial activities strategy;
- Commercial activities (CA);
  - Training;
  - Software,;
  - Revised Army commercial activities management information system (ACAMIS) and CA inventory systems;
  - Revised Army CA directives;
  - Most effective organization (MEO) design strategies;
  - Incentives for installation commanders;
  - Resource rules;
  - Change in the micro-purchase threshold from \$2.5K to 5K;
  - Service standards; and
  - Multi-service BASOPS where feasible.

#### 3.4.4 Inhibitors

Several barriers to efficiency were identified:

- multi-service operations barriers;
- McKinney Act Requirements;
- cost of restrictions on use of operations and maintenance, Army (OMA) to procure goods costing over \$100K per item;
- Randolph-Sheppard Act;
- constraints on voluntary services;
- restrictions on use of inmate labor;
- restrictions against purchases from state and local agencies;
- A-76 commercial activities rules;
- OPM personnel policy restrictions;
- single year appropriations; and
- wage rate restrictions (i.e., Davis Bacon).

##### 3.4.4.1 Enabling Legislation

Table 3-1 summarizes the enabling legislation that would lessen the effects of the inhibitors. The FAA stressed that the recommendations do not eliminate the inhibitors to the best business practices, but just lessen their effects.

##### 3.4.4.2 Conclusions

The FAA suggested that a means to get around these inhibitors might lie in the creation of a not for profit (NFP) BASOPS corporation (BOC) which would not be bound by laws and rules which preclude using the best business practices. Creating such a corporation would require significant enabling legislation but would be considered a long-term solution. The NFP BOC would be a government-chartered, private corporation, which provides BASOPS services. Army membership on the Board of Directors (BOD) would provide for Army oversight. The garrison commander would work for the installation commander and the Army would own the installations. Both BASOPS and mission dollars would flow to the installation, and the installation would purchase BASOPS services from the BOC.

FORSCOM made the following assumptions concerning the BOC structure:

- enabling legislation can be enacted similar to Army Housing Corp (AHC); and

- BOD membership would be similar to AHC.

The FAA assumed a BOC would work because the BOC would be:

- established as a non-profit, private sector entity;
- governed by a BOD;
- based on traditional corporate structure (i.e., CEO, CFO, COO, etc.);
- headquartered in a central location with regional offices and branch offices on every installation;
- rated as determined by BOD;
- a “sole source” status for providing BASOPS services;
- funded by dollars that flow from HQDA through MACOMs to garrison commanders;
- able to sell services to the garrison commander and therefore the commander retains all command prerogatives (i.e., authority and responsibility);
- staffed by current civil service employees detailed to BOC at inception; later become non-government employees or leave BOC and remain civil service; and
- initialized by capital provided by congressional appropriations; BOC then sustains itself in a business environment (BOC can incur debt and buy and sell assets).

Repeal/Amend Legislation	Advantages	Cost Savings	Difficulty
Create “joint service” authority	Permit functions to be collocated; recovery of service O&M funds to other services		Low
Modify McKinney Act to exclude excess DoD property from consideration for possible use for housing for homeless	Eliminate reporting requirements for excess property; faster transfer of DoD property	Save administrative and work costs	Moderate
Raise OPA/OMA criteria to \$1M	Commander will have greater flexibility in purchasing		Moderate
Modify Randolph-Sheppard Act mandatory source rules to exclude dining facilities	Allow Commander to fully compete dining facility attendant costs	Avoid locking installations into sole-source contract with blind vendor	Moderate
Relax restrictions on acceptance of voluntary services	Allow Commander to accept nearly any voluntary service		High
Expand authority for use of federal and state inmate labor	Greater source of labor for installation	Permit work not being done to be accomplished	High
Repeal DoD unique contract out restrictions	Allows Commander more flexibility in reorganizing his work force	20-30% of in-house operation cost	High
Expand scope of Economy Act to allow direct purchase by MIPR of goods and services from state and local govts as well as from other agencies	Greater flexibility to Commander in partnering with local government		Very High
Civil service reforms to allow flexible management of the workforce	Remove “bump-run” rights; permit noncompetitive fill; permit civilian employees separated due to outsourcing to transfer “vested” interests in federal retirement plan to private plan		Very High
Make OMA 2 year funds to avoid problems of Bona Fide needs rule	Allows Commander greater budget control over his funds	No year end waste and no loss of funds	Extreme
Repeal mandatory use of Department of Labor (DOL) wage rates in Davis-Bacon and service contract acts	Allows Commander to pay locally prevailing wage rates on construction-service contracts	18-30% over current contract costs	Extreme

**Table 3-1. Enabling Legislation**

Figure 3-13 displays the inhibitors that would not apply to the not for profit BASOPS corporation.






Figure 3-13. Inhibitors that would not Apply to the NFP BOC

### 3.4.5 Recommendations

FORSCOM concluded its briefing with the following recommendations (Table 3-2).

Issue	Action
<b>BASOPS Command and Control</b>	
Reduce HQDA BASOPS Role	DAS
<b>BASOPS Service Delivery Methods</b>	
Direct HQDA proponents to issue policy guidance to implement BASOPS FAA service delivery method recommendations where applicable	DAS
<b>Other Recommendations</b>	
Test DPW/USACE partnering for application only at AMC industrial sites	AMC, USACE, ACSIM
Contract Director of Logistics (DOL) operations	DCSLOG
Develop baseline Army-wide BASOPS service standards	ACSIM
Develop Army-wide prioritization of QOL services	ACSIM
Implement ABC Army-wide	ASA(FM), ACSIM
Establish service secretary level mandate for developing multi-service partnerships	OSA
Design a "customer friendly" off post support (AR 5-9) system based on known costs and phased implementation	ACSIM
Implement assessment program for benchmarking and continuous improvement	DAS, ACSIM
Proactively seek legislative changes that eliminate inhibitors to best business practices	ASA(M&RA), ASA(IL&E), ASA(FM&C), OCLL
If Army cannot obtain relief from inhibitors, consider studying not for profit BASOPS corporation	ACSIM

Table 3-2. Recommendations

### **3.5            *Installation Management Umbrella FAA***

The Umbrella Group conducted a parallel assessment of the **operate installations** process. The assessment used business process reengineering (BPR) principles including single process ownership, treating process activities like a business and integration of like core processes into the total system to eliminate duplication. The Umbrella Group also developed the following definition for the operate installations process:

**The process of planning, organizing, coordinating, staffing, directing and controlling resources to accomplish the installation's mission in support of maintaining the readiness of the force, deploying and sustaining the force, protecting the environment and enhancing the quality of life for soldiers, families and the Army civilian workforce.**

#### **3.5.1    Briefing Points**

The Umbrella Group assumed that:

- defense resources will not keep pace with service requirements;
- Army operational forces will operate in an environment as described in TRADOC PAM 525-5;
- Army institutional forces will operate in an environment as described in DA PAM 100-1;
- mission related programming will continue to be done by MACOMs;
- DoD will continue to move toward privatization;
- Army will have forces forward deployed in accordance with a power projection strategy; and
- there are 122 services involved in installations.

The group emphasized that the following critical points should be taken away from the briefing:

- there are no established requirements or performance standards for services;
- there is no viable resource capability;
- there is questionable "joint" service consistency; and
- billpayers (e.g. OPTEMPO) are counterproductive.

It was stressed that the operate installations process represents a significant resource investment consisting of approximately 2,000 installations, 1.2 billion square feet in Army inventory, 12.1 million acres of land, 32,000 civilian and 12,000 military personnel and \$6 billion dollars. Therefore, the redesigned process should provide a mechanism to support the future requirements appropriately.

##### **3.5.1.1 Issues**

The Umbrella Group discovered the following problems with the current process.

- From the customer's view point:
  - no clear direction;
  - expectations exceed resources;
  - requirements exceed resources—installations are bankrupt; and
  - ineffective, fragmented information systems.
- From the process owner's view point:
  - multiple "process owners" and "hands-offs;"
  - no performance measures;
  - resource delivery not tied to requirements; and
  - process is manpower and time intensive.

### 3.5.1.2 Direction

The Umbrella Group noted that direction affecting installation management emanates from a number of sources and offices as reflected in Figure 3-14.




Figure 3-14. No Clear Direction

While the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics & Environment (OASA(ILE)) and OASAIM are the operate installations process owners, and are proponents for a number of functions and related services performed on installations, e.g., housing, environment, and exercise their proponentcy through MACOM headquarters, there are a host of other functions and services with other proponents having independent linkages either through the MACOM headquarters or directly with the installations. OACSIM and FORSCOM acknowledged to the Umbrella Group that there is little structure invested at MACOM headquarters to manage these functions, hence it was concluded that policies affecting these functions are communicated, for the most part, directly between HQDA and the installations, or through MACOM headquarters, but without integration. Indeed, information gathered directly from some installations by the Umbrella Group cited clear examples of direct, systemic interaction with HQDA including an Inspector General information management system, interaction between the Offices of the Judge Advocate Generic and Chief of Chaplains, including direct personnel management, standard contracting management information systems with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Development, and others.

### 3.5.1.3 Direction Alternative

An alternative to the current process, where direction- policies, priorities, resources, standards - is communicated to installations through a variety of mechanisms, was offered. This alternative is reflected in Figure 3-15.




Figure 3-15. Direction Alternative

Under this alternative the process owners, OASA(ILE) and OACSIM, become the sole source of corporate direction to the installations. All proponents for functions and related services performed at installations refer policies, requirements, standards, resources to the installation departmental process owners, who serve as the integrators and ultimate adjudicators for services which installations provide their tenants. MACOM commanders, in this paradigm, exercise the command function of defining to the departmental process owners that which they expect of installations in support of their missions, largely in terms of installation tenant support. Departmental policies, service standards, and resourcing levels are coordinated with the MACOM commanders but communicated directly to installations for execution. MACOMs continue to command the installations and exercise essential linkages between installations and HQDA, apprising the latter when their policies, standards, resourcing et al are for tenant mission performance. But, the MACOMs do not “manage” the installations. The relationship might be analogous to readiness, where standards are established by HQDA for all operational units; intermediate MACOM headquarters assist in helping units achieve those standards but are not involved with establishing MACOM-unique readiness standards. Resources, rather than being distributed to MACOMs for subsequent redistribution to installations based on variable MACOM priorities and standards, would be distributed directly to installations consistent with HQDA priorities and standards. MACOM commanders would retain the prerogative for redistribution during the year of execution to accommodate unforeseen exigencies like natural disasters in a given locale.

This approach is not totally consistent with the operating force analogy. The current flow of OPTEMPO is largely referred to the headquarters of MACOMs having operating forces, i.e., FORSCOM, USAREUR, EUSA, USARPAC, USARSO. And, it is the Umbrella Group’s understanding that, because of the lack of consistent direction from HQDA regarding installation management, and concomitant resourcing, OPTEMPO funds are available to off set inadequately resourced installation management functions. Moreover, by extrapolation, it may then be assumed that other MACOMs like TRADOC and AMC must make some similar accommodation for under resourced installation functions in the absence of OPTEMPO. This process puts MACOM commanders in the position of perhaps using mission funds, in the case of TRADOC, or charging higher maintenance overhead costs, in the case of AMC, in order to make up for vagaries in installation funding. The proposed alternative relieves MACOMs of this conflict between mission and support, and charges functional proponents with their stewardship responsibilities.

### 3.5.2 Conclusions

The Umbrella Group took the approach, that in order to make this process work, the process owner would have to:

- align all 122 services with the 12 Army core processes;
- rank order the services from government in nature (GIN) to divest;
- define resources (dollars and manpower) to services; and
- determine what percentage of the resource is at the installation level.

This solves the problem by giving the process owner visibility and stewardship. Rank ordering the services allows the process owner to:

- divest the service and save all;
- outsource the service if it is cost effective; or
- recapitalize:
  - within the installation;
  - within installation management; or
  - within the Army at large.

#### 3.5.2.1 Decisions Required

The Umbrella Group determined that decisions were required to:

- create a single operate installations process owner;
- ensure installation commander has authority to balance resources;
- maximize outsourcing of maintenance and sustainment functions, when appropriate;
- ensure installation commander has direct coordination with process owner;
- channel policies, priorities, resources, standards—direction—through process owner to process executors (acquire assets, provide capabilities); and
- create a single funding manager and program integrator.

### 3.6 Summary

The Installation Management FAA described the enormous difficulty in delivering services to the installation level due to a lack of clear direction from a single source and the absence of standards and priorities, particularly in the area of QOL. Suggested alternatives considered the changing of relationships between HQDA, MACOMs, and installations commanders (to include resource flow), with the FAA Proponent providing an alternative notion of a NFP BOC which would sell services to the Army.

### 3.7 FAA Issue Sheets

#### 3.7.1 Residual Issues

The following are issues that were not decided upon at the conclusion of Phase I. These issues were developed from the Construct FAAs briefed by USACE and the Umbrella Group and then referred to the ASA(M&RA) and VCSA for decision in the February 23, 1996 decision briefing. (See Phase I Report)

##### 3.7.1.1 MILCON Streamlining

To accelerate the MILCON process, it is necessary to streamline current programming and execution cycles. The normal MILCON process can take up to 5 years before construction is initiated. A reduced process time (from requirement identification to award of construction) from 5 to 2.5 years would significantly increase responsiveness to mission generated construction changes, and reduce inflationary project cost increases incurred because of the excessive time associated with the current process.

### 3.7.1.2 Environmental Management/Technical Support

Environmental management often lags behind in the life cycle of a construct project because environmental expertise is fragmented across organizational lines and districts, and frequently competes for resourcing. The result is that environmental compliance is often addressed too late in the Real Property development process at additional costs to the process. Simplified access to environmental technical support will result in savings from economies of scale.

### 3.7.1.3 Outsourcing Real Property Functions and Facilities

Facilities and construct functions have direct bearing on readiness, quality of life and retention of soldiers. This issue addresses how to determine the best alternative means, through outsourcing, to achieve standards for satisfying facilities, e.g., family housing. This strategy should significantly reduce government ownership and save costs of maintenance, repair, renovations and construction of new facilities.

### 3.7.1.4 Single Real Property Disposal Agent

The Army is projected to carry approximately 170M square feet of excess facilities (minus surge requirements) into the next century. This represents a considerable cost in terms of minimal maintenance (safety), and lost opportunity in revenue that might be generated by disposing of this excess. The real property management process would be more efficiently managed if a single process owner were designated with the responsibility of expeditious disposition of excess real property.

### 3.7.1.5 Installation Construction Authority

A significant level of the construction activity at the installation level is under \$1M per project. Increasing the O&MA and RDTE appropriation for construction/modification projects to \$1M (from the current \$300K per project) and Unspecified Minor MCA (UMMCA) from \$1M to \$3M (from the current \$1M per project), would empower installations with sufficient authority to exercise almost autonomous control over the localized "Acquire and Sustain Facilities" process on a given installation— a single process owner.

## 3.7.2 Phase II Issues

Following the proponent and Umbrella FAA assessments, the Umbrella Group gathered the FAA results into issues. The issues reflected those alternatives that should be carried forward for senior leadership consideration. Subsequent paragraphs provide a synopsis of each of the issues developed from the FAAs briefed by FORSCOM and the Umbrella Group. A full explanation, to include PBD and implementation guidance, is provided at Appendix C.

### 3.7.2.1 Establish Installation Service Standards

The primary role of Army installations is to provide a place for Army organizations to live, work and play. In the performance of this function installations provide up to 98 different services such as career transition services, family housing management and pastoral care. (This represents a refinement of the 122 services identified in the original FAA and listed in Figure 3-11.) Each service has a proponent office within HQDA. Currently, there is no acknowledged, approved standard for level of service for installation services.

### 3.7.2.2 Prioritize Quality of Life Services

Quality of life services are an essential dimension of the Army family and are as diverse as sports—physical fitness centers, housing—Bachelor Officer Quarters and Bachelor Enlisted Quarters (BOQ/BEQ), family housing furnishings or auto crafts. There currently exists no baseline set of requirements or standards for these services nor criteria establishing whether they be provided on installations, can be

obtained off-post or are categorically "nice to have," resources permitting. The Army should acknowledge the contribution QOL services make to Army families and, vicariously, unit readiness and establish standards, a prioritization methodology and service delivery means.

#### 3.7.2.3 "Service Delivery" Methodology

Installation services may be delivered through a variety of methods ranging from centralization and/or regionalization supporting multiple installations to contracting or privatizing. Absent a standard methodology for determining a consistent means of service delivery, inefficiencies and possibly inconsistent service quality may result. A standard methodology for establishing the preferred means of service delivery will permit more consistent quality and efficiency. The methodology should be robust enough to permit local variance where a more cost-effective alternative producing the same service quality is available.

#### 3.7.2.4 Service-Based Costing

The actual costs of providing services on installations vary by installation and, absent a consistent standard, by level of service provided. HQDA proponents attempt to program and allocate resources for providing services based on MACOM established requirements that are often distorted by the vagaries of service cost estimates. A standard methodology for determining costs of installation services will assist in establishing a consistent level of service provided.

#### 3.7.2.5 "Model Cities" Book

Army installation commanders are essentially the senior tenants on post, e.g., division commander, corps commander or school/center commandant. While their primary responsibilities are clear they are, nonetheless, required to preside over, in effect, a small town with the attendant responsibilities of a town mayor. To assist them the Army has recently established a program for command-selecting officers to serve as garrison commanders who attend a unique installation management course prior to assuming their duties. In addition, the tenets of installation management should be published as installation management "doctrine," available to all members of the installation management community which would also serve as a reference resource for other Army professional education systems, e.g., Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), Army Management Staff College (AMSC), Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Senior Service College. FM 100-22, Installation Management, 11 October 1994 is the most current publication from TRADOC on this subject.

#### 3.5.2.6 Installation Funding

Currently installation services are resourced by HQDA through the major command headquarters. Amount of resources provided is based in large part on MACOMs' projected requirements reflected in their POM submissions. It is not clear how much of the resources provided by HQDA are required to support installation management at MACOM staff level. An alternative process would have HQDA issue resources directly to installations.

#### 3.5.2.7 Multi-service Installation Partnership

Multi-service installation partnerships envision service delivery through regionalization and/or agreements with other DoD services (Navy, Air Force) or Federal Agencies where installations are contiguous or in close proximity. Examples of local partnerships include shared contract for multi-installation heating fuel and maintenance of common items from various installations at one place. Currently such partnerships are developed locally and lack an overarching DoD or DA sponsorship. Given HQDA established services and standards, there is a need for a holistic departmental directive to develop cost effective, multi-service partnerships to include a mechanism, or an incentive, to allow installations engaged in such partnerships to retain some or all savings realized.

#### **4.1 Background**

A combined Operational and Institutional Law Enforcement FAA was presented to the VCSA and the ASA(M&RA) on 19 August, 1996 by the Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) and the Commander, USACIDC. The FAA combines an assessment of the Military Police Corps' capability to support the Force XXI Commander (Operational FAA) with MP and USACIDC reengineering to enhance the Institutional Army's ability to perform Service Title 10 functions, namely security, law enforcement and criminal investigation. These briefings can be found in appendices D and E, respectively.

In addition, the Umbrella Group presented the results of a parallel assessment of the Law Enforcement FAA on August 14, 1996. The Institutional Army Redesign Umbrella Group was charged with conducting a parallel assessment of each FAA and providing the VCSA and ASA(M&RA) with alternative views and findings. Their findings are discussed later in this chapter. The briefing can be found in its entirety in appendix F.

A unique element to this Law Enforcement FAA is that the Operational functional area assessment was completed in tandem with the Institutional functional area assessment as part of the TOE forces' regular 2-year FAA process. As such, there were some FAA decisions that impact both the institution as well as the operational force. This is addressed below.

#### **4.2 Objective**

The purpose of the Law Enforcement FAA was to present the reengineering concepts and recommendations for redesigning the Force XXI core process, sustain and maintain land operations.

#### **4.3 Methodology**

Utilizing concepts from Force XXI, DA PAM 100-1, Phase I-Lessons Learned and the Umbrella group issues as well as the Military Police operational concepts, an MP proponent task force was organized in order to collect data for use in process action workshops. Then, using the reengineering process analysis (namely, looking at core competencies, core capabilities and core processes), a redesign analysis was carried out. Three alternatives were then put forward. These alternatives were as follows:

- a significantly smaller military police organization;
- a reorganized military police organization; and
- a "dealers' choice."

This methodology was also carried out for the Criminal Investigation Command part of the Law Enforcement FAA. Once a cost/benefit analysis was made comparing the three alternatives, recommendations were made.

For the USACIDC portion of the Law Enforcement FAA, core competencies were identified and described in terms of capabilities and processes and these were then analyzed in terms of competencies. Part of the business process analysis was to incorporate a review of external studies that took place from 1992-1996 (Army Audit Agency--AAA, Manpower Requirements Criteria--MARC, U.S. Army Force Integration Support Agency--USAFISA and the (RUFF) Commission). The results focused on three alternative courses of action, similar to the MP portion of the FAA.



## 4.4 Military Police Institutional FAA

### 4.4.1 Purpose

The purpose of the Military Police Institutional FAA was to recognize the military police and criminal investigate processes to enhance the institutional Army's ability to perform service Title 10 functions. Additionally, an overarching purpose of performing the MP FAA was to determine how to more effectively and efficiently support the operational Army's warfighting organizations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### 4.4.2 MP Core Processes

The Army Operational Force's core competency is to **conduct** military operations and the Institutional Force's core competency is to **support** for military operations. Criminal investigation and law enforcement are two of many diverse services that function under the Army's institutional core process, maintain and sustain land operations. The MP core competency is to sustain the force by providing military police force protection, populace/movement control and criminal investigative support to Army commanders across all states of the strategic environment. Table 4-1 below lists the MP core competencies.

MILITARY POLICE CORE CAPABILITIES	
Operational	Institutional
Maneuver and mobility support operations	Traffic management operation
Area security	Physical security
Internment/resettlement operations	Corrections
Law and order operations	Law enforcement
Independent criminal investigations	Independent criminal investigations

**Table 4-1. Military Police Core Capabilities**

Of these five institutional core capabilities, the first four were discussed in detail in the Military Police FAA. Table 4-2 below is a breakdown of the Military Police core processes with regard to these four core capabilities.

CORE PROCESSES			
Actions that translate capabilities into products			
Capabilities			
Traffic Management	Physical Security	Corrections	Law Enforcement
<b>Processes</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop and implement traffic control procedures</li> <li>Perform traffic IAW enforcement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop and implement security procedures and protective measures</li> <li>Protect specific, designated assets and resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Effect custody and control of U.S. military prisoners</li> <li>Administer correctional treatment programs</li> <li>Perform correctional facility logistics</li> <li>Administer and enforce legal requirements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Administer law enforcement program</li> <li>Conduct patrol operations</li> <li>Conduct military police investigations</li> </ul>
<b>Products:</b> Installation security, community safety, military order and discipline			
<b>Customers:</b> Commanders, soldiers, families			
<b>End Product:</b> FORCE SUSTAINMENT			

**Table 4-2. Military Police Core Processes**

#### 4.4.3 Potential Institutional FAA issues

During the briefing, the Commandant, USAMPS, referred to three potential issues raised by the Umbrella group. The first is the divestiture of long-term corrections. Second, the Umbrella group brought up the rather controversial issue of reestablishing a Provost Marshal General as part of the CSA Special Staff. The third Umbrella issue discussed was an alternative delivery method for CONUS (TDA) law enforcement, physical security and traffic services. These three potential issues are discussed in more detail under the Umbrella portion of the Law Enforcement FAA.

#### 4.4.4 Briefing Points

##### 4.4.4.1 Alternative 1: Significantly Smaller Military Police Organization

The question that started this section of the MP FAA briefing was, is there a better way to run Army Corrections? There are many alternative methods available for reducing the size of Army Corrections: divestiture, outsourcing, civilianization, joint resourcing and DoD consolidation. Army corrections is a good place to start the reengineering analysis because, "good order and discipline" are Title 10-based Army core requirements and, as Title 10 states, "success in combat requires...good order and discipline."

Army Corrections provides quality confinement and treatment services. It is an Army organization that plays a very important part in reinforcing credible authority in the command structure. Army Corrections is integral to an ethics-based military justice system and it is the organization which returns errant soldiers to society as responsible citizens. Thus, it fulfills an inherent Army responsibility. In addition, the Army is the executive agent for DoD for the incarceration of all members of the armed forces who are long-term prisoners. Finally, Army Corrections supports the Operational Army.

Military justice is the operational link and Army Corrections is one pillar of the Military Justice System. Figure 4-1 below is a graphical representation of the Army Ethos.




Figure 4-1. Army Ethos

By comparison with the other services, the Army has a particular interest in the efficiency of its correctional facilities. The annual prisoner flow for FY95 from the Army to the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) is 151 and the annual Army prisoner flow to a Regional Confinement Facility (RCF) is 443. The other services combined sent 99 prisoners to the USDB and 39 to the RCF in FY95. The key drivers for these much higher prisoner flow rates found in the Army are force levels, conviction rates, sentences and clemency and parole. Also for FY95, the RCF output to the civilian sector was 392 and

the number of transfers from the USDB to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) was 113. Another issue that must be factored in when the Army's correctional facilities are being considered is wartime prisoner rates. According to FM 101-10-1, there is a wartime prisoner planning factor of .50 percent. The current normal capacity is 1,950 and the current maximum surge capacity is 3,900. The wartime planning rate at 495,000 is 2,500. Wartime surges must be borne by CONUS nondeployable (TDA) units. See figure 4-2 below for a historical overview of wartime prisoner rates.





Figure 4-2. Wartime Prisoner Rates

The Army has learned through past experience that there should be military control over military prisoners. The first military prison was established in 1873 in Rock Island, Illinois. In 1875 Fort Leavenworth officially became a USDB. However, in 1895 and 1929 the Department of Justice took control of USDB but returned control to the military in 1907 and 1940, respectively. Military control over military prisoners insures fair and standard treatment and assures legitimate rehabilitation services. In addition, maintaining military control over its prisoners supports mobilization requirements and reinforces good order and discipline.

With this background information demonstrating the necessary level of standards the Military Police must maintain when performing the functional area assessment, the MP proponents used the following format to organize their analysis. This format is included in figure 4-3. The reengineering question then is, can another delivery system do the job?



	POTENTIAL SAVINGS (MILITARY MANPOWER)	POTENTIAL SAVINGS (DOLLARS)	FOLLOW-ON COSTS	POLICY DIRECTION	MISSION EFFECTIVENESS	LEGAL MANAGEMENT	OPERATIONAL IMPACT	FEASIBILITY	PROJECTED E-DATE	TOTAL
DIVESTITURE										
OUTSOURCING										
CIVILIANIZATION										
JOINT RESOURCING										
DOD CONSOLIDATION										
RETENTION										

THE REENGINEERING ISSUE: CAN ANOTHER "DELIVERY SYSTEM" DELIVER?

ALTERNATIVE #1

**Figure 4-3. Alternative Delivery Systems**

The general study parameters that were employed in the MP FAA began with a definition of corrections. Corrections is the confinement and treatment of all adjudged prisoners, making no distinction between long-term or short-term sentencing. There are three regional confinement centers: Ft. Lewis, Ft. Sill and Ft. Knox, and one USDB at Ft. Leavenworth. All four of these facilities were included in the FAA analysis, whereas the CONUS (Ft. Hood and Ft. Carson) and OCONUS confinement facilities (Mannheim, FRG, Camp Humphries, Korea, Ft. Richardson, Alaska and Ft. Clayton, Panama) were not included. CONUS pretrial confinement is either outsourced or performed by RCFs, and OCONUS pretrials confinements are performed by other Army facilities.

The question was raised at the briefing, "is the new USDB an FAA variable." The answer given was that it is a FAA variable as a matter of practicality. The following facts were considered:

- There is a building imperative because of severe deterioration
- There are seismic, wind and vertical load hazards
- There is a high-risk threshold: FY99 (Chief of Engineers (COE) estimate)
- Secretary of the Army decision: April 1994
- State of the art design is 100% complete
- FY98 MILCON budget submission: \$63 million
- Military Construction Appropriated (MCA) planning and design sunk cost: \$7 million
- Projected building completion date: FY00

The next thing considered in the briefing was the economic and personnel analysis parameters. The units of measure used to carry out the MP FAA were military authorizations and all other costs. Investments or savings were expressed in military authorizations and dollars separately as net changes to Management Decision Package (MDEP)-VJAL (corrections, confinement, etc.). The elements of cost are the following:

- Civilian personnel charges
- Depreciation of real property
- Utilities, maintenance and repair
- Rentals, contracts and reimbursements

- Supplies and material
- Travel and transportation
- Depreciation of equipment
- Medical support
- Support from other activities

Prisoner labor offsets are derived from BASOPS and repair of Army equipment. The baseline is represented here in Table 4-3.

	<b>FY95</b> (3 RCFS & Present USDB)	<b>FY00</b> (3 RCFS and New USDB)
<b>Total capacity</b>	1950	1109
<b>Prisoner population</b>	1626	1078
<b>Facility staffs</b>	983 mil      142 civ	692 mil      106 civ
<b>Prisoner per-day cost</b>	\$85	\$85 (FY95 Cosnst. Dollars)

**Table 4-3. Baseline Military Prison Data.**

The personnel data sources for this information are derived from 9603 Updated Authorization Document (UAD), FY97 TDAs and 9606 TAADS (the Army Authorization Documentation System).

#### 4.4.4.1.1 Divestiture of Army Corrections.

The only viable option to which the Army could divest its correctional facilities is the U.S. Department of Justice through the FBOP. A fair economic assumption is that at least some Army dollars would leave with the mission (e.g. \$63 million military construction MILCON for new disciplinary barracks). Tables 4-4 and 4-5 below depict net investment and savings changes for FY00 and FY03 for Army confinement facilities. And, figure 4-4 below provides a timeline for those changes to take place from FY97 to FY03.

<b>MDEP-VJAL (confinement facility)</b>	<b>Net Change for FY00</b>	
	<b>Military</b>	<b>Civilian</b>
TDA Authorizations	-150 (savings)	+150
Total Obligation Authority		+\$5.1 million (investment)

**Table 4-4. Army Confinement Facility Investment/Savings FY00**

<b>MDEP-VJAL (confinement facility)</b>	<b>Net Change for FY03</b>	
	<b>Military</b>	<b>Civilian</b>
TDA Authorizations	-808 (savings)	(-81)
Total Obligation Authority		-\$3.5 million (potential savings)

**Table 4-5. Army Confinement Facility Investment/Savings FY03**




Figure 4-4. Army Confinement Facility Investment/Savings Timeline

In considering the divestiture of Army correctional facilities to the FBOP, the following comparative analysis Table 4-6 was performed.

	ARMY	FBOP
Prisoner	First offender	Career criminal
Present cost	\$85 per day	\$63 per day
Program	Treatment	Warehousing
Parole recidivism	6 percent	42 percent
Current fill	83 percent	126 percent
Surge capacity	100 percent	0 percent (war-stopper?)

Table 4-6. FBOP – Comparative Analysis Army Confinement Facility

In the publication, *A Judicial Guide to the Federal Bureau of Prisons* (1995), it states, “The Bureau’s inmate population is growing tremendously, substantially exceeding the design capacity of the Agency’s institutions.” It is clear that divesting Army corrections to the FBOP carries with it several advantages and disadvantages.

#### Advantages:

- returns approximately 808 military spaces back to the Army;
- a potential savings of up to \$3.5 million in civilian salaries and occupational costs;
- eliminate the burden for the Army to confine military prisoners;
- a divestiture eliminates the requirement to maintain a Correctional Specialist Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) (95C).

#### Disadvantages:

- divestiture eliminates wartime surge options;
- it removes the Army’s ability to insure fair and standard treatment of its prisoners, which runs counter to the Army ethos;
- eliminates active component training and experience and removes the Army’s ability to return errant soldiers to society as responsible citizens;
- requires a significant change in Army and DoD policies;
- and controversial among other services (it would constitute a backing off from 1991 Army commitment).

Table 4-7 provides a subjective assessment of the positive and negative impacts of divestiture.

Areas of impact	Positive or negative effects
Manpower savings	+
Dollar savings	+/-
Follow-on costs	+
Policy direction	-
Mission effectiveness	-
Legal management	+/-
Operational impact	-
Feasibility	+/-
E-date	-

**Table 4-7. Army Confinement Facility Divestiture Impacts**


#### 4.4.4.1.2 Outsourcing of Army Corrections

An alternative to divesting Army Corrections to FBOP in order to decrease the overall size of the MP structure is outsourcing. Table 4-8 below provides a cost comparison per prisoner. Figure 4-5 is a timeline of the government owned contractor operated (GOCO) model.

	Daily cost per prisoner	Total cost
Army-including mil. Salaries	Military pay (\$73) + civilian pay (\$7) + BASOPS (\$22) - prisoner labor offsets (\$17)	\$85
Army-not including mil. Salaries	Civilian pay (\$7) + BASOPS (\$22) - prisoner labor offsets (\$17)	\$12
Government owned, contractor operated	Quote (\$41)* + government costs (\$22) - prisoner labor offsets (\$17)	\$46
Contractor owned, contractor operated	Quote (\$51)* + government costs (\$10) - prisoner labor offsets (\$1)	\$60

**Table 4-8. Army Costs Per Prisoner**

\*Sources: Corrections Corporation of America  
Wackenhut Corporation  
U.S. Corrections Corporation



**Figure 4-5. Government Owned Contractor Operated Corrections Facility Timeline**

As with divesting, there are also several advantages and disadvantages to the outsourcing of Army corrections.

Advantages:

- returns 788 military and civilian authorizations to the Army by FY00; and
- eliminates the requirement to maintain a Correctional Specialist MOS (95C).

Disadvantages:

- requires an investment of at least \$11.2 million;
- removes the inherent control and authority of the military cadre and renders the Army vulnerable to rate hikes and labor disputes;
- will not replicate Army standards of treatment, care and feeding;
- does not relieve the Army of its Title 10 USC rehabilitation requirements;
- requires changes in DoD policy and encumbers wartime surge operations;
- eliminates active component training and experience; and
- ignores the lessons learned from other government agencies.

Table 4-9 provides a subjective of the positive and negative impacts of outsourcing:

Areas of impact	Positive or negative effects
Manpower savings	+
Dollar savings	-
Follow-on costs	-
Policy direction	-
Mission effectiveness	-
Legal management	+
Operational impact	-
Feasibility	+/-
E-date	+/-

**Table 4-9. Outsourcing Army Corrections Facility Impact**

#### 4.4.4.1.3 Civilianization of Army Corrections

A third alternative for decreasing the size of military billets invested in the corrections service is to civilianize it. Table 4-10 below provides a before and after comparison of civilianization by each Army correctional facility.

	Before		After		Fiscal Year
	Military	Civilian	Military	Civilian	
USDB	358	87	19	426	00
Ft. Lewis	137	9	11	135	99
Ft. Knox	101	5	9	97	99
Ft. Sill	96	5	8	93	98
Other	116	0	0	25	00
TOTAL	808	106	47	776	

**Table 4-10. Civilianize Army Correction Services**

A time line for this transition was also provided. See figure 4-6 below.






Figure 4-6. Civilianize Army Correction Services Timeline

## Advantages:

- 761 military spaces returned to the Army by FY00;
- establish civilian continuity;
- eliminate the Army requirement to maintain a Correctional Specialist MOS (95C);
- allow for early phasing at the RCFs; and
- civilianization is highly feasible.

## Disadvantages:

- require an investment of 670 trained DA civilians that would run a cost of \$24 million;
- removes the inherent control and authority of the military cadre;
- requires change in Army policy and would encumber wartime surge operations;
- restricts work force flexibility in a zero-defects environment; and
- creates a potential situation of non-funded civilian authorizations.

Table 4-11 provides a subjective list of the positive and negative impacts of civilianization:

Areas of impact	Positive or negative effects
Manpower savings	+
Dollar savings	-
Follow-on costs	+/-
Policy direction	+/-
Mission effectiveness	-
Legal management	+
Operational impact	+/-
Feasibility	+
E-date	+/-

Table 4-11. Civilizing Army Correction Services Impacts

## 4.4.4.1.4 Joint Resourcing of U.S. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB)

The fourth alternative for creating a significantly smaller military police structure (by way of reducing Army corrections) is by joint resourcing of the USDB. Table 4-12, provides a breakdown of each services' prisoner distribution and current and new military manpower totals.

Joint Resourcing of USDB					
	USA	USAF	USMC	USN	USCG
FY95 prisoner distribution (% basis for 'fair share joint resourcing)	60.0%	22.68%	9.57%	7.56%	0.19%
FY95-current USDB					
Military manpower (TOTAL: 649)	390	147	62	49	1
Funding (TOTAL: \$7,981K)	\$4,789K	\$1,810K	\$746K	\$603K	\$15K
New USDB (FY00)					
Military manpower (TOTAL: 358)	215	81	34	27	1
Funding (TOTAL: \$4,366K)	\$2,620K	\$990K	\$418K	\$330K	\$8K

Table 4-12. Services' Prisoner Distribution

## Advantages:

- return up to 259 military spaces to the Army by FY98, or 143 military in FY00;
- save between \$2 and \$3 million;
- existing mission effectiveness (such as military control and authority) would be retained;
- preserve wartime surge capability and be the least disruptive to ongoing operations; and
- joint resourcing is relatively uncomplicated and the 95C Correctional Specialty MOS would be retained.

## Disadvantages:

a controversial solution among other services (as it constitutes backing off from 1991 Army commitment).

there are fewer potential military manpower savings than divestiture, outsourcing or civilianization.

joint resourcing would require a change in DoD policy; and

it would require periodic re-negotiations of interservice agreements.

Table 4-13 provides a subjective list of the positive and negative impacts of joint resourcing of USDB:

Areas of impact	Positive or negative effects
Manpower savings	+/-
Dollar savings	+/-
Follow-on costs	+/-
Policy direction	+/-
Mission effectiveness	+
Legal management	+
Operational impact	+
Feasibility	+/-
E-date	+

Table 4-13. Joint Resourcing USDB Impact

## 4.4.4.1.5 Department of Defense Consolidation

The savings under DoD consolidation would be at least equal to that of joint resourcing but probably much greater through closure and realignment of level II facilities. There would be an improved guard to inmate ratio, a consolidation of resourcing and infrastructure reductions.

Economic and operational consolidation factors as well as disciplinary barracks imperatives were considered in this section of the FAA. The economic factors considered were design capacity, plant efficiency, BASOPS adequacy and expandability. The operational factors were regionalization, offense

classification, treatment requirements and custody grades. The disciplinary barracks imperatives that were considered are:

- maximum security design;
- bed-space requirements;
- rehab facilities;
- treatment program;
- supporting infrastructure;
- wartime surge capacity; and
- new disciplinary barracks program (safety).

In order to complete a DoD consolidation, several things are required. First of all, the Army must support consolidation. Second, a consolidation study must be performed. Third, the DoD consolidation decision must be made. And finally, there must be closures and realignments.

Advantages:

- It would return at least 143 military authorizations to the Army by FY00 and would save approximately \$2 million;
- of all of the 5 alternative delivery systems, DoD consolidation has the greatest potential for additional follow-on savings;
- retains the existing mission effectiveness, such as military control and authority, preserves wartime surge capabilities, retains 95C skills and experience and is highly feasible; and
- relieves the Army from executive agent responsibilities, it deconflicts interservice coordination and consolidates training resources and standards.

Table 4-14 provides a subjective assessment of the positive and negative impacts of DoD consolidation of correction facilities.

Areas of impact	Positive or negative effects
Manpower savings	+/-
Dollar savings	+/-
Follow-on costs	+
Policy direction	+
Mission effectiveness	+
Legal management	+
Operational impact	+
Feasibility	+
E-date	+/-

**Table 4-14. DoD Consolidation of Correction Facilities Impacts**

#### 4.4.4.1.6 Alternative 1—Significantly smaller MP Conclusions

Below in figure 4-7 is a consolidated comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of each MP reduction option detailed above.

ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS										
	POTENTIAL SAVINGS (MILITARY MANPOWER)	POTENTIAL SAVINGS (DOLLARS)	FOLLOW-ON COSTS	POLICY DIRECTION	MISSION EFFECTIVENESS	LEGAL MANAGEMENT	OPERATIONAL IMPACT	FEASIBILITY	PROJECTED E-DATE	TOTAL
DIVESTITURE	+	±	+	-	-	±	-	±	-	1.8
OUTSOURCING	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	±	±	1.7
CIVILIANIZATION	+	-	±	±	-	+	±	+	±	2.1
JOINT RESOURCING	±	±	±	±	+	+	+	±	±	2.4
DOD CONSOLIDATION	±	±	+	+	+	+	+	+	±	2.7
RETENTION	-	-	±	+	+	+	+	N/A	N/A	2.3
RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION										

Figure 4-7. Comparative Analysis of Alternative Delivery Systems

In conclusion, the Army corrections program has been, and continues to be, a critical component of the military justice system and the Army ethos. DoD consolidation of military corrections would generate Army savings with no degradation to enduring Army values or operational effectiveness.

#### 4.4.4.2 Alternative 2: Reorganization - Reestablishment of a Provost Marshal General (OPMG)

The Umbrella Group, in an earlier briefing had brought up the idea that there should be a total revision of the current MACOM and Major Subordinate Command (MSC) organizational structure. This would entail reestablishment of a Provost Marshal General as part of the CSA's special staff. The reengineering objectives in establishing the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) were: greater effectiveness in force sustainment; increased efficiencies of processes; and consonance with Force XXI. The OPMG was established in 1941 with the Corps of Military Police and it was discontinued in 1974. Figure 4-8 below represents a timeline and list of responsibilities that the OPMG performed. The concern of those who were champions of reestablishing the OPMG was that the functions listed in figure 4-8 were not being performed efficiently.

# OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL (1941 - 1974)




Figure 4-8. OPMG Responsibilities, Over Time

In addition, the Umbrella Group postulated that the nature of the threat that the Army will respond to in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is likely to be predominately lawlessness, e.g., terrorism, war crimes, and the Secretary and CSA would be better served with senior special staff representative than, in the current staff structure.

During the briefing two different OPMG organizational models were provided to compare with the as-is organization. Figure 4-9 below is an organizational chart of the as-is Military Police organization, where the MP functions are distributed through each MACOM. During the briefing, two other organizational models were prepared which included the reestablishment of the Provost Marshall General: the ARSTAF model and the Force Projection model.




Figure 4-9. Current Army Military Police Organization

#### 4.4.4.2.1 ARSTAF Model I

The first model discussed was ARSTAF, depicted below in figure 4-10. This model has the advantage of elevating Military Police ARSTAF representation to a principal or special staff officer. It also consolidates Army corrections. It does, however have several disadvantages. It does not generate significant efficiencies or savings and, if USACIDC were sustained, it adds another layer to the Military Police organizational hierarchy (in other words, it reengineers up). This model also diminishes command focus for the commanding general of USACIDC (potentially eliminates CIDC as a major command). It also overlaps branch and proponent responsibilities.





Figure 4-10. ARSTAF Military Police Model

#### 4.4.4.2.2 Force Projection MACOM, Model 2

The second model under the MP reorganization alternative, the Force Projects (Forces Command) MACOM is displayed in figure 4-11.



**Figure 4-11. Force Projection MACOM Military Police Model**

There are many advantages of the PPP MACOM. It provides general officer MP planning and operational support to the Army's force generation and projection MACOM. It also consolidates Army corrections and flattens the Military Police headquarters staff structure. Finally, this model preserves USACIDC independence. The disadvantages of the PPP MACOM model are numerous. First, the model does not generate significant efficiencies and savings. Second, unless all operational forces (TOE) are aligned under FORSCOM for "administration control," it crosses MACOM ASSC boundaries (an USACIDC currently). Third, the model removes DA-level policy and DoD executive agent responsibilities from ARSTAF. And, when coupled with the first model when the OPMG were reestablished, it eliminates MP ARSTAF representation. Additionally, this model requires auxiliary Army general officer authorization. Finally, the model overlaps branch proponent responsibilities.

#### 4.4.4.2.3 Alternative 2 Conclusion

The FAA concluded that, the ‘as is’ Military Police organizational design serves the Army well, with good connectivity among functional components. The FAA further concluded that the disadvantages of reestablishing a provost Marshall General would far outweigh the advantages for both the Army and the MP Corps.

#### 4.4.4.3 Dealer's Choice

The third MP FAA alternative is the Dealer's Choice. This alternative was an eclectic approach that the MP FAA proponent produced looking at four different types of approaches: elimination, reorganization and consolidation, conversion and civilianization.

#### 4.4.4.3.1 Elimination

This first method would eliminate 16 military and 43 civilian spaces by FY98. The basis for eliminating certain functions is found in Army regulations, MACOM policy, installation directives and tradition and expectations. The functions eliminated were vehicle registration, AWOL apprehension, crime prevention and gate guards. Approximately 90% of these functions had already been eliminated

previously, but the FAA represented an effort to eliminate those residuals. The key drivers for this elimination effort were installation size and location, troop population, offense rates, threat, national defense and international agreement.

#### 4.4.4.3.2 Reorganization/Consolidation

The new USDB facility (to be completed FY00) will reduce the number of military and civilian spaces needed for operation. Also, DoD consolidation (as described above) would save 143 military spaces. The basis for correctional reorganization and consolidation is Army and DoD design and congressional action. The new USDB capacity, the prisoner population, wartime planning factors and enduring Army values are the driving forces behind reorganization and consolidation.

#### 4.4.4.3.3 TDA to TOE Conversion

The operational linkage between the TDA and TOE Army to make the conversion are listed here:

<u>TDA</u>	<u>TOE</u>
Provost Marshall sections	Law and Order Augmentation Detachments
Law enforcement positions	Customs teams
Military working dog teams	Military working dog teams
Regional confinement facilities	Internment/resettlement battalion

#### 4.4.4.3.4 Civilianization

With the TDA to TOE conversions, the remaining 1400 ( $\pm$ ) spaces in law enforcement, physical security, hospital security, traffic control, game wardens and low density MOSs went through a proponent business process analysis. From there a MACOM line-by-line review was performed for validation, coordination and approval. Approximately 700 spaces were deemed militarily essential and the other 700 were candidates for civilianization. The basis for civilianization came from Army regulations 570-4 (Manpower), 600-3 (personnel proponent) and 690-series. The key drivers were unconverted and non-military spaces. The civilianization process would entail an investment of \$30.8 million and the specific skills involved are; GS-080 (physical security) GS-083 (police); GS-085 (security guard); GS-1811 (crime investigation); and GS-1812 (game warden).

Figure 4-12 below is a depiction of the dealer's choice implementation through FY03.






Figure 4-12. "Dealer's Choice" Law Enforcement Organizational Alternative

**Advantages:**

- returns up to 1150 military authorizations to the Army;
- converts approximately 1800 TDA positions to TOE;
- corrects military police combat support shortfalls and provides an early entry enemy prisoner of war capability;
- establishes civilian continuity in CONUS Provost Marshall operations and retains military essential law enforcement TDA positions; and
- preserves a military corrections program with significant potential added savings.

**Disadvantages:**


- would require an investment of about \$26 million, including 620 DA civilians;
- reduces cross leveling flexibility and generates additional general support unit (backfill) requirements;
- creates the perception in the Army of a civilian police force and it could generate unfunded civilian authorizations
- sets the stage for future increased borrowed military manpower (BMM); and
- requires some change in the Army and DoD corrections policy.

The FAA concluded that the dealer's choice alternative represents a combination of the best reengineering options available to the proponent. With this conclusion, and with continued MACOM and HQDA support (and TAA success) the military police corps was prepared at the time of this briefing to move forward with the program. Approval of the dealer's choice was recommended.

## 4.5 Criminal Investigation Command FAA

### 4.5.1 Background

The USACIDC became independent under its own command in 1971. And as figure 4-13 below denotes, the criminal investigation support that the USACIDC provides to the Army crosses the operational continuum.



**Figure 4-13. U.S. Army Criminal Investigation – Historical Perspective**

The key issues that were considered during the CID reengineering process were the reduction in CID agents since FY90, CID location reduction, number of new missions and the increase of missions. In FY90 there were 1211 authorized CID agents compared to 813 in FY97 (33% decrease). Similarly, there were 132 CID locations in FY90 compared to 106 in FY97 (20%) reduction. While these reductions have been made, there has been a corresponding increase in the number and types of missions that the CID must perform including increases in:




Figure 4-14. CID Support to Military Operations

protective services; multiple deployments; major procurement fraud; and logistics security. New missions include: computer crimes; environmental crimes; and workman's compensation fraud. The CID also supports military operations, as depicted in figure 4-14 above. Reserves and civilians are vital to the mission of the CID. The CID has fully accredited special agents. It performs a full range of criminal investigation missions, supports protective service missions worldwide and continually assists the Army's active component investigative force. It does all of this by providing hi-tech support. The CID reserve agents are activated for contingency operations and support current investigation during periods of active duty for training (AT). Additionally, reserve agents expended 216 man-days FY97 for points only. Figure 4-15 below shows the breakdown of the civilians, and reserve CID population.




Figure 4-15. CID Structure Mix, by Component

#### 4.5.2 Process

The CIDC's vision is an independent Army command, supporting the Army in any environment with a highly skilled, trained and ready force, that will continue to deter, detect and solve crime into the 21<sup>st</sup> century and beyond. CID's core competency is to provide timely and thorough independent criminal investigative support to the Army. Its core capabilities are:

- To deter, detect and investigate serious felony crimes;

- To maintain the integrity of investigative product;
- To provide a rapid and accurate response to Army commanders; and
- To safeguard Army resources.


Its core processes are:

- To conduct criminal investigations;
- To process criminal intelligence;
- To perform logistics security;
- To conduct protective services;
- To conduct Force Preservation Operations;
- To operate the Army Crime Laboratory;
- To conduct Army Criminal Polygraph Operations;
- To manage the Army Crime Records Center;
- To Manage Crime Deterrence Programs; and
- To support anti-terrorism operations.

The USACIDC portion approach of the Law Enforcement FAA was to review reengineering accomplishments, establish a baseline and get input from commanders, staff principals and subject matter experts. The FAA postulated showed several things: that investigative independence is of paramount importance; that the USACIDC has continually reengineered and downsized; and that TDA and TOE must be fully integrated to support commanders in all environments. Bottom line conclusions are that: essential investigative operations are independent of changing environment and technology; there be no redundancy; and only limited manpower efficiencies can be gained through technology and operational headquarters .

#### 4.5.3 Analysis

The USACIDC organizational chart is reflected here in figure 4-16.



**Figure 4-16. USACIDC Current Organization**

#### 4.5.3.1 Headquarters

The mission of the CIDC headquarters is to support HQDA, other MACOMs and CID investigative field elements. HQ authorizations are 53 military and 61 civilian. CIDC HQ provides operational support to all CID field elements:

- |                                  |                         |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| -Current operations              | -IG                     |
| -Criminal intelligence           | -PAO                    |
| -Manpower and plans              | -SJA                    |
| -Reserve affairs                 | -Information Management |
| -Policy                          | -Logistics              |
| -Military and civilian personnel | -Internal Review        |

During the functional analysis, an in-depth analysis of each staff function was conducted. The results show that staff functions directly support investigations; there are no redundancies (each function is one deep); removing the function impacts field and HQDA support; and an arbitrary 'salami slicing' drives elimination of functions. For example, in FY96 6 civilian positions were cut. The total obligation authority (TOA) issue impacts the ability of the CIDC to fill unencumbered civilian positions. As such, the decision was that there were no functions to transfer or divest.

#### 4.5.3.2 U.S. Army Crime Lab (USACL)

There are 3 organizations under the USACL: Laboratory analysis, deployable technical support and technical training. The mission of the USACL is to provide worldwide forensic laboratory services to CIDC elements and other DoD and federal agencies. To do this, an efficient mix of active duty, reserve and civilian examiners is required. This mix provides a flexible and responsive service. It also ensures fewer legal challenges to evidence or lab results and promotes a tighter custody of evidence chain. Additionally, this efficient mix also means that there is a quicker crime scene response anywhere in the world. When necessary, the ACL will outsource for a case with unusual requirements. At the time the

briefing was delivered, USACIL lab authorizations totaled 14 military and 75 civilian. The USACL functional analysis concluded that neither outsourcing nor civilianization of the ACL is in the best interest of the Army. This is so because there has been continuous reengineering of the lab function. There have been several outsourcing studies (1981, 1991 and 1996) and the US Army Force Integrated Support Agency (USAFISA) completed a study in 1995. An example of this continual reengineering process is the closing of two OCONUS labs between 1992 and 1996, eliminating 31 positions. USACL is now 85% civilian.

#### 4.5.3.3 Army Crime Records Center (CRC)

There are three functions under the CRC: polygraph program manager; Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act; and CID and MP Records. At the time of the briefing there were 2 military and 49 civilian CRC authorizations. The Mission of the CRC is to manage Army crime records and criminal intelligence database. This includes the following:

- interactive crime records and criminal intelligence database;
- 24-hour-a-day operations (worldwide accessibility);
- criminal intelligence functions for U.S. and Allied Law enforcement agencies;
- the Army's FOIA and Privacy Act programs for Criminal investigation records;
- the Army's criminal polygraph program; and
- records screening process.

The CRC functional analysis concluded that outsourcing the CRC is not in the best interest of the Army. For several reasons. First, just as with the USACL, the CRC is constantly being reengineered for optimal efficiency. Furthermore, consolidation with other records centers is not viable; consolidation would not render a cost savings. Also, outsourcing increases risk to security. Currently, no federal law enforcement agency outsources criminal records. The FAA concluded that the CRC should remain intact.

#### 4.5.3.4 701<sup>st</sup> MP Group (CID)

The 701<sup>st</sup> MP Group has 3 units under its organization. These are the field investigative unit (FIU), the protective services unit and the major procurement fraud unit. The mission of the field investigative unit is to conduct sensitive and classified investigations. It was created in 1984 as a Task Force, as directed by the CSA. It provides a unique and essential capability to the Army. FIU authorizations total 10 military and 4 civilian spaces. The FIU functional analysis postulated that the neither outsourcing nor civilianization of the FIU is in the best interest of the Army. Field investigations are not only a Title 10 function, but are essential to the Army. These require an operational flexibility that the too-rigid civilian equivalent can not provide. The FAA concluded that the FIU remain intact.

Protective services units (PSU) provide protective service operations to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Deputy SECDEF (DEPSECDEF), SA, CSA, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) and to other dignitaries, as directed. Total PSU authorizations are 35 military and 1 civilian. Also, Active Component temporary duty (TDY) man-days total 5,343 and RC TDY man-days total 251. The PSU functional analysis concluded that neither outsourcing nor civilianization is in the best interest of the Army. Again, outsourcing is not a viable option for PSU because civilian organizations are too rigid. It was noted in the briefing that there are both active duty and reserve component investigators, and at the time the briefing was given, PSU was attempting to obtain 18 spaces from other services. The FAA concluded that the PSU remain intact.

The major procurement fraud unit (MPFU) mission is to investigate major fraud Army-wide. This involves preserving scarce resources and safety as well as protecting delivery of Army goods and services. Its mission is very cost effective as it returns resources to the Army and government. Total

MPFU authorizations are 0 military and 106 civilian spaces. Since 1989 there has been \$1.187 billion in procurement and fraud recoveries. In the 12 months prior to the delivery of the briefing the Army recovered \$25 million through MPFU. This figure juxtaposed with the USACIDC's total FY95 budget of \$39 million demonstrates the importance of MPFU's mission.

#### 4.5.4 Alternatives

Just as with the MP portion of the Law Enforcement FAA, the CIDC FAA followed a methodology of completing three alternative assessments: a significantly smaller organization, a reorganization and a dealer's choice.

##### 4.5.4.1 Alternative 1

A significantly smaller CIDC would require relinquishing the major procurement fraud mission. The DoD inspector General would assume the Army major procurement fraud investigative function. The cost impact would be 106 civilian positions at \$8.2 million. The major advantage of this alternative is that it would result in a 15% reduction in CID XXI TDA. It was noted during the briefing that the 1995 DoD Advisory Board recommended consolidation of all DoD Major Procurement Fraud. This would come at no Army savings. Budget and spaces would be transferred to the Department of Defense Inspector General. Disadvantages are: eliminates the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army's ability to investigate major procurement fraud; counters the Deputy Secretary of the Army's position on MPFU as well as the Army position on support to the procurement fraud mission; it revisits the issue of the Army's commitment to fight procurement fraud and removes safety concerns as a basis for corporate investigations and makes a break with Force XXI principles - the MPFU mission is a substantial component of logistics security (LOGSEC) and it would eliminate the Army's ability to investigate fraud in all environments.

##### 4.5.4.2 Alternative 2

The second alternative was to reorganize the CIDC. Such reorganization would assume all Army criminal investigative authorizations and policy functions. This would shift Military Police Investigation (MPI) to CIDC and restructure the CIDC investigative mission. MPI authorizations for FY97 are TDA: 358, TOE: 477. The advantages to reorganization are that it would establish one investigative standard and centralize the span of control. It would also consolidate Title 10 investigative functions. The disadvantages are that it dilutes the focus of the CIDC. It also eliminates tiered response capability, and supported commanders lose flexibility in use of criminal investigative assets.

##### 4.5.4.3 Alternative 3

Alternative 3 is the "dealer's choice." Headquarters Staff functions directly support CIDC worldwide operations and there is a complete conversion to CID XXI force. The CID portion of the Law Enforcement FAA did not identify any redundant functions in the reserve affairs office, the public affairs office, the staff judge advocate, the inspector general or the staff engineer. The advantages to the dealer's choice model starts with the fact that it reiterates the Army's commitment to independent and objective criminal investigations. It also provides responsive, tailorable support to operations in all environments. This model also ensures continued CID support to Army operations and it minimizes the impact of Army restructuring on an already austere organization. Additionally, it maintains a headquarters staff that is critical to the continuation of CIDC operations worldwide. Finally, it preserves Army pre-eminence in military criminal investigations. The single disadvantage of the dealer's choice model is that it provides no savings.

#### 4.5.5 Summary

The conclusions drawn from the CID portion of the law Enforcement FAA are that for alternative 1, divesting the MPFU would result in major Army losses, as delineated above. Similarly, alternative 2, a

reorganization of the CIDC is not the best option because Army commanders lose flexibility in performing important CID tasks. The FAA concluded that the third alternative, the dealer's choice, that is the CID XXI organization, as the best choice for the CIDC.

#### 4.6 Umbrella Law Enforcement FAA

The Umbrella Group presented a parallel assessment of the Law Enforcement FAA to the VCSA on August 14, 1996. The purpose of the Umbrella group's assessment was to provide the VCSA and the ASA(M&RA) with alternatives to the views and findings of the proponent's Law Enforcement FAA. This FAA combines an assessment of the Military Police Corps' capability to support the Force XXI Commander (Operational FAA) with MP and CIDC reengineering to enhance the Institutional Army's ability to perform Service Title 10 functions (Security/Law Enforcement/Criminal Investigation FAA).

TDA law enforcement includes 6312 military and 3136 civilian personnel, and costs the Army \$541 million annually. Confinement operations represent \$70 million of that total cost. USDB costs are 50% higher than comparable FBOP on a per prisoner per day basis, and three times higher than private firms. The Umbrella Group concluded that outsourcing the USDB may be a viable alternative.

There were several other proposals put forward. The Umbrella group proposed that the Provost Marshal General Office be re-established, within the Army Secretariat, as a focal point for law enforcement. Both the Commandant, USAMAPS, and Commander, USACIDC, opposed this recommendation. The ODCSOPS community opined that it is not clear that supporting analysis adequately addresses the operational aspects of law enforcement and its linkage to the HQDA. It was recommended that the VCSA either disapprove the recommendation or table it for further analysis. Additionally, the Umbrella Group recommended elimination of some installation functions (vehicle registration, AWOL apprehension, gate guards) and civilianization of others to reduce costs and return military personnel to higher priority missions. Implementation should be deferred until Army policy, standards and prioritization of BASOPS functions have been developed. Finally, it was noted that CIDC HQ has been organized without some traditional staff sections or personnel to reflect reliance on installation matrix support.

##### 4.6.1 Background

Table 4-15 provides a list of the Umbrella Group issues that were addressed by the MP and CID proponents in the Law Enforcement FAA.

Issue	Status
1. Consolidation of law enforcement and criminal investigation	CID FAA
2. Divestiture of long-term corrections	MP FAA
3. A GO at HQDA for law enforcement policy	MP FAA
4. CONUS installation police support	Combined in MP FAA
5. Physical security as a MP function	
6. Federal, state, local police organization information exchange	
7. CIDC special relationship	Not directly addressed

**Table 4-15. Umbrella Group Law Enforcement Issues**


The Umbrella group raised other issues. One was addressed by the MP school's eclectic approach, or dealer's choice. The dealer's choice eliminates remaining vehicle registration, AWOL apprehension, crime prevention, and gate guard positions. It reorganizes the USDB by FY00 and converts TDA to TOE by FY97-00 (1874 authorizations). Finally, the MP dealers' choice will civilianize law enforcement,



physical and hospital security, traffic management, and game warden positions (FY01). The Umbrella Group also recommended TDA to TOE conversions but noted that the equipment bill could be large. The ACSIM tasked to develop BASOPS service standards, priorities and policies before additional changes can be made. The USDB should be studied for potential outsourcing.

Another issue that the Umbrella Group commented on was the CIDC option to consider divesting the procurement fraud mission to Defense Investigative Service (DCIS). This consideration was also a recommendation of the 1994 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) study on investigative capability. This option would transfer 106 civilian positions to OSD. The CIDC recommendation was to retain the procurement fraud mission and not to divest. The Umbrella Team acknowledged that the OSD Inspector General's focus may be on areas that are not constant with the Army's, and therefore transferring the procurement fraud mission may not be in the Army's best interest. With divestiture, the Army leadership would be unable to set investigation priorities especially for those small cases with high Army impact, such as safety or systems readiness.

The Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations as well as the CID and MP organizations are presented below in Figures 4-17, 4-18, and 4-19.



**Figure 4-17. Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations**




Figure 4-18. USACIDC Detailed Current Organization




Figure 4-19. Army Law Enforcement Organization

The breakdown of operational and institutional forces is presented in table 4-16.

<b>Operational Force FY96</b>				
	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Warrant Officers</i>	<i>Enlisted</i>	<i>Total</i>
COMPO 1	581	236	10146	10963
COMPO 2	722	40	12934	13696
COMPO 3	743	157	6445	7345
			<b>Total</b>	<b>32004</b>
<b>Institutional Force FY96</b>				
All TDA (military)				6312
<b>Total military</b>				<b>38316</b>
TDA % Total Force				16%
TDA % Active				37%

Table 4-16. Army Operational Institutional Law Enforcement Structure

The Law enforcement costs for FY96 are presented in Table 4-17 below.

<b>Category</b>	<b>Personnel (military/civilian/total)</b>	<b>Dollar amount in millions<sup>a</sup> (personnel, tng, BASOPS, other)</b>
TDA Law Enforcement (CONUS)	3091/1027/4118	233
TDA Law Enforcement (OCONUS) <sup>b</sup>	1751/1351/3102	112
TDA Law Enforcement (NG and RC)	0/106/106	35
Confinement (CONUS and OCONUS)	1363/133/1469	70 <sup>c</sup>
CID <sup>d</sup> (TDA and TOE)	1032/519/1551	91
<b>Totals</b>	<b>7237/3136/10373</b>	<b>\$541</b>

<sup>a</sup> Excludes MDEP XMGH staffing at DA, MACOM, etc. Source: ODL.

<sup>b</sup> OCONUS includes USAREUR, USARSO, EUSA, USARPAC, and EUCOM.

<sup>c</sup> Total confinement costs of \$78 million offset by \$8 million assuming prisoner generated welfare funds offset need for appropriated funds and locally used prisoner labor offsets BASOPS—per USAA August 1993 audit. Source: ODL.

<sup>d</sup> CID portions of FY96 MDEPs FPDQ, PAMP, PAOT, QBOS, VTER, VXOI, WIAC and XCID.

Table 4-17. Army Law Enforcement Costs

#### 4.6.2 Briefing Points

##### 4.6.2.1 Corrections

The Umbrella Group looked at alternative correctional service delivery methods. The MP institutional FAA recommended retention as the current process as the key link to good order and discipline. An alternate view is that correctional custody is a utility function that could be provided more efficiently if centrally managed. Oversight and control needs to be exercised by comparing rates and costs to alternative public sector operations. If rates are not or cannot be made competitive, then the function should be transferred to the competitive marketplace. Activities not providing appropriate quality service at a competitive price go out of business.

The Internment/Resettlement concept (I/R). The Army has separate special-purpose units for U.S. military prisoner confinement and Enemy Prisoner of War/Confinement and Internment (EPW/CI) internment. Both perform similar functions: shelter, sustain, guard, protect and account for personnel. The I/R concept is to redesign enemy prisoner of war and confinement TOE into one I/R battalion to support U.S. prisoners, EPW/CI and dislocated civilian operations across the full range of operations. The USDB is not required for a wartime surge. Current confinement battalion RC and future I/R battalion handle surges if required.

Table 4-18 below is a personnel and costs chart for FY96 corrections.

Location*	USDB	Carson	Knox	Lewis	Sill	Hood	Alaska	Hawaii	Pan.	Korea	Germ.	Total
<b>Personnel</b>												
Mil. Assigned	686	59	131	141	98	43	18	5	11	67	104	1363
Civ. Assigned	100	0	6	9	4	0	0	0	0	2	12	133
<b>Costs (\$1000s)</b>												
Personnel	31242	2316	5361	6060	4068	1692	717	195	444	2702	4598	59395
Contracts	1398	71	111	187	117	29	37	84	71	61	220	2386
Equipment	348	18	28	47	29	7	9	21	18	15	56	596
Operations	9378	474	745	1257	781	193	249	560	474	408	1472	15991
Total	42366	2879	6245	7551	4995	1921	1012	860	1007	3186	6346	78368
<b>Prisoners</b>												
Capacity	1503	75	120	202	125	30	40	90	76	65	236	2562
End Strength	1103	75	120	123	88	21	3	6	2	12	35	1588
% utilization	73	100	100	61	70	70	8	7	3	18	15	62
Cost/prsnr/day	\$93	93	128	122	131	223	924	393	1379	727	497	120
Prisoner:Staff	1.4:1	1.3:1	0.9:1	0.8:1	0.9:1	0.5:1	0.2:1	1.2:1	0.2:1	0.2:1	0.3:1	1:1

\*Carson and Hood facilities close in FY97

**Table 4-18. FY96 Costs for Army Corrections Facilities**

The cost per day for CONUS is \$102. For OCONUS, the costs per day are \$586. The cost per day for the FBOP in 1993 was \$50-\$58. That cost is estimated to be \$63 per day in 1996. The Wackenhut Corrections Service cost per day is \$30-\$35.

The Force XXI law and order operations will emphasize internment/resettlement functions supporting peace enforcement, nation assistance, support to civil authorities and humanitarian assistance and will de-emphasize confinement. If required, reserve component refinement units (and I/R units of the future) can provide wartime surge capability. USDB is expensive in both rate/day and military manpower (1:1 ration of personnel to prisoners). OCONUS is extraordinarily expensive. Based on this information, the conclusions that the Umbrella group made were: outsource USDB or divest the function to the FBOP; convert CONUS pretrial facilities to I/R battalion and confinement modules; investigate alternatives to OCONUS operations (transport prisoners to CONUS or outsource or I/R battalion module).

Outsourcing USDB saves \$64,000 per day and \$23 million per year and returns 686 soldiers to higher priority assignments. It is important to consider a private company to design new disciplinary barracks to maximize efficiency and to keep costs in the \$30-\$35 range. An additional option is to convert pre-trial facilities at Knox, Lewis, and Sill to internment or resettlement battalions. USDB outsourcing presents a savings opportunity plus it permits the Army to posture itself for the most likely Stability and Support Operations. The I/R battalion also retains a corrections warm base and prevents the Army from being held hostage by private contractors.

#### 4.6.2.2 Provost Marshal General

The first area discussed in this section was the relationship between intelligence and law enforcement. TRADOC PAM 525-5 states that nationalist movements based on religious, tribal, ethnic, historical or territorial identity can erode the power and legitimacy of states. In some cases these movements are closely linked to criminal organizations. The non-state warrior poses a problem because he does not fight by the rules of conventional warfare. His targets are not force-oriented but are the political will of his opponents. His tactics include terrorism, ambushes, kidnapping and criminal action. Also, in recent

history, warfare itself is becoming less civilized. Actions once regarded as criminal are accepted if performed by a state or an organized non-nation force. With these facts in mind, there is a considerable intersection that exists between law enforcement and counterintelligence in the areas of espionage, terrorism and low intensity conflict—especially in situations involving civil and political disturbances, peacekeeping and nation-building.

What is needed is a fusion of police and criminal intelligence. TRADOC PAM 525-5 states, “a major challenge to intelligence analysis will lie in developing reliable, verifiable methodology for measuring nonnation forces’ military capabilities. This is compounded by the profusion and mingling of criminal, as well as ethnic or subnationalist and supernationalist elements, within almost every nonnation force.” Force XXI operations highlight the need for criminal intelligence operations, yet criminal intelligence and law and order are stovepiped and there is no HQDA coordination point. There is a natural link between the USACIDC to Federal, state and local police organizations, as well as international law and order bodies. With that background the Umbrella Group recommended establishing a Provost Marshal General as HQDA staff office focal point for criminal intelligence and law and order policy.

The Office of the Provost Marshal General would be responsible for the following activities:

- criminal intelligence operations;
- law and order;
- enemy Prisoners of War/internment/resettlement operations;
- liaison with Federal, state and international police agencies;
- liaison with Federal Bureau of Prisons (if corrections is divested);
- criminal investigations; and
- protective services.

The HQDA would be the focal point for police and criminal matters. OPMG responsibilities would be carried out under ARSTAF or the Secretariat. Policy centralization and the management of Army law enforcement would be carried out under either ARSTAF or the Secretariat. Providing law enforcement planning, criminal intelligence and operational support including internment/resettlement operations would be carried out best with the Provost Marshal General in ARSTAF. The OPMG being the focal point for criminal investigations and protective services would best be carried out under the secretariat. Finally, the OPMG as liaison with Federal (including the FBOP), state and international agencies would also be carried out best with the OPMG in the secretariat. A focus on criminal investigations and intelligence, with continuing and active liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Customs, Secret Service supports the OPMG in the Secretariat.

The approach to implement the OPMG in the secretariat would require the dual-hat responsibility of the Provost Marshal General to be the commanding general of the USACIDC. In the secretariat, this would preserve the necessary independence (as is the case with the Inspector General) and permit direct access to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army. It would also function to realign ODCSOPS ODL and military police operations agencies to the Provost Marshal General. This would mean a consolidation of police and criminal investigations policy, procedures, oversight, etc. ODL would become PMG staff. It was noted during the briefing that the HQDA redesign downsized Military Police Operations Agency (MPOA) from 16 to 11 and merged with ODL. Finally, the Provost Marshal General would be the focal point for criminal intelligence with links to MPI, CID, FBI, DEA, Customs, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and other field agencies. Having the Provost Marshal General as the focal point for criminal intelligence and investigations would assist HQDA responsiveness in planning and programming support for combating areas which are becoming increasingly important in today’s environment and on future battlefields which have terrorists, ethnic and religious groups, gangs, other groups outside uniformed military organizations.

#### 4.6.2.3 BASOPS FAA Related Issues

The BASOPS FAA recommended that law enforcement services be contracted out. The Umbrella group pointed out that contracting out these services demands an Army-wide, broad-based perspective in management issues. Also, the consideration was made that law enforcement benefits the Army community as a whole and not individuals or single installations (Army Crime Trend Analysis, for example). Additionally, centralized funding permits Army leadership to set the direction. Finally, the Umbrella group brought up the fact that contracting out these services would raise Army oversight and control issues. Police powers remain an Army-wide leadership and control issue; some narrow activities such as physical security and game wardens may be civilianized or possibly outsourced.

The BASOPS FAA recommended HQDA issue service delivery method policy guidance for installation services along with developing service standards and QOL prioritization. The MP institutional FAA proposed an elimination of 4 functions (vehicle registration, AWOL apprehension, crime prevention, gate guard—16 military and 43 civilian spaces) and civilianization of additional functions (700 spaces). The Umbrella group opinioned that both of these are good ideas, but that implementation should be deferred until policy, standards and prioritization are developed by ACSIM and until installation commanders are allowed to work the issues for their unique circumstances.

#### 4.6.2.4 USACIDC Headquarters Staffing

Figure 4-20 below is a comparison between the USACIDC HQ to Major Command and Notional Specialized Command Staffing.

MAJOR	SPECIALIZED	USACIDC HQ
● Commander	●	✓
● Deputy Commander	●	✓
● IG	●	✓
● Chaplain	○	
● Auditor	○	✓ (2/2)
● C of S	●	✓
● SGS	○	✓ (1/1)
● RC Advisor	○	✓ (2/1)
● PA	○	✓ (6/4)
● JAG	○	✓ (8/7)
● Protocol	○	✓ (1/1)
● Historian	○	
● Surgeon	○	
● Internal Review	○	(Auditor)
● Safety	○	
● EEO	●	✓
● Engineer	○	✓ (1/1)
● Provost	○	
● MWR	○	
● Personnel	●	✓
● Logistics	●	✓
● Operations	●	✓
● Intelligence	○	✓ (15/14)
● Information Management	●	✓
● Contract	○	
● Resource Management	●	✓
(36/31)		

Legend:

○ = TBD  
Req/Auth

Figure 4-20. MACOM/Specialized Command/USACIDC Comparison

The headquarters of the USACIDC staff offers several unique functions. First, they act as auditors to ensure the absolute integrity of CID operations world-wide in all matters. Second, the Secretary General Staff (SGS) is comprised of a 5-person Chief of Staff Office, including the Chief of Staff, the detachment commander/protocol, Administration. NCO and Automation Assistant. Third, in the area of Reserve Affairs, they are responsible for reserve CID recruitment, training and retention and must coordinate reserve CID support. Fourth, the USACIDC HQ staff has a world-wide Public Affairs responsibility. Fifth, through the Judge Advocate General they are responsible for wiretap request coordination, counter drug operations, DoD IG subpoenas and criminal investigation report amendment reviews. Sixth, the HQ detachment commander's primary duty is protocol. Seventh, the CID has unique building requirements and thus has unique engineering functions. Finally, the USACIDC HQ is responsible for criminal intelligence and analysis. Focusing on these unique requirements and operations requires specialized knowledge, training/education and a continuous working relationship. All of these are essential for successful job performance and, without which, there is high potential impact on Army for sub-par performance. Moreover, there are traditional staff sections and personnel that do not require specialized knowledge and do not require or are not authorized and not on TDA: chaplain, historian, surgeon, safety, provost, MWR, contract. A matrix support is appropriate for such staff support. HQ USACIDC staff reflects a matrix support rather than organic staff when appropriate.

The USACIDC as a separate command provides a world-wide focus, operations and units. It would also requires command to command relationships during deployments. A separate command structure reinforces the CIDs investigative independence. It would also provides the dual-function of both executing policy, which is the mission of a field operation agency (FOA) as well as assisting the HQDA in formulating policy, which provides the rationale for a Staff Support Agency (SSA). USACIDC meets the definition of a specialized command: A unified command that is directly subordinate to HQDA with operational responsibilities for formulating and executing policies associates with its function.

#### 4.6.3 Recommendations

The Umbrella Group made several recommendations based on the above analysis. First, it was recommended that the USDB be outsourced. This would include activating the internment/resettlement battalion with confinement modules to run CONUS pre-trial facilities and investigating OCONUS alternatives. Second, it was recommended that the Provost Marshall General be reestablished. Third, as noted above, the Umbrella Group advocated that the recommendations impacting BASOPS be deferred until HQDA (ACSIM) develops policy, standards and prioritization of services. Finally, if the USACIDC were retained as a separate command with staff specialties as documented in current TDA, this would entail the dual-hat responsibilities of the USACIDC commanding general and the Provost Marshal General.

### 4.7 *FAA Issues Sheets*

#### 4.7.1 Phase II Recommendations

Following the proponent and Umbrella FAA assessments, the Umbrella group gathered the FAA results into issues. The issues reflected those alternatives that should be carried forward for senior leadership consideration. The following sections provide a synopsis of each of the issues developed from the FAAs briefed by the proponents and Umbrella Group. A full explanation, to include PBD and implementation guidance, is provided in Appendix C.

##### 4.7.1.1 Elimination of Selected MP Functions

Approximately 90% of installation vehicle registration, AWOL apprehension, crime prevention and gate guard authorizations have already been eliminated. Command emphasis, mutual dependency (e.g. gate guard and vehicle registration), and installation directives permit elimination of the remaining authorizations.

#### 4.7.1.2 Elimination of CIDC as a MACOM

Law enforcement on Army installations is a shared process between garrison provost marshals and CIDC. Serious crimes are the purview of criminal investigators assigned to CIDC. Minor offenses are handled by military police assigned to local commands. CIDC was established as a “stovepipe” MACOM in order to ensure independent, impartial investigation, free of undue command influence. CIDC consists of TOE and TDA elements with worldwide responsibilities. The command totals 1,538 military and civilian personnel stationed regionally for area support to commanders. CIDC investigative capability has been reduced by 33% since 1990. In the same period, the emergence of computer and environmental crime has added to the CIDC mission. These factors, and others, combine to argue for examination of re-structuring alternatives which might realize greater efficiency and effectiveness than the current CIDC organization. The Army’s long range plan to reduce MACOMs is a further consideration. Alternatives to a MACOM include the establishment of a criminal investigation arm of The Inspector General, consolidation of criminal investigations at the DoD level, or embed CIDC operational assets within the operational force, responsive to local commanders’ needs. HQDA pronency for Force Protection in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century may offer another consolidation option.

#### 4.7.1.3 TDA Provost Marshal Conversations to TOE

MP deployments for stability and support operations require provost marshal sections to conduct police operations in theater. Current TOE design does not provide for provost marshal sections. Ad hoc organizations have been formed to cover the void. There have been 3181 MP billets, dedicated to TDA garrison law enforcement have been identified as feasible for conversion to TOE provost marshal sections. At least 77% of this number are needed in terms of MP OPTEMPO.

#### 4.7.1.4 Reorganization of the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks

The new USDB, programmed for completion in FY00, includes design efficiencies and new technologies that will improve the guard/inmate ratio and permit reduction in the workforce.

#### 4.7.1.5 U.S. Disciplinary Barracks Operating Efficiencies

The Army is the Executive Agent for incarceration of all DoD service members who are long-term prisoners. The USDB performs the mission of long-term corrections. Currently, 686 military and 123 civilians operate the existing USDB at a cost of \$8 per prisoner per day. The operating budget is \$7.9 million paid for by the Army. Yet, the distribution of the prisoner population is 60% Army, 20% Air Force, 10% Marine Corps, 8% Navy and 2% Coast Guard. DoD consolidation of long-term corrections with joint resourcing on a “fair share” basis would be more equitable and cost effective for the Army. Additional savings could be garnered by capitalizing on prisoner labor to generate income to defray operating costs.



#### **5.1 Background**

The purpose of the Health Care FAA was to examine the Army Health Care System to ensure it is capable of supporting Force XXI requirements. The FAA proponent was the Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) and relevant briefing can be found in Appendix G.

A unique element to this FAA is that the Operational functional area assessment was completed in tandem with the Institutional functional area assessment as part of the TOE forces' regular 2-year FAA process. As such, there were some FAA decisions that impact both the institutional as well as the operational force.

In addition to the proponent FAA, the Umbrella Group, under the sponsorship of ODCSOPS and OASA(M&RA), conducted parallel assessments of the Army Health Care System. The Umbrella Group's charter was to review these processes and make recommendations, which capture "out-of-the-box" thinking. Relevant briefing is at Appendix H.

#### **5.2 Objectives**

The following were the specific objectives of the health care FAA.

- Identify unresolved issues that could impede implementation of requisite structure.
- Design the optimal Army health care delivery system to support Army XXI.
- Ensure a ready, modernized, trained and doctrinally sound AMEDD force.
- Explain the impact/shortfalls of the FY98-03 POM on the restructuring of the AMEDD (all components)

#### **5.3 Methodology**

The overall study methodology was an evolutionary investigative approach designed to systematically describe status quo practices, identify performance issues, investigate reengineering opportunities, analyze impacts and develop alternatives. MEDCOM developed their methodology by concentrating on a concomitant analysis of current business processes and practices contained within each of the core processes. They used, as a framework, the AMEDD Vision which chartered MEDCOM to:

Provide a world class system for total quality health care in support of America's Army at home and abroad...accessible to the total Army family...accountable to the American people.

Using this imperatives as a guide, MEDCOM focused its reengineering efforts on providing an Army health care process that is trained and ready to meet its health care mission (see figure 5-1).

## 1996 AMEDD FUNCTIONAL AREA ASSESSMENT


*AMEDD Mission*

Figure 5-1. AMEDD Mission

**5.4 FAA Briefing**

MEDCOM began its FAA presentations with a review of previous reorganization efforts chartered under the Task Force Aesculapius study. The briefing was presented by the MEDCOM Chief of Staff. The framework of the presentation evolved from the definition of current business processes to a description of a desired end state business processes (see figure 5-2).




Figure 5-2. Current Process

After the discussion of the current progress the major areas listed below were presented for review:

- a. AMEDDs linkage to the operational force;
- b. Mobilization and deployment;
- c. Medical treatment facilities infrastructure reduction;
- d. MEDCOM resources (\$);
- e. Authorization;
- f. Reserve component integration; and
- g. Training.

The discussion then focused on AMEDD's top readiness challenges that were listed as:

- a. evacuation;
- b. command, control, communication, computers and intelligence (C4I);
- c. logistics (Deployable Medical System (DEPMEDS) Equipment); and
- d. dental recruiting

These topics were discussed in detail and the VCSA requested follow-up briefings to the Army leadership to seek guidance and determine a course of action for improvement.

The next major area of discussion was the Medical Reengineering Initiative (MRI) – essentially the medical operational force organizational model for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century - that was approved by the VCSA on 9 October 1996 and to begin implementation in Army Total Area Analysis (TAA) 05.


### **5.5 Organization Alternatives**

After establishing its desired process end state MEDCOM then addressed four alternative structures to satisfy the Army's health care requirements. The four alternatives consisted of:

- |                           |                      |
|---------------------------|----------------------|
| ▪ Alternative 1 -         | Specialized Command  |
| ▪ Alternative 2 -         | Disestablish MEDCOM  |
| ▪ Alternative 3 a and b - | U.S. Medical Command |
| ▪ Alternative 4 a and b - | U.S. Medical Service |

### 5.5.1.1 Briefing Points (Alternative 1—Specialized Command)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative one depicted below in figure 5-3. This alternative would streamline the MEDCOM staff to purely functional responsibilities, defining other, special staff responsibilities, e.g., legal chaplains, internal review, etc., to commanders of tenant installations.



#### Advantages:

Reduces number of MACOMs

- Unity of command
- Senior AMEDD Officer in Charge
- Streamlined Command and control
- Economies and efficiencies derived from matrix organization
- Single AMEDD champion
- Tried and proven

#### Disadvantages:


- Savings already realized-minimal additional manpower or dollar savings to Army
- AMEDD product lines not aligned with Army product lines

Figure 5-3. Alternative #1 - Specialized Command

Alternative 1 would still leave the Army short of a fully integrated health care institution required to support Force XXI requirements.

### 5.5.1.2 Briefing Points (Alternative 2—Disestablish MEDCOM)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted under alternative two depicted below in figure 5-4. In this alternative internal Army health care services are focused on soldiers – their health to enhance training, and their care when exposed to threatening operations. Other Army health care services, e.g., families, retirees, civilians, would be provided by sources outside the immediate Army structure such as a Health Maintenance Organization. (HMO).



**Advantages:**

- AMEDD product lines aligned with Army product lines
- Reduces number of MACOMs
- Three-4 Star advocates
- In Line with DA PAM 100-1 approach

**Disadvantages:**

- Breaks up integrated system
- No unity of command
- Increased need for coordination
- Would require growth of OTSG
- No savings-possible growth required
- Reduces synergistic effects

**Figure 5-4. Alternative #2 - Disestablish MEDCOM**


This alternative would provide the Army a fully integrated health care system capable of supporting Force XXI requirements.

**5.5.1.3 Briefing Points (Alternative 3A - Establishment of U.S Medical Command)**

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative 3-a depicted below in figure 5-5. In this option each service retains its autonomy and individual Surgeon General as a service headquarters special staff officer.

This alternative would establish a joint medical command but would keep the services separate. It could serve as the first step in the establishment of a joint medical command.

## ***U.S. Medical Command Alternative #3a***

**Figure 5-5. Alternative #3A -U.S. Medical Command (service unique)**

#### 5.5.1.4 Briefing Points (Alternative 3B - Establishment of U.S Medical Command)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative 3B depicted below in figure 5-6. Under this option service capability is merged and blended into a single health care organization. Autonomous Surgeon General positions and reoriented to functional areas such as training and research and development.




Figure 5-6. Alternative #3B-U.S. Medical Command (service unique)

This alternative establishes a Joint Medical Command. The advantages and disadvantages of both 3 A and B, are depicted below (see figure 5-7):

### Alternative #3

#### Advantages

- Enhances Jointness and Readiness in Health Care Arena
- Enhances Health Care response and support to Civilian Agencies
- Single Military Manager of Defense Health Care System
- Consolidates Service Medical Activities
- Consolidation will result in Economies of Scale Savings and enhance Cost Effectiveness
- Eliminates Redundant Functions
- Allows Assistant Secretary of Defense(Health Affairs) to focus on Strategic Issues

#### Disadvantages

- Counter to Oct 1991 SECDEF Memo assigning ASD(HA) the Mission of executing DoD's Medical Mission
- Other Services opposed to Unified Command

Figure 5-7. Alternative #3 - Joint Medical Command

### 5.5.1.5 Briefing Points (Alternative 4A - Establishment of U.S Medical Service)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative 4A (see figure 5-8). This alternative expands health care to a broader national role with Defense as one of its primary customer. Alternative 4A retains the organizational construct of Alternative 3B




Figure 5-8. Alternative #4A - U.S. Medical Service

### 5.5.1.6 Briefing Points (Alternative 4B - Establishment of U.S Medical Service)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative 4B depicted below in figure 5-9. This alternative further integrates the warfight responsibilities throughout the broader national health care providers, retaining a focused, Joint Task Force, under the Combat Command of the Joint Force Providers, Commander Atlantic Command.




Figure 5-9. Alternative #4B - U.S. Medical Service

The advantages and disadvantages of alternative 4A and 4B are depicted below in figure 5-10:

## ***Alternative #4***

### **Advantages**

- Consolidates DoD and Department of Veterans Affairs, Excess Capacity, resulting in Cost Savings
- Consolidation produces more effective Single System
- Single Source Graduate Medical Education
- Reduces Size of Service Surgeon General Staffs
- Reduces Size and Scope of ASD(HA)
- Improves Cost Effectiveness of Federal Health Care Delivery

### **Disadvantages**

- Combines Two Distinctly Different Cultures
- Would require specific Cabinet Oversight
- Could lead to significant outsourcing of Nonwarfight Requirements
- Military Assets in the Sustaining Base would be integrated into a Civilian-Military Structure
- Dual Delivery Systems still in Operation -- One for Retirees, VA Beneficiaries -- One for Active Duty Personnel
- Deployment of Forces could create a Health Care Delivery Void
- Separates Sustaining Base Health Care from War Fight Health Care

**Figure 5-10. Alternative #4 – National Health Care Providers**

#### ***5.5.1.7 Conclusions***

MEDCOM recommended adoption of Alternative 1. The rationale for this alternative was that this alternative would create a specialized command that would be the single source provider of all U.S. Army health care. The VCSA requested a follow-up In Process Review (IPR) in six months and outlined several subjects to be addressed.

#### ***5.6 Functional Area Assessment Follow-up IPR***

As a result of the VCSA guidance MEDCOM presented a follow-up IPR Briefing on 10 July 1997 (Appendix I) covering the areas listed below:

- combat lifesaver training;
- flight surgeon utilization;
- congressional fellows;
- graying of RC physicians;
- satisfaction w/ Joint medical training;
- recruitment of dental officers;
- evacuation update;
- MEDCOM reorganization update;
- AMEDD Center and School (C&S) to TRADOC;
- TDA hospitals to TOE; and
- TAA hospital Status.

The first six areas of interest were addressed by providing information papers that can be found in Appendices J through O. The status of the other five areas of interest were briefed in detail and are summarized below.

##### ***5.6.1 Evacuation Update***

MEDCOM presented a Level II to Level III Battlefield Evacuation plan that is designed as a joint operation utilizing Air Force lift capabilities. The plan was recommended for incorporation into the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Operations Plan (OPLAN).



### 5.6.2 MEDCOM Reorganization Update

MEDCOM briefed an organizational plan that continues to streamline AMEDD's structure. Major points of the plan include:

- a. capitalizing communications technology; and
- b. focusing on ARSTAF support while maintaining one AMEDD staff.

### 5.6.3 AMEDD C&S to TRADOC

MEDCOM reviewed the transfer of the AMEDD Center and School (C&S) to TRADOC. MEDCOM reported that the concept was operational, but presented numerous reasons to retain the C&S in MEDCOM.

### 5.6.4 TDA Hospitals to TOE

MEDCOM briefed the TDA to TOE integration plan. Plan is executable and has FORSCOM support. MEDCOM plans to continue to study and implement the concept.

### 5.6.5 TAA Hospital Status

MEDCOM briefed Hospital Resourcing Initiatives that will be included in the next TAA. This initiative will improve the support of MTOE hospitals by the Defense Health Program (DHP).

## 5.7 ***Umbrella Group Assessment—X***

The parallel assessment focused on business process reengineering (BPR) principles including single process ownership, treating process activities like a business and integrating like core processes into the total system to eliminate duplication. Additional guidance by the VCSA required the inclusion of five areas of special interest which were briefed in detailed.

The umbrella presentation began with a thorough review of MEDCOM's product, customers and workload. A profile of MEDCOM was presented as the basis of the analysis.

MEDCOM's Organizational Profile:

- evolving to a "specialized" command DA PAM 100-1;
- fenced resources provided by OSD(HA) – DHP;
- performs to some degree all of the Army's 12 Institutional Core Process;
- comprised of mix of TDA/TOE units; and
- MEDCOM's role in these core processes has been or is being reviewed during the other Institutional Axis proponent FAAs (e.g., TRADOC – Develop Doctrine).

The umbrella team then addressed the first item of special interest involving the future of MEDCOM's existence as a MACOM by reviewing three alternative structures. These presentations were used as a vehicle to address the next four of the items of special interest of:

- reestablish TSG as principal position on ARSTAF;
- transfer of Center and School to TRADOC;
- transfer of Doctrine and Combat Development to TRADOC; and
- transfer of Materiel Development to AMC.

### 5.7.1 Briefing Points (Alternative 1 – Disestablish MEDCOM)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative one depicted below in figure 5-11.

## Alternative #1




Figure 5-11. Alternative #1 Disestablish MEDCOM (Umbrella Group)

This option considers five of the VCSA items of special interest by eliminating MEDCOM as a major command; reestablishing the TSG as a principal on the ARSTAF; transferring the C&S, Doctrine and Combat Development to TRADOC; and transferring Materiel Development to AMC.

### 5.7.1.1 Briefing Points (Alternative 2 – MEDCOM as a Specialized Command)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative two depicted below (See figure 5-12).





Figure 5-12. Alternative #2 MEDCOM as a Specialized Command (Umbrella Group)

This option formalizes MEDCOM current organization into a specialized command.

### 5.7.1.2 Briefing Points (Alternative 3a – MEDCOM as an Army Service Component Command (ASCC) of a Joint Command)


The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative 3A depicted below (See figure 5-13).



**Figure 5-13. Alternate #3 Joint Command (a) (Umbrella Group)**

This organizational alternative presented MEDCOM as a joint command that would be organized under the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) model.


5.7.1.3 Briefing Points (Alternative 3b – MEDCOM as a ASCC of a Joint Command)  
 The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative 3b depicted below  
 (See figure 5-14).



This organizational model was used to analyze MEDCOM as a Joint Command without service specific operational controls.

The last area of special interest that was briefed was the umbrella teams concept of converting TDA Hospitals to TOE structures. The concept depicted below (figure 5-15) is based on constructing TOE hospitals by using modular organizational units that include active and reserve military and civilian personnel. Under this concept the Army would have modular hospitals, parts/modules of which could be detached and deployed in crisis response whether it be a military operation or support of civil authorities such as natural disasters. While deployed the modules would be back-filled by local, mobilized reserve component units routinely affiliated with the hospital. Ideally the reserve unit would perform its annual training mission at the affiliated hospital, familiar with not only the staff and facilities but, in some cases, even the patients – persons who routinely access health care at that hospital.

## Current TDA to TOE



**Figure 5-15. Current TDA to TOE (Umbrella Group)**

### 5.7.1.4 Conclusions

The umbrella group review of alternative organizations and special items of interest resulted in the following assessments based on guidance from the VCSA.

<u>Guidance</u>	<u>Assessment</u>
MEDCOM as a MACOM	Can Be Done Eliminate Layers: MACOM HQ; RMC HQ
TSG Reestablish as a Staff Principal	Can Be Done HQDA/FOA/SSA grows Resource Management at HQDA
Individual Training to TRADOC Combat Development to TRADOC Materiel Development to AMC	Can Be Done 4 star advocacy Synergy
TDA to TOE	Should be Done!

The VCSA's response to the various MEDCOM organizational alternatives, based on the initial FAA, IPR and Umbrella briefing, is captured in the Phase II recommendations in the next section. In summary, the VCSA found merit in the TDA and TOE hospitals merger. He felt that it was not appropriate to pursue organizational changes for MEDCOM and TDA/TOE merger at the same time; those initiatives should be tabled for future consideration.

## **5.8      *FAA Issues Sheets***

### **5.8.1   Phase II Recommendations**

Following the proponent and Umbrella FAA assessments, the Umbrella group gathered the FAA results into issues. The issues reflected those alternatives that should be carried forward for senior leadership consideration. The following sections provide a synopsis of each of the issues developed from the FAAs briefed by the proponents and Umbrella Group. A full explanation, to include PBD and implementation guidance, is provided in appendix C.

#### **5.8.1.1 Establishment of Joint Medical Command**

Analysis of the Army's 12 institutional core processes identified a potential organization change, which may serve as a catalyst for streamlining and consolidating like functions. This change is based on the premise that health care is not an Army core process and is therefore a service that could be provided by alternative sources. The consolidation of health care services in a Joint Medical Command would serve to reduce duplicative requirements (manpower and dollars) and provide a single Joint Medical Force for supporting the CINCs. This consolidation would also provide savings in the current institutional health care system and maintain the quality of health care to the beneficiaries.

#### **5.8.1.2 Medical TOE/TDA Integration and Command**

In FY96 there were 23 Army Community Hospitals (ACH) such as Womack Army Community Hospital, Ft. Bragg, NC, organized under TDA. The Army also has, pending conversions attributable to Medical Reengineering Initiative (MRI) and allocation in TAA 05, 15 active and 37 reserve TOE hospitals of various types, e.g., combat support hospitals (CSH), field hospitals, etc. While no two ACH are exactly alike, a preliminary comparative analysis of one (Womack) with an MTOE hospital (28th CSH) revealed approximately 80% match in required medical personnel by grade and skill. Integration of the two into a single unit with both deployable and nondeployable elements could leverage the DHP when not deployed and potentially identify redundant spaces that could be returned to the Army. At issue is command of the composite hospitals.

#### **5.8.1.3 Disestablishment of MEDCOM**

Analysis of the Army's 12 institutional core processes identified a potential organizational change that may serve as a catalyst for streamlining and consolidating like functions. MEDCOM and FORSCOM have command and control responsibilities for similar CONUS based medical units: MEDCOM for TDA; FORSCOM for TOE. Similar conditions exist in USAREUR and USARPAC.

Reconfiguring/merging TDA and TOE units under FORSCOM and transferring medical C&S to TRADOC could effectively disestablish MEDCOM as a stovepipe major command. Medical materiel development function could transition to AMC. Remaining functions of medical research, veterinarian, dental, preventive medicine and institutional healthcare policy oversight could be reconfigured as an FOA of HQDA/TSG or transferred to FORSCOM as appropriate.

## 6.1 Background

The Military Intelligence (MI) FAA was presented to the VCSA and the ASA(M&RA) on 12 December 1996, by the Commander, United States Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS). The purpose of the Military Intelligence FAA was to present reengineering concepts for redesigning the core process of *maintaining and sustaining land operations*. A copy of the briefing is at appendix P.

The Umbrella Group presented a parallel assessment of Military Intelligence on 5 December 1996. A copy of that briefing is at appendix Q.

## 6.2 Objectives

The following were the objectives of the MI FAA:

- provide an MI Branch overview;
- describe how MI is evolving to meet Army XXI requirements;
- provide an MI Force assessment; and
- describe current issues requiring resolution.

## 6.3 Methodology

The presentation of an integrated MI TOE and TDA FAA was deemed necessary because of the operational link between MI TOE and TDA forces and the fact that both are changing in response to Army XXI concepts and the defining of the future MI force. Further, both are influenced by evolving technologies and lessons learned from previous operations.

The following *design imperatives* were used in the assessment:

- combined arms integration and the use of MI as part of that team;
- intelligence capabilities at each echelon of the force;
- balanced and tiered capabilities in the air and on the ground; and
- the achievement of efficiencies.

The briefing was divided into the major categories of doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel and soldiers. Major issues falling under some of those categories were identified as the following:

- lack of realistic simulation-driven combined arms training capability;
- need for NCO restructuring;
- shortfall in field-grade MI officers;
- need for precision deep strike sensors (ASAS-RWS) within corps and divisions; and
- Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) reductions and restructuring.

## 6.4 Military Intelligence Assessment

### 6.4.1 The Integrated Role of Intelligence

The presentation began by stressing that intelligence agencies and units are becoming increasingly integrated and that the lines between each have become more indefinite (See figure 6-1). Additionally, the Army's MI force at corps and division levels will become flatter, more integrated and seamless under evolving modernization and with increasing emphasis on support to the warfighter as shown at figure 6-2.




Figure 6-1. The Integrated MI Force




Figure 6-2. The Army's MI Force

The combination of intelligence assets ranging from national and joint capabilities to Army echelon above corps (EAC), corps and division within the TDA and TOE active and reserve component forces, presents a major operational challenge. A description of how MI is evolving (figure 6-3) to meet Army XXI requirements, to include a view toward gaining efficiency through future functional and organizational changes and land information warfare activity (LIWA) was provided.




Figure 6-3. Evolution of the MI Force

#### 6.4.2 Intelligence Modernization

MI is undergoing modernization in response to evolving technologies and a new generation of systems and doctrinal concepts in response to Army XXI (See figure 6-4). Army XXI will require that MI be multidimensional, simultaneous, non-linear, distributed, precise and integrated on the battlefield. Commanders will require immediate information to achieve battlefield dominance, information that includes the entire battlefield, and provides precision targeting, force protection and operational links to joint and national activities (figure 6-5).






Figure 6-4. MI Today




Figure 6-5. Army XXI

The Future MI Force consisting of Division XXI and Corps XXI will be developed by FY99 and will be based on the results of work by integrated functional concept teams and MI studies. Objectives are to allow MI requirements to evolve around Army requirements, in order to provide national and joint leverage, integrate new technologies and pursue efficiencies.

### 6.4.3 Major Briefing Points

#### 6.4.3.1 Doctrine

This portion of the briefing discussed MI doctrine and noted that the MI community will deal with a wide range of unpredictable threats; joint and coalition requirements at divisional echelons; increasingly urban terrain; need for fine grain resolution; diverse and coalition augmentees; and political pressure to minimize casualties. Intelligence echelons have differing requirements based on focus, volume and responsiveness as depicted at figure 6-6.




Figure 6-6. Army XXI Stability &amp; Support Ops

Doctrinal concepts include (See figure 6-7):

- Synchronization;

- Broadcast;
- Split-basing; and
- Tactical tailoring.




Figure 6-7. Doctrine

These provide the major elements residing on a platform of intelligence operations available to interagency, joint and combined elements. This doctrine has been integrated into joint doctrine and is relevant to future doctrine in support of Army XXI and the Army After Next. Reduction in field manuals, elimination of a paper-based system and saving accrual of \$720K in publishing and production costs are projected.

#### 6.4.3.2 Training

Training goals are outlined at figure 6-8. The objective is to develop training materials for the entire force, with the understanding that training must be conducted in a realistic environment to be effective.




Figure 6-8. Intelligence Training XXI Goals

#### 6.4.3.3 Leader Development

Leader development will involve officers and NCOs who are competent in Brigade Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) operations (particularly in S2 operations), confident in building intelligence architectures and are able to operate in a joint environment under the guidance of national, defense-level and joint agencies. An overview of leader required competencies is at figure 6-9.




Figure 6-9. Leader Development Overview

#### 6.4.3.4 Organization

Significant reductions in MI force composition (both military and civilian personnel) will occur between FY90 through FY96 as shown at figure 6-10. Division MI organizations will experience a delta resulting from losses and gains of organizational elements and systems, while increasing risk factors such as reduction in determining threat intent and heavy reliance on targeting and surge capabilities will occur above the division level.




Figure 6-10. MI Force Composition

#### 6.4.3.5 Materiel

The numbers of systems and platforms are being reduced in the areas of ground and airborne collectors and communications processors. Capabilities such as precision support to targeting and wide area surveillance will be affected but efficiencies in maintenance, training, force structure and numbers of systems will result (See figure 6-11).





Figure 6-11. Modernization Strategy

#### 6.4.3.6 Soldiers


Soldier requirements under Joint Vision 2010 (See figure 6-12) will cause MI soldiers to be increasingly involved in the joint environment and the complex national-to-tactical integration.

Figure 6-12. 21<sup>st</sup> Century Soldier Requirements

## 6.4.4 Issues


The following major issues were raised:

6.4.4.1 Lack of realistic and robust simulation-driven MI combined arms training capability. The requirement has been validated but is unfunded, and Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Training (IEWTPT) is needed to produce high resolution simulations, support leader training, achieve Warfighters' Simulation (WARSIM) 2000 objectives and meet the CSA intent concerning MI BOS (See figure 6-13).




**Figure 6-13. Training**  
*-Improved Intel Training-*

6.4.4.2 Field grade shortfalls in MI majors results in only a 47% percent fill of authorizations with the average division receiving only 25% of Officer Distribution Plan (ODP) (See figures 6-14 and 6-15). Recommendations for easing the shortfall included requirements reductions, reduction in functional area participation, selective continuation of MI majors and reduction in policy fill.



**Figure 6-14. Leader Development**  
*Field Grade Shortfall*



**Figure 6-15. Leader Development**  
*Field Grade Shortfall*

- MI organization and force composition estimates indicate corps and division deep strike capability is at risk without responsive precision sensors on the battlefield (See figure 6-16). The

UAV force structure must be maintained at both levels. The ASAS-RWS requirement is underfunded by \$65.33M as noted at figure 6-17.




Figure 6-16. Materiel

*Deep Strike: Future Aerial Reconnaissance*




Figure 6-17. Materiel

*ASAS RWS for Army*

- The MI NCO structure exceeds Army Model strength requirements (figure 6-18) and should be restructured. A proposal has been submitted for both PERSCOM and proponent review and will have operational and retention implications.




Figure 6-18. Soldiers


*NCO Restructure*

#### 6.4.5 Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)

The role of INSCOM and possible changes to its organizational structure were addressed. It was stated that as the primary echelons above corps (EAC) asset, INSCOM plays a critical role in force protection and in providing specialized intelligence collection, regional and technical expertise and daily coordination with national and joint intelligence activities.

##### 6.4.5.1 Reductions

It was noted that INSCOM will experience a 37% reduction in organization after FY90 as a result of actions noted at figure 6-19. Potential additional structure reductions increase risks in the areas of national-level support, increased mobilization time, surge support, and dealing with changes in the law and policy.



**Figure 6-19. Organization  
INSCOM in Transition**

#### 6.4.5.2 Options

Options include INSCOM:

- as a Specialized Command;
- as an MSC of FORSCOM; and
- the DCSINT dual-hatted as the commander of INSCOM.

The FAA proponent recommended that Specialized Command option in order to maximize the preservation of critical functions, provide simpler coordination with national agencies and to reduce structure. A detailed description of each of these options is at section 6.6.

#### 6.4.6 Conclusions and Recommendations

The following conclusions and recommendations were offered by the FAA proponent.

- An integrated MI force is essential to meeting MRC and S&SO requirements in gaining information and battlefield dominance.
- Army XXI requirements will increase target density and decrease reaction time.
- Volume and responsiveness of primary collectors in the Army exceeds that of the other services.
- Non-operational costs can include loss of fidelity and leverage.
- Force XXI requires a seamless MI architecture.
- INSCOM should be made an Army Specialized Command.
- A UFR of \$20M for IEWTPT should be supported.
- Eliminate MI 01A/02A requirements; reduce functional area participation by 50%; selectively continue eligible MI majors; and reduce policy fill from 96% to 85%.
- Acquire Corps UAV if necessary, and support migration of GRCS to ARL and ACS.
- Support ASA-RWS UFR of \$65.33M beginning in FY98, and field it in accordance with the DAMPL.
- Continue force reduction efforts.

### 6.5 Summary

The Military Intelligence FAA provided a broad overview of the challenges the intelligence community faces during a period of uncertain requirements; increased need for commanders to have immediate and precise intelligence under Army XXI; the dependence on technology and communications; the need to ensure that enough qualified officers and NCOs are available to carry out increasingly demanding roles; and the need to ensure an organizational structure

capable of responding to intelligence from the national and joint levels and to strategic intelligence demands. Major issues were identified in the areas of modernization, doctrine and manpower, and solutions were suggested. The Umbrella Group stressed the core processes performed within the intelligence community and offered alternative organizations for INSCOM as a MACOM.

## 6.6 Military Intelligence Umbrella FAA

The Umbrella Group briefing addressed the following areas:

- the MACOM status of INSCOM;
- the 40% reduction in MACOMS;
- TDA to TOE efforts;
- POM 00-05; and
- HQDA redesign Functional Area Review (FAR) of DCSINT.

The Umbrella Group discussed the approach they had taken in assessing the Army's intelligence program in terms of the Army's 12 core processes and in concert with the reengineering hypothesis. They defined the MI core processes and used process reengineering to suggest an organization that could provide better and more cost-effective intelligence. Military intelligence was identified as an *enabling* process that merges the TOE and TDA into a single capability. Performance measures such as relevancy, timeliness, and accuracy are used when judging its value to commanders. The DoD enterprise model provided a framework for consideration of the intelligence process (See figure 6-20).




Figure 6-20. Intelligence in Context & The Intelligence Process

The various laws and directives that provide the basis for the intelligence process were noted and the major current influences on the intelligence community and their impacts on the area of intelligence are described at figure 6-21. In addition, the Umbrella Group identified reviews of the various initiatives that the intelligence community was undertaking (See figure 6-22). The recurring themes that were contained within current initiatives were cited as the following:

- streamline operations and organizations;
- improve support to the warfighter;
- leverage technology;
- synchronize and integrate capabilities; and
- eliminate duplication.






Figure 6-21. Intelligence Process Basis




Figure 6-22. Intelligence Community Initiatives

The current intelligence organization in the Army is shown at figure 6-23. Intelligence process funding and manpower levels indicated that the intelligence community was overstructured and underfunded, given organization, architecture and technology required in the next century.

A portion of the briefing addressed INSCOM and provided organizational alternatives to its role as a MACOM. These alternatives included those identified during the FAA but also contained a recommendation concerning the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC):

- a specialized command (as is);
- a specialized command (folded into the NGIC);
- NGIC as an FOA of DCSINT (dual-hatted); and
- NGIC as an MSC of FORSCOM (power projection alignment).





Figure 6-23. Today's Military Intelligence Force

#### 6.6.1 Alternative 1-INSCOM as a Specialized Command


This option is depicted at figure 6-24. Modest savings derive from this alternative.



**Figure 6-24. Alternative #1**  
**INSCOM as a Specialized Command**

### 6.6.2 Alternative 2-NGIC as a Specialized Command


This option is at figure 6-25. IC allows for a stand-alone entry point into the national level architecture.



**Figure 6-25. Alternative #2**  
**NGIC as a Specialized Command**

### 6.6.3 Alternative 3-NGIC as a FOA


This option is at figure 6-26. Under this concept, the DCSINT would be dual-hatted as the FOA commander. The DCSINT would be the entry level into the National architecture and is Army Service Cryptologic Executive (SCE).



**Figure 6-26. Alternative #3**  
**NGIC as a FOA**

#### 6.6.4 Alternative 4-NGIC as an MSC of FORSCOM

This alternative is at figure 6-27. It aligns EAC intelligence with the force projection command. The G2 is the entry point to the National architecture and is Army SCE.



**Figure 6-27. Alternative #4**  
**NGIC as a MSC of FORSCOM**

The summary chart on briefing major points is at figure 6-28. Conclusions are at figure 6-29.

Summary	
Guidance	Umbrella Assessment
MACOM Status of INSCOM	Can be a Specialized Command "As Is" or as flattened organization under NGIC
40% Reduction in MACOMs	As NGIC can be a FOA under DCSINT or MSC under FORSCOM
TDA to TOE	INSCOM SIGINT units offer opportunity for TOE conversion
Measure of Efficiency & Effectiveness (POM 00-05)	Modest savings & streamlined organization with re-role of NGIC; additional yield in 9026/LIWA merge; further potential in TOE conversion
Follow-on	
- DCSINT FAR	Opportunity to take on additional issues: linguists; polygraph; force protection
- TOE Redesign	Should be pursued in conjunction with OPMS Study

Figure 6-28. Summary

Conclusions	
Concerns	"Umbrella" Perspective
Oversight	Army equities are protected by HQDA mechanism already in place
Access to National Intelligence	NGIC is entry point into National architecture; 74th Sde Commander should leverage SIGINT
Loss of NFIP	Exploit NFIP for civilians (no BES issue) & exploit NFIP for TOE (EAC) military
Dilution of NGIC production capability	NGIC will need some spaces from INSCOM for command & control of subordinate units
Degradation of support to warfighter	Army intelligence customer is Army Component Commander (or JTF); what is core to the Army should be embedded at component level & below so as to be responsive to ground commanders; G2 fusion machine & battlefield collection are key at each operational echelon
Over-confidence in technology advances	In the Information Age, evolutionary organizational change may not keep pace with technology or decision cycle of commanders

Figure 6-29. Conclusions

## 6.7 MI FAA Leadership Guidance

The MI FAA resulted in the following guidance provided by the VCSA.

- MI should focus on reducing field-grade requirements ASAP. The intelligence leadership should make recommendations as to where the Army can reduce joint MI requirements and advise service counterparts that the Army intends to make this a Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) issue.
- The MI community must be realistic in terms of what will be available in Military Satellite Communication (MILSATCOM).
- The MI community must work to upgrade current automation, where practical, rather than simply buying new lines of equipment.
- The proposal for converting INSCOM from a MACOM to a specialized command, with maximum conversion of TDA units to TOE is deferred.
- The ARSTAF must look at assigning RC personnel to AC units with ALO shortfalls, with the possibility of manning some units up to 200% of RC fill. The ARSTAF should investigate doing this across the Army.
- The Army must be careful to not try to solve the information warfare issue by just providing more personnel.
- MI focus on fielding Joint Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (JTUAV) and determining how much of the gap can be filled by the loss of Hunter.
- Make the whole personnel structure as lean as possible and at the next personnel laydown provide savings figures for the POM years.
- Training is the biggest solution to information warfare rather than purely technical solutions.
- The UFR for ASAS must compete with other UFRs.
- Continue working the MI NCO structure issue without breaking the MI NCO corps.
- MI personnel should not be overwhelmed with information but must understand the commander's intent and support that intent, understand how to do battle tracking and how to use the intelligence automation at their disposal.
- As Army increases its modularity for split-based operations, it must do so without increasing personnel requirements.

## 6.8 Additional Briefings

### 6.8.1 Update to VCSA

An update on the Military Intelligence FAA was provided to the VCSA on May 2, 1997. The purpose was to provide an update on taskings received at the FAA and to seek additional guidance from the VCSA. A copy of the briefing is at appendix R. The briefing focused on:

- force assessment and reduction;
- INSCOM C2;
- TDA to TDA conversions; and
- initial ideas concerning AC and RC mix.

A force assessment issue recap and status of taskings provided during the FAA were provided as shown at figures 6-30 and 6-31.

MI FORCE ASSESSMENT — Issue Recap —	
ISSUE	RECOMMENDATION
• Lack of Realistic Simulation Driven Combined Arms Training	Support \$20M UFR for IEWTPT
• Field Grade Shortfall	Eliminate MI 01A/R2A Rptmt Reduce FA participation by 50%. Selectively continue eligible Majors Reduce Policy FBI from 98% to 85%.
• Deep Strife: Future Aerial Reconnaissance	If CONOPS/FCE does not work, acquire UAV for Corps Fight. Support migration of GRCS & ARL to ACS.
• ASAS RWS	Support UFR of \$65.33M beginning in FY98. Field ASAS-RWS IAW DAMPL.
• Force Reduction	Work in progress!
• INSCOM C2	Specialized Command

Figure 6-30. MI Force Assessment

Recap of VCSA Taskings	
• Divisional MI Bn — Make as small as possible — FM at 100% or higher — AC/RC Composite Unit	• Done ...
• Corps MI Bde — Explore integrating RC into AC	• Done ...
• INSCOM — Convert to Specialized Command — Convert TDA to TOE	• Done ...
• Field Grade Requirements — Reduce vice off-load	• Done ...
• Recap Total MI Force ... reduce — Joint — All COMPOs	• Working ... J1 & JWCA ISR issue • Done ...

Figure 6-31. Recap of VCSA Taskings

### 6.8.2 Final Briefing to the VCSA

A final briefing was presented to the VCSA on July 31, 1997 (Appendix S). The purpose was to provide a final status update on taskings received at both the MI FAA and the May, 1997, meeting noted above. The briefing included many of the same issues addressed at the May meeting. They were:

- force reductions;
- ASAS RWS;
- CSTAR funding;
- MI field grade shortfall;
- tactical restructuring; and
- drawdown opportunities.

The majority of earlier taskings had been completed.

### 6.8.3 Recommendations

The following recommendations were made to the VCSA:

- proceed with INSCOM drawdown opportunities and conduct a study to determine if billets could be outsourced; and
- make operational and tactical reductions but DCSOPS needs to work the USAREUR floor and ceiling issues.

## **6.9            *FAA Issue Sheets***

During a review of Phase II recommended issues conducted in October 1997, the following MI issues were presented. Detailed issue sheets including recommendations and proposed implementing guidance are at appendix C.

### **6.9.1   Echelons above Corps (EAC) Intelligence**

INSCOM is a "stovepipe" MACOM with operational responsibility for EAC intelligence and it serves as a conduit for National intelligence support to combatant commanders.

INSCOM could become a specialized command and realize efficiencies by reducing overhead structure and retaining only operational capability. Alternatives include converting TDA to TOE to the maximum extent and shaping INSCOM as an EAC equivalent to a division; making INSCOM a FOA of DCSINT; or making INSCOM an MSC under FORSCOM.

### **6.9.2   Joint and Defense Intelligence Requirements**

Army intelligence billets represent 18% of the total Army contribution to defense and joint requirements (2,300 spaces) and just 3% of Army fill. INSCOM provides an additional 3,112 SIGINT spaces to NSA. National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and other requirements result in a competing demand for fill in the TOE Army, particularly at the field grade level. A reduction of joint and defense Army spaces is warranted.

## Chapter 7

### Support to Organizational Training FAA

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#### 7.1 *Background and Objective*

The purpose of the Support to Organizational Training (SOT) FAA was to present the reengineering concepts and recommendations for redesigning the Force XXI core process, **support organizational training**. FORSCOM presented the AC to RC training support portion of the SOT FAA to the VCSA and the ASA(M&RA) on 12 March 1997, while TRADOC presented the TDA training support section on 7 July 1997. FORSCOM's and TRADOC's findings can be found in appendices T and U, respectively.

In addition to FORSCOM and TRADOC, the Umbrella Group, under the sponsorship of the DCSOPS, conducted a parallel assessment of the SOT FAA and presented their finding to the Assistant DCSOPS (ADCSOPS) on 6 March 1997. Their findings are discussed later in this chapter (section 7.5) and the briefing can be found in its entirety in appendix V. Because the Umbrella Group's findings were not significantly different from the proponents' FAAs, or recommendations were within the purview of the DCSOPS for implementation, results were not presented to the VCSA and ASA(M&RA).

#### 7.2 *Methodology*

#### 7.3 *FORSCOM FAA Process*

FORSCOM's on 12 March 1997, briefing reviewed the C2 structure and manpower to support RC unit training. The purpose of this briefing was to:

- determine the optimum Command and Control structure for AC to RC training support;
- determine how much AC and RC manning is required; and
- apportion AC and RC manning properly within the support structure.

FORSCOM made several considerations in the following three areas:

- Force Projection Army;
- Guidance; and
- Factors.

These three areas comprise the outline by which FORSCOM organized the entire briefing. To review current AC to RC numbers, refer to page 10-11 of the briefing included in appendix T.

Under the first area, Force Projection Army, FORSCOM considered the following:

- The National Military Strategy is based on:
  - flexible and selective engagement,
  - deterrence and/or conflict prevention; and
  - to fight and win, if necessary.
- There are few forward stationed forces.
- Most, if not all, CONUS units have multiple-theater options.
- Enhanced brigades could go to any theater as well as work for any corps or division.
- Support and Stability Operations (SASO)/Operations Other Than War (OOTW)/Lesser Regional Contingency (LRC) will require tailored packages, location(s) and composition unknown.

From these considerations, FORSCOM concluded:

- the emphasis should be on the pre-mob training relationship;
- the goal is a same-training relationship, pre-mob and post-mob; and
- realities define the active component relationship.

Under the second area, Guidance, FORSCOM considered the following:

- Integrate structure;
  - Tri-component strengths
  - Total Army
- Optimize structure;
  - History and experience
  - Active Component infusion
  - Best service to RC units
- Strengthen CONUSAs; and
  - Missioned to support RC training, mobilization
  - Extensive structure
- Recognize impact on Active Component units.
  - Operational tempo (OPTEMPO)/ Personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO)
  - Dedicated Active Component individuals

Under the third area, Factors, FORSCOM considered the following:

- Pre-BOLD SHIFT experience;
  - Post-Draft period (1973-1990)
  - Desert Shield/Desert Storm
- BOLD SHIFT experience;
  - Platoon focus
  - Lanes training
  - RTT, RTD, ORE, etc.
- Title XI experience;
  - 3,4 years
  - Dedicated, Available
  - RTB, RTBn, Div (E)
- Redundancies; and
  - Readiness Groups (RGs), RTTs
  - RTBs, OREs
- Lack of unity of command
  - CONUSA—RTB—RTD
  - Active Component Division—RTD

The current AC to RC Structure is depicted in figure 7-1. Also included, in figure 7-2, is a graphical representation of the complexities that a typical RC unit commander currently must negotiate and coordinate.





## Current AC/RC Structure




Figure 7-1. AC to RC Structure




Figure 7-2. Typical RC Unit

Training Support Brigade (TSB) functions are:

- coordinating and conducting combined arms lane training;
- assisting during Annual Training (AT) and Inactive Duty Training (IDT) to make assessments (namely advising, giving evaluations and mentoring) and to provide Mobile Training Teams (MTTs);
- approving a Yearly Training Program (YTP)/Mission Essential Task List (METL) for all units except E-Brigades and GO Command YTP/METLs which are approved by an associated Active Component unit;

- providing input to the Combat Training Center (CTC) assessment process, namely, in Battle Command Support Teams (BCST) results and the Training Assessment Model (TAM);
- providing inputs to Title XI requirements for high priority units. This includes assessing personnel, equipment and resource shortfalls, assessing compatibility for the RC unit with active component force and providing data to the associated active component unit commander; and
- executing Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA)/Mobilization (MOB) requirements as assigned by CONUSA (AC DCO and DCEs provided)

A graphical representation of the Training Support Brigade concept and organization is provided in figures 7-3 and 7-4.




Figure 7-3. Training Support Brigade Concept

### TSB Organization




Figure 7-4. Training Support Brigade Organization

Training Support Battalion (TSBn) functions are similar to those of the TSB:

- coordinating and conducting combined arms lane training;
- assisting during Annual Training and Inactive Duty Training to make assessments (namely advising, giving evaluations, and mentoring) and providing Mobile Training Teams (MTTs);
- providing Training Assessment Model evaluation as directed (battalion and below);
- participating in the Yearly Training Program/Mission Essential Task List process; and
- providing branch and functional assistance (formerly from Readiness Groups).

Figures 7-5 and 7-6 below represent the Training Support Division Integrated Alternative and the Training Support Battalion (CA and CS/CSS) organization.




Figure 7-5. Integrated Alternative

## TSBn (CS/CSS) Organization




Figure 7-6. TSBn (CS/CSS) Organization

Figures 7-7 and 7-8 provide a breakdown of the Training Support Division (TSD) headquarters organization as well as a recap of the TSD, manpower requirements respectively. Training Support Division Headquarters functions (ADCON).

- coordinating headquarters (which does not play in training execution);
- scheduling lanes simulations and Training Assessment Models;
- synchronizing the missions of subordinate brigades;
- coordinating resources; and
- conducting regional Annual Training sites and conference dates.



## TSD HQ Organization (5 Div)




Figure 7-7. TSD HQ Organization

<b>Tng Spt Div (TSD) Recap (5 Div)</b>				
	<b>DR RES</b>	<b>AGR</b>	<b>AC</b>	<b>CIV</b>
<b>DIV HQ (5)</b>	720	200	105	165
<b>TSB HQ (27)</b>	1,485	540	324	270
<b>SIM BDE (5)</b>	2,470	95	170	70
<b>CA BNS (38)</b>			1,894	
<b>CS BNS (16)</b>	3,392	48	368	16
<b>CSS BNS (18)</b>	3,816	54	414	18
<b>E-BDE RTD(15)</b>			709	
	<b>11,883</b>	<b>937</b>	<b>3,984</b>	<b>539</b>
			<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>17,343</b>

Figure 7-8. Tng Spt Div (TSD) Recap

**Conclusions:**

- There should be an integrated synergism which will optimize each component's expertise, which has tri-component potential and which establishes a "Total Army" example.
- A more efficient structure would optimize Title XI spaces and will save other spaces in the active component spaces and Active Guard Reserve (AGR).
- A more unified command for training support places CONUSA in charge of RC training support and improves standardization.
- The Active Component mentor relationship with RC is improved.
- More flexibility will enhance ability to surge, to focus on needed areas, to task organize (as required) and to seek assistance through the chain of command.
- Balances have an impact on active component units. Associated active component units will continue Section 1131 support and active component units will provide RC mentorship (in designated relationships). FORSCOM will task active component units for support as or if needed (considering OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO).

**FORSCOM noted several concerns during their briefing:**

- The AC is "backing away" from RC training.
- There is concern for the USAR's command and control role in the ARNG's unit training.
- CONUSA command and control implies no confidence in Div(E) headquarters.
- The Army Reserve has lost colonel headquarters' opportunities.
- There is a question concerning the value of the added Training Support Directorate/DIV(E) headquarters.
- There has been a loss of Readiness Group support.
- Five thousand titled positions equal self-fulfilling ceiling.

**Actions:**

- Implement a hybrid organizational alternatives to the proposed end state (TSD) immediately. See figures 7-9 and 7-10 below for a depiction and recap of the hybrid alternative. FORSCOM has already organized Active Component structures of the hybrid alternatives, effective 1 October, 1997. RC determines appropriate Drilling Reservist, AGR support.




Figure 7-9. Hybrid Alternative



### Hybrid Alternative (Recap)

	DR RES	AGR	AC	CIV
DIV EX HQ (5)	837	123	15	104
FEB HQ (24)	384	48		96
TSB HQ (15)			630	
SIM BDE (5)	2,470	95	170	70
CA BNS (38)			1,894	
CS BNS (16)	3,392	48	368	16
CSS BNS (18)	3,816	54	414	18
LSB (22)	440	110		220
E-BDE RTD(15)			709	
	11,339	478	4200	524
			<b>TOTALS 16,541</b>	

Figure 7-10. Hybrid Alternative (Recap)

- An integrated organization will be established as an end state. See figure 7-11 below. FORSCOM will establish a Process Action Team (PAT) for review and analysis. End state is to be made effective 1 October, 1999. For a comparison of active component personnel authorization/titling integrated and hybrid alternatives, refer to pages 24-25 and 30-31 in the FORSCOM SOT briefing included in appendix T.




Figure 7-11. Training Support Brigade Concept

## 7.4 TRADOC SOT FAA

TRADOC's assessment of the training support portion of the SOT FAA was briefed to the VCSA and ASA(MRA), 7 July, 1997. The briefing included the overall findings that SOT is fragmented and stovepiped; has duplicative support organizations; and has limited feedback to management. The briefing recommended that there be just one training GOSC, one acquisition process, and one warehouse management system. Also, it recommended a regionalized, outsourced and consolidated Army wide video, film graphics fabrication and Training Support Center support.

### 7.4.1 Briefing Points

#### 7.4.1.1 Mission and Definition

The mission identified in the FAA was to conduct a zone reconnaissance to identify concepts for further detailed study and to identify potential space efficiencies for FY 00-05+ POM. The end state is a Force XXI in which soldiers, leaders and units are prepared to deploy, fight and win in combat at any intensity level, anywhere, anytime, as shown here in figure 7-12.




Figure 7-12. Soldier, Leader, &amp; Collective TOE Training


#### 7.4.1.2 Resource Overview

SOT provides the resources (i.e. ranges, aids, devices, simulators, materials, people, visual information (VI), multimedia products/services, etc.) from TDA organizations to unit commanders to conduct effective and efficient AC and RC unit training. This does not, however include the Combat Training Center (CTC Process Action Team) or TOE-to-TOE support.

The total number of TDA spaces designated to Army-wide SOT Training Support Lane is 9010 (4129 military spaces and 4881 civilian spaces). Over 75% of these spaces (2554 military and 4226 civilian spaces) are designated as direct support at the installation level. Categorically policy is designated 6.6%

(283 military and 4881 civilian spaces); acquisition and general support has 16.3% (1241 military and 227 civilian spaces); and feedback has 1.9% (51 military and 118 civilian spaces). These numbers include Army-wide MACOM military and civilian spaces. Of direct support category, range support has over 52% of the total spaces, making it the largest single piece of direct support. Overall findings suggest that SOT is not user-friendly, is fragmented and stovepiped, has duplicative support organizations and has limited feedback.

#### 7.4.1.3 Executive Summary of Issues, Potential Impact and Recommendations


**Support to Organizational Training FAA**

Issue Summary	
CATEGORY	ISSUES
1. Policy:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Multiple DA-level training regs &amp; pams</li> <li>• Multiple GOSC</li> <li>• Multiple publications guide Commander</li> </ul>
2. Acquisition:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "Too much training support stuff"</li> <li>• System TADSS \$\$ diverted in acquisition process</li> <li>• New Equipment Training (NET) is resource intensive</li> <li>• Multiple, unsynchronized acquisition processes</li> </ul>
3. General Support:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Multiple warehousing systems</li> <li>• Multiple materiel management information systems</li> </ul>
4. Direct Support:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Education Center opportunity</li> <li>• Multiple support organizations</li> <li>• Resource-intensive ranges</li> </ul>
5. Feedback:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited feedback process</li> </ul>

Figure 7-13. TRADOC Issue Summary

#### 7.4.1.4 Policy Issues

There are at least 28 HQDA-level training regulations and pamphlets. There are multiple GOSCs and multiple publications guide Commanders. The bottom line is that policy and guidance are not user friendly. TRADOC provided several recommendations. First, there should be one training GOSC. This will create a better management arrangement. Second, there should be one training and training support regulation which will make the whole process more user friendly. Finally, there should be one 'guide' for the Commander, e.g. digital mission training plans (MTP) + Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) + Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) + Field Manuals (FMs). DCSOPS and TRADOC have already started following up on these recommendations to fix the problems.

#### 7.4.1.5 Acquisition Issues (including requirements)

There is simply too much training support material. This problem is exacerbated by Training Development (TD) shortfalls and a lack of unit training. TRADOC recommends that in order to fix these problems, first of all, existing training materials by Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and unit type or slice need to be discarded. This will reduce inventory. Second, a single GOSC and acquisition process should be developed. Doing this will align Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations (TADSS), ranges, etc., and will install better requirements management. Third, TRADOC recommended investment in the Training Development account. The ASA (MRA) and DCSOPS are already helping to fix Training Development manpower. TRADOC's final recommendation, which is already underway as part of TRADOC Common Core, is to recapture Unit Training Management training. This will allow



units to know how to use the system (Action: DCSOPS/TRADOC). TRADOC Training Development manpower is down 76% since 1987.

The second acquisition issue is that the systems Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations (TADSS) money is diverted in the acquisition process. TRADOC made several recommendations to fix this problem. First of all, System TADSS should be included within the proposed Training GOSC oversight. This will have the effect of integrating and aligning system and nonsystems TADSS (Program Manager's). Second, system training monies should be listed on a separate line in the (PM) budget. This would provide the new Systems' training 'tail' more visibility. Third, TRADOC recommended that Program Executive Officers (PEO) and PM be required to notify proponents if training funds are diverted. This would enable proponents to adapt with the new training strategies. Finally, an Army-wide simulation/simulator strategy should be developed. Such action would ensure compatibility among TADSS, instrumentation, etc. This should also reduce costs.

The third acquisition issue is that new equipment training (NET) is resource intensive and that post-new equipment training exhibits a sustainment gap. The first recommendation that TRADOC made is to require self-paced, stay-behind new equipment training packages. This action will help to fill the NET gap. Second, TRADOC recommended that SOT maximize technology-based new equipment training (e.g. Distance Learning, Embedded Computer Based Training, etc., which will lower delivery costs, and standardize training. This will also help to fill the NET gap. The final recommendation was that Operational Training Base (OTB) increase its outsource of new equipment training to maximum in order to save up to 291 (plus) spaces. It would require investing \$14.5-29.1M (plus) million (Action: SARDA/DCSOPS/AMC). Army-wide new equipment training resources are as follows:

Army-wide NET resources:		
AMC	291	129 military and 162 civilians
TRADOC	279	Zeroed in 1998
<b>TOTAL TDA</b>	<b>670</b>	
Contractors	500	Estimated
MACOM	425	Estimated-Borrowed Military Manpower
+\$150M		




Figure 7-14. TRADOC's Recommendation

The final acquisitions issue that TRADOC noted in their brief is that the acquisition process is multiple and unsynchronized (i.e. ranges, system TADSS, non-systems TADSS, etc.). The best long-term solution to the acquisition problem is to improve requirements. Figure 7-14 outlines TRADOC's recommendations for improvement.

#### 7.4.1.6 General Support Issues

There are multiple warehousing systems, such as Visual Information (VI), Training Aids, Devices Simulators and Simulations (TADSS), Graphic Training Aids (GTA), Training Support Plan (TSP), Army Training Support Center (ATSC), Army-wide Doctrinal and Training Literature Program (ADTLP), etc. and multiple Army Correspondence Course Programs (ACCP) (AMED C&S, Army War College (AWC), Judge Advocate General (JAG), Army Logistics Management Center (ALMC), etc.). TRADOC recommended, first, to consolidate all Army-level training materiel warehousing management in order to save overhead spaces. Consolidation will require a warehousing review. This process would include consolidating Visual Information under DCSOPS from DISC4, to simplify command and control. It could also involve the consolidation of Army Correspondence Course Program operations under the Army Training Support Center (ATSC) which will save 23 spaces and which will consolidate Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP) budgets at ATSC. Second, TRADOC recommended minimizing warehouse functions by improving management processes, maximizing pinpoint distribution and maximizing electronic distribution. This consolidation should reduce warehouse costs. Third, OTB should contract out and divest warehouse functions. This should produce further savings, to be determined.

The second general support Issue is multiple training materiel management information systems. TRADOC recommended that all training materiel management information systems be integrated into one inventory, ordering and utilization "objective" system (Training and Visual Information Support System—Super TRAVISS). The impact of this recommendation would be to make the system much more user-friendly, with an investment cost of \$15M (over POM), and a cost avoidance of up to \$206M (over POM). TRADOC also recommended that MACOMs must have a 'voice' in the system (Change Control Board—CCB) which will identify all requirements.

#### 7.4.1.7 Direct Support Issues

There are 3 issues relevant to direct support: Education Center opportunity, multiple support organizations, and resource-intensive range support costs. Over 75% of all TDA spaces are under direct support category. Also, approximately 34% (\$32.3M) of the Education Center's \$94.7M budget is in personnel overhead costs.

The first direct support issue is Education Center opportunity. TRADOC recommended that education centers, learning centers and the distance learning mission integrate. The mission would be consolidated to either DCSPER or DCSOPS (Education Workgroup Initiative). Distance learning centers may be moved under the Director of Plans, Training and Mobilization (DPTM). Additionally, personnel training needs must be reviewed. Finally, TRADOC recommended that a manpower survey be conducted to determine requirements and also that tuition assistance (TA) be automated. These consolidation efforts support a new distance learning mission with the existing infrastructure. It also places an emphasis on education for training support and aligns installation needs and resources. Another impact would be the investment of 1.35M in new technology training and the optimization of support costs. Testbeds are underway. Second, TRADOC recommended that OTB outsource its education functions, an ASA(M&RA) initiative. This will save up to 710 spaces and invest up to \$32.2M. An additional option would be a plus-up tuition assistance by any savings.

The second direct support issue is multiple support organizations. TRADOC first recommended creating an installation Training Resource Management (TRM) process (within FM 25-100/101 planning process). The impact would be on cross-level needs and resources. Second, all installation-level support management, including training support centers (TSC), simulations centers, ranges, libraries (ed, pubs, VI), education centers—distant learning Centers, visual information (VI) and fabrication shops should be consolidated. This would unite the Command and eliminate duplication. Finally, TRADOC recommended regionalizing, outsourcing and consolidating (ROC) within HQDA-level Regionalizing Outsourcing and Consolidating (ROC) plan for VI operations, fabrication and training support centers. This effort should save spaces (TBD, up to 788+ civilian spaces) and eliminate duplication, with an investment of \$45-\$90M (TBD).

The third direct support issue is resource-intensive range support costs. It is important to note that ranges are over 52% of total SOT TDA spaces. DCSOPS has tasked TRADOC TRAC (TRADOC Analysis Center) to study range, targets and instrumentation policy, requirements, acquisition, operations and support. All of this will function to develop accurate options with an investment of \$4.6M to do the study. The \$4.6M is broken down as follows: 2.6M and 9 months, current options; and 2.0M and 24 months, Force XXI requirements. This is a TRADOC Analysis Center estimate per director of the OASA(MRA). A second and new recommendation is to centrally manage ranges, targets and instrumentation requirements within the Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS) and Life Cycle Management Model. Doing this should reduce life cycle costs, as well as align range, target and instrumentation requirements. Finally, it was recommended that OTB civilianize or outsource the operation of range facilities. This should save up to 2122 military and up to 2601 spaces (TBD) for a total savings of 4723 spaces. The investment is \$236-\$472M (TBD).

#### 7.4.1.8 Feedback Issues

There were 2 feedback issues:

1. Information is stored in multiple 'libraries'.
2. There is a limited training support feedback process.

TRADOC recommended that there be one system under Center for Army Lesson Learned (CALL) for all feedback and lessons learned. This will produce a more user-friendly process with an investment of \$760k per year to digitize. To do this a manpower survey among 'libraries' must be conducted (e.g. Army Research Institute, AAA, IG, Safety Command, etc). This will reduce spaces (TBD). Also, a proponent evaluation capability must be re-established in order to forge the unit-proponent link, and to improve requirements, investing up to 80 spaces or a contract of \$4-\$6M. It is important to note that feedback leverages the approximately \$10B training system for greater efficiency. Also, the CALL is already developing a solution—110,000 hits per week. CALL is the DoD Information Technology testbed.

#### 7.4.2 Conclusions

TRADOC found, in conclusion, that SOT is not user-friendly, is fragmented and stovepiped, has multiple support organizations and gets limited feedback. SOT goals are to have combat-ready units for TRADOC to develop what units need to support fits within units' resources and for training to "go to war." A summary of recommended concepts and investment is provided in figure 7-15 below.

Support to Organizational Training FAA			
RECOMMENDED CONCEPTS	MIL	CIV	INVEST (POM 00-05+)
<b>1. POLICY</b>			
• One Training GOSC			qualitative
• One DA-level training & training support reg			qualitative
• One Unit Commander digital 'guide'			qualitative
<b>2. ACQUISITION</b>			
• One acquisition & requirements process			qualitative
• System TADSS \$\$ line item visibility with Training GOSC			qualitative
• Technology-based New Equipment Training (NET)	Up to 129+	Up to 162	Up to 29.1M
<b>3. GENERAL SUPPORT</b>			
• One training warehouse management system		TBD	TBD
• One ACCP system		23	
• One training product inventory software system			\$15.0M
			cost avoid \$206.0M
<b>4. DIRECT SUPPORT</b>			
• Regionalize-Outsource-Consolidate Army-wide video, film, graphics, fabrication, TSC support		Up to 788+	Up to 78.8+M
• Integrate Education Centers with Distance Learning			\$1.35M
• Study range policy, acquisition process, operation & support			4.6M
	Up to 2,122	Up to 2,601	Up to 472.3+M
<b>5. FEEDBACK</b>			
• One Lessons Learned & feedback electronic 'library' at CALL		TBD	\$1.00M
• Re-establish proponent evaluation teams			80 spaces or \$4+M
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Up to 2,251+</b>	<b>Up to 3,654+</b>	<b>Up to 606.1+M</b>

Note: Rough Order of Magnitude data

Figure 7-15. TRADOC Recommended Concepts

## 7.5 Umbrella Group Assessment SOT FAA


The Umbrella Group conducted a parallel assessment of the support to organizational training process. The assessment was completed using the following approach:

- Define the process product, customer and proponent.
- Assess the current process in terms of the Army's Institutional 12 core processes.
- Reengineer the processes as appropriate and deduce an organization redesigned to provide better or more cost-effective support to organizational training.

To accomplish this in the most effective manner, they used the DOD Enterprise Model to define the process and organizations. Furthermore, the Umbrella assessment was carried out with a particular vision in mind for the Institutional Force, as depicted below in figure 7-16.

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## Institutional Force -- A Vision



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Figure 7-16. Institutional Force -- A Vision

The SOT process provides a customer-focused seamless support system. The SOT product is unit training support and the customers are the army units. The activities are:

- training aids, devices, simulators and simulations;
- training ranges, facilities and land;
- training ammunition;
- combat Training Centers;
- training support units;
- training evaluations; and
- training feedback.

There are many Phase I and Phase II issues that are relevant to the SOT process. For Phase I, these issues are illustrated below in figure 7-17.

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### Phase I FAA Issues Relevant to SOT Process

- **Acquire and Sustain Facilities FAA**  
Outsourcing Real Property Functions & Facilities - APPROVED
- **Manage Information FAA**  
Disposition of Non-Core IM Responsibilities - APPROVED
- **Develop Doctrine**  
TRADOC becomes single process owner for doctrine - APPROVED
- **Determine Requirements**  
Align all CD activities in TRADOC - APPROVED
- **Training Development**  
A single Army Training Management System - Study due July 97
- **Leader Development**  
TRADOC to become single Leader Development Process Owner -  
Concept Plan due October 96

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Figure 7-17. Phase I Issues

There are several areas in which Phase II FAA issues are relevant to the SOT process. First of all, the entire Installation Management core capability and its resourcing impact on the SOT process. The installation is the conduit through which many of the support to organizational training resources are provided. As such, standards for "Services" should be developed as well as a "5<sup>th</sup> option" for managing installations. Second, under Law Enforcement, because of OPTEMPO concerns and the limited number of MP units, TRADOC was tasked to address the feasibility of developing training packages to allow other type units (e.g. light infantry) to operate and perform MP functions. Thirdly, under Medical, the issues relevant to the SOT process are: blending operating (TOE) and institutional (TDA) hospitals; determining appropriate MACOM command and control relationship; and consideration of C&S to TRADOC, et al. Finally, under Intelligence, the SOT-relevant issues are the manning of the Active Component TOE personnel shortfalls with RC at 200% and the consideration of INSCOM to FORSCOM transition.

## 7.5.1 Process Briefing Points

### 7.5.1.1 The Process

Figure 7-18 below illustrates the SOT process. The process includes any and all aspects of supporting unit commanders at all levels with the direction, assets and capability to conduct organizational training. It includes, but is not limited to, determining requirements, establishing policy, allocating resources, acquiring assets (training aids, simulators, ranges, etc.) and supporting units with assistance, oversight and evaluation in the conduct of realistic combat oriented organizational training.




Figure 7-18. Support to Organizational Training: The Process

### 7.5.1.2 The Organizations

Figure 7-19 below illustrates the various organizations that correspond to the different SOT processes.

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## Support to Organizational Training: The Organizations




Figure 7-19. Support to Organizational Training: The Organizations

### 7.5.1.3 Process and Product

The product is Unit Training Support. Given the commander is responsible for the conduct of training, this FAA addresses the process that provides the support necessary for organizational training to take place. The below figure 7-20 depicts the SOT process and product.




Figure 7-20. SOT Process and Product

### 7.5.1.4 Process proponent

FORSCOM is the process proponent for SOT. But there are several other stakeholders, namely HQDA, TRADOC, AMC, USARC, USAEUR, EUSA and ARNG involved in the core capability of generating and projecting forces, to which SOT is core. The stakeholders and their respective areas of responsibility are:

- HQDA  
DCSOPS-OTEMPO

DCSOPS (FD & TR) – establish requirements  
 ASA(FM&C) – allocate funds  
 ASA(M&RA) – training policy  
 DUSA(OR); ASA(RDA); DCSOPS – Modeling and Simulation  
 ASA(RDA) – acquires “system” TADSS

- TRADOC
  - DCST; NCS; ATSC; CTC; Center and School Commandants – set standards and evaluate
  - CTC; CALL; TRAC; Center and School Commandants – conduct feedback
- AMC
  - STRICOM – acquire “non-system” and some system TADSS
- FORSCOM; USARC; USAREUR; EUSA; ARNG
  - Responsible for TOE unit readiness – conduct organizational training, employ SOT
  - Acquire “non-system” TADSS


FORSCOM and TRADOC provided complementary FAA briefings regarding the reoperation roles in Support to Organizational Training FAA. The FORSCOM briefing included the range of AC to RC support issues: traditional support (support and assistance programs), Title VII (ORE/RTT/RTD) and Title XI (AC TO RC support programs). The TRADOC briefing included TDA training support: TADSS, training ranges, training ammo, facilities and educational centers. There were several SOT topics that FORSCOM and TRADOC did not cover in their FAA briefings. These issues are: combat training centers (CSA directed General Officer (GO) Process Action Team (PAT), TOE unit support to training, Operational tempo, acquisition costs, borrowed military manpower, support for joint training, active component units (e.g. 2ID), and support of “response” force packages (MTOF).

#### 7.5.1.5 SOT Process Resources

Figure 7-21 summarizes the Army’s manpower and dollar investment in SOT.

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### SOT Process Resources



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Figure 7-21. SOT Process Resources





### 7.5.1.7 Acquiring Assets for the SOT Process

**As is.** First, SOT requirements are not coordinated. The system requirements for training support are often squeezed out of the procurement. As a result, system and non-system requirements often compete for a much smaller resource pot. Second, TADSS is perceived as a billpayer for unplanned Contracted Logistical Support (CLS). Third, there is very little integration between system and non-system requirements at HQDA. Finally, the Army Training Support Center provides oversight of schools pronponency for system TADSS.

**To be.** First, SOT acquisition should be consolidated at Simulations Training and Instrumentation Command (STRICOM). This would mean less system procurement. Secondly, the training support centers should be regionalized and realigned (See figure 7-23). For example, Electronic Multimedia Imaging Centers (EMICs) should be regionalized Army-wide. This would entail expanding the Ft. Eustis TRADOC EMIC concept throughout the Army. Before EMIC there were 100 people in the Training Aids Support Center, but after the EMIC was established there were only 40. The initial cost for equipment was approximately \$350K, with a savings of \$120K per site, per year (60 people at \$20K). Regionalizing and realigning training support centers would entail: regionalizing TADSS production/Visual information (VI) Multimedia regionalization; divesting GTA/VI Equipment/VI Products and Graphics; outsourcing Photo (wet); and the consideration to use March Air Force Base as JVIC pinpoint Visual Information distribution. This regionalization and realignment carries with it a potential savings of up to 424 spaces or \$25 million. Finally, the SOT process should be included as part of the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications and Computers (DISC4) study.




Figure 7-23. Regionalize TSCs Army-wide

One of the main problems in acquiring system and non-system TADSS is that the MACOMs purchase TADSS without a valid requirement and/or with no support plans or money in POM. In figure 7-24 below, the TADSS acquisition process is outlined.




Figure 7-24. TADSS Acquisition Process

#### 7.5.1.8 Provide Capability from SOT Process

**As is.** Active component support for training reserve component units consists of different programs implemented at different times. This is inefficient and redundant. Also, each MACOM has its own training support and educational centers, VI has not leveraged new technology and SOT has not been focused (installations, MACOMs and DCSOPS). Finally, the feedback for SOT is not integrated (e.g., Standard Army Training System, CALL, FXXI Db, CTCs, and Training, Exercise and Military Operations).

**To be.** First, active component support to reserve component should be restructured. This would entail reducing redundant command and control elements integrating AC to RC throughout units and focusing on effectiveness, simplicity and efficiency. Second, Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) BASOPS/ Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)-OPFOR should be contracted out. Third, education centers should be either, outsourced or privatized or should be converted to distance learning centers. Finally, a single SOT process owner should be established.

#### 7.5.1.9 AC to RC Support to Organizational Training

**As is.** To begin, AC support to RC training exists as a sort of "congressional patchwork" without a synchronization concept. Also, the organizational construct itself lacks simplicity, efficiency and effectiveness—there is an "alphabet soup" of AC to RC relationships. There are redundancies in headquarters and a lack of command unity. And finally there is no relationship between force structures and requirements. Often, spaces are not based on requirements, but on law.

**To be.** To ameliorate the existing AC to RC support to organizational training inefficiencies, the AC to RC organization first of all should be integrated from top to bottom. Second, AC to RC should be organized to maximize the training/management role. Third, AC to RC should capitalize on tri-component training experiences. Fourth, to reduce unnecessary redundancies, AC to RC should develop a “one stop shopping” for reserve component people to support unit training. Finally, measures of effectiveness should be based on efficiency and effectiveness and not on the oftentimes arbitrary number of spaces determined by law.

### 7.5.2 Umbrella Recommendations for the SOT Process

There are many organizations in the Army that are not coordinating with SOT very well, such as training ranges and facilities, TADSS, training ammunition and combat training centers. Considering this fact, it is an important question to ask, can some efficiencies be made even more effective? It is important to first reengineer the process in order to deduce the organization, as seen here in figure 7-25.





Figure 7-25. Reengineer the Process - Deduce the Organization

The Umbrella group made several recommendations to improve the SOT process. First of all, there should be a single SOT process owner. The traditional view is that decisions about the SOT process should be split between TRADOC and the Deputy Commanding General (CA). The DA Pam 100-1 view is that the SOT process should be owned by FORSCOM (G-3). Figures 7-26 and 7-27 below provide an overview of two different SOT proponent structures. The second recommendation that the Umbrella group made was to eliminate and/or consolidate: Deputy Chief of Staff for Training to the Deputy Commanding General, Combined Arms Command; Army Training Support Center to CALL; and NSC to STRICOM. The Umbrella group also recommended that training support centers and Visual Information both do a better job of leveraging technology and that they both be consolidated Army-wide.

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## SOT Proponent Structure - Option "A"




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Figure 7-26. SOT Proponent Structure - Option "A"

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## SOT Proponent Structure - Option "B"



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Figure 7-27. SOT Proponent Structure - Option "B"

## **7.6            FAA Issue Sheets**

Following the proponent and Umbrella FAA assessments, the Umbrella Group compiled the FAA results into issues. The issues reflected those alternatives that should be carried forward for senior leadership consideration. Subsequent paragraphs provide a synopsis of each of the issues developed from the FAAs briefed by FORSCOM, TRADOC and the Umbrella Group. A full explanation, to include PBD and implementation guidance, is provided at appendix C.

### **7.6.1    Support to Organizational Training Process Owner**

SOT is currently provided by a variety of organizations; however, there is not a single process owner responsible for a product—trained units, for a customer—the combatant command. This results in duplication, redundancy, reduced visibility of customer concerns and issues and complications in the distribution of resources. Designating a process owner will resolve the above and ensure standard, consistent organization support to the Army in peacetime or in conflict.

### **7.6.2    Army-wide Range Operations Study**

Range operations currently require approximately 4,723 (2,122 military, 2,601 civilian) SOT personnel (not including borrowed military manpower or reserve component training), excluding those supporting reserve component training. Range, target and instrumentation sets should be developed within a centralized management structure, based upon proponent approved tasks. An Army-wide study should identify more cost-effective ways to acquire, maintain and operate Army ranges (including targets, instrumentation, land, etc.). Assume a 20 percent reduction in manpower as a result of this study.

### **7.6.3    AC Support to RC Organizational Training**

Current AC support to RC organizational training structure is complex, redundant and inefficient. It lacks unity of command/effort, habitual training relationships and AC to RC integration. Proponent recommends an end state organization comprised of 5 tri-component training support divisions of 27 training support brigades (6,007 AC personnel) effective October 1, 1999.

### **7.6.4    Distance Learning**

Per FAA, 34 percent of Education Center budget (or about \$32 million) is in personnel overhead. The integration of Education Centers, Learning Centers and the Distance Learning mission will be more efficient and will improve education services. TRADOC has identified an initial cost of \$1.35 million for each new technology training course; Army Continuing Education System (ACES) has identified a requirement for no fewer than five courses, total \$6.75 million. TRADOC estimates \$4.4 million to automate education services; ACES is conducting ABC study to determine net costs and savings, including contracting out of some functions. At SOT FAA TRADOC estimated an additional cost of \$160 million over POM 00-05 to accelerate to fully implement distance learning. Anticipate a 20 percent reduction in personnel overhead costs as a result of these efficiencies with likely additional savings in other areas (e.g., resident instruction, Training Exercise and Military Operations (TEMO), Temporary Duty). There is an existing \$839 million investment in Distance Learning technology.

### **7.6.5    Training Feedback System Standardization**

Training feedback is currently stored in multiple “libraries” utilizing various feedback systems. “There are still too many points of contact to deal with on automation issues at DCST (TDAD, ATSC, and TASS are a few examples”. This situation makes it difficult for units to retrieve, use and learn from past and on-going training events. Currently SOT feedback systems do not transfer data among themselves. They neither display data in a standardized format nor do they store data in a standard manner. The result is that data can not be shared within the TEMO, Advanced Concepts and Requirements (ACR), and Research Development and Acquisition (RDA) domains. It also means that data input to Army Training Digital Library (ATDL) is done manually, if at all. Standardizing the Army’s training feedback

systems will increase unit access to reports and data, improve management, tracking, and quality control and reduce automation needs and associated overhead.

#### 7.6.6 Consolidate Training Management Information Systems

Currently, there are multiple training management information systems for materiel inventory, media inventory and ordering. This causes duplication, reduced access and a loss of asset visibility, with a resultant loss of training efficiency. Consolidating existing management information systems into one system will reduce costs and increase inventory visibility, access and control, allowing unit commanders to identify and use training support more effectively.

#### 7.6.7 New Equipment Training (NET)

As proponent for new equipment fielding, TRADOC is inadequately reimbursed for their role in NET. Proponency should address all aspects of equipment fielding, to include NET. Making the PM responsible for NET will increase visibility of NET requirements and protect this funding.

#### 7.6.8 Consolidate TADSS Management

Systems TADSS funding is sometimes diverted during the acquisition process. Consolidating Non-system and System TADSS review within the "Super" training GOSC oversight will ensure hardware compatibility consistent training strategies, policy and guidance and eliminate critical funding shortfalls. GOSC and proponent notification will be required when system TADSS funds are diverted.

## Chapter 8

### Financial Management FAA

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#### **8.1 Background**

The Financial Management (FM) FAA was presented to the VCSA and the ASA(M&RA) on September 5, 1997, by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA(FM&C)). A copy of the briefing is at appendix X.

#### **8.2 Objectives**

- Describe proposals for maximizing information technology;
- provide concepts for enhancement of workforce effectiveness;
- propose ways to improve funds management;
- identify tools to effect improvements;
- identify methods to optimize resource management within the Army;
- simplify finance and resource management processes; and
- create efficiencies in financial operations.

#### **8.3 Methodology**

The finance community primarily focused on their internal processes and functions as well as their workforce when developing the FAA. They emphasized the need to involve FM agencies from HQDA through the field level. The methodology used to develop information consisted of:

- workshops at HQDA and MACOM levels;
- consultant development of selected issues;
- professional development sessions for resource and finance personnel;
- use of a multi-attribute utility model; and
- an Army Audit Agency (AAA)/ US Army Cost and Economic Center (CEAC) validation of resource implications.

In addition, written comments on the redesign process were requested from both HQDA activities and MACOMs.

One of the most important methods used during the FM review was an independent analysis of the Army's financial management by the consulting firm of Booz-Allen & Hamilton and two off-site sessions held at their conference facility in McLean, Virginia. The first session held from December 9-11, 1996 was designed to define the current FM processes and identify issues for further consideration. The second session was conducted from February 11-14, 1997 and was intended to develop optimum solutions to issues identified and to recommend changes necessary to create processes for the future. Participants included FM personnel from installation through HQDA levels.

The major issues derived from the meetings served to codify the areas of consideration to be identified during the FAA. These were generally divided into planning process, manpower and management issues. The issues were subsequently described in detail and then ranked by average score and benefits. Breakout groups then considered each and developed optimum recommended solutions and change requirements.



## **8.4 Financial Management Assessment**

### **8.4.1 Current Defense Trends**

The FAA results presentation began with an overview of the current trends in the DoD environment that are influencing resource management. It was noted that these trends significantly impact financial management and will require bold redesign steps:

- continued NPR initiatives;
- government downsizing through personnel reductions;
- Quarterly Defense Review (QDR) emphasis on outsourcing and infrastructure reductions; and
- reduction in Army civilian end strength from 252,000 in FY97 to 199,000 by FY05.

### **8.4.2 Major Briefing Issues**

Within the overall review of finance systems within the Army, the following general areas of concern formed the basis for identified specific improvements:

- Army financial systems are old;
- financial and functional systems do not connect;
- program and budget processes are bottom-up rather than top down;
- roles of the FM community at HQDA, MACOM, and installation levels are unclear;
- part of the service accounting process has been outsourced (DFAS) and is not under Army control; and
- financial processes are labor intensive.

Not only are there broad, systemic issues that need to be addressed within the financial community but the following process improvements were determined to be necessary to allow for increased efficiency, organizational functioning, use of technology and improved funds management.

#### **8.4.2.1 Planning Process**

- The Army needs a single authoritative source and vision for the PPBES process;
- TAP and the DPG need to be reconciled;
- relationship between the TAP and other Army planning documents needs to be established; and
- there is a need for a common architecture from the planning to the programming and budgeting stages of FM.

#### **8.4.2.2 Manpower Process**

- Need to develop credible workload analysis systems to support resource allocations;
- manpower and dollar disconnects allow for lack of integrated resource decisions;
- lack of linkage between civilian manpower and PPBES funding can create affordability and imbalance problems; and
- lack of clarity between the manpower and FM communities leads to inefficiencies and confusion.

#### 8.4.2.3 Management Process

- A single proponent for management analysis programs is necessary to prioritize programs and initiatives based on return of investment (ROI)/savings, and to provide a vision for the future;
- use realistic cost factors and allow for review and approval of outsourcing decisions at lower levels;
- identify one proponent for a single set of finance processes to guide quality programs; and
- eliminate of AR 5-10 as a basis for assessing military and civilian jobs.

#### 8.4.3 Recommendations

The solutions to the variety of issues inherent in the FM process were then addressed according to FAA guidance and included: maximizing information technology; organizational improvements; improving workforce efficiency; improved business practices; and improved funds management.

##### 8.4.3.1 Maximize Information Technology

- Resource and financial management processes should make use of existing WEB technology to draw information from disconnected financial and functional systems;
- horizontal electronic PPBES linkage should be established between the POM, the President's Budget, and field activities, and a vertical linkage between HQDA and the field;
- single entry data source for FM/RM PPBES transactions should be developed; and
- convert FM paper processes to on-line systems for business transactions.

##### 8.4.3.2 Financial Management Organization and Functions

- Consolidate FM functions at HQDA and in the field;
- integrate programming and budgeting functions (implies merging OASA(FMC) and PAE);
- complete Goldwater-Nichols Act consolidation;
- consolidate MACOM FM offices at the same locations;
- consolidate all auditors into the Army Audit Agency (AAA);
- outsource selected CEAC functions; and
- establish an Army PPBES biennial process.

##### 8.4.3.3 Workforce Effectiveness

- Reduce or eliminate certain FM job series to allow for better utilization of personnel; and
- consolidate the FM and RM job series.

##### 8.4.3.4 Improved Funds Management

- Remove restrictions on use of funds and streamline funds allocation and control;
- provide funding targets through installation level;
- distribute funds authority electronically;
- eliminate reprogramming restrictions;
- reduce numbers of fund sub-divisions;
- implement an annual apportionment;

- create two-year appropriations and allow carryover; and
- provide MACOM funding letters by 1 October of each FY.

#### 8.4.3.5 Business Practices

- Use modern, Army-wide standard business applications including models and metrics;
- adopt the best practices for disbursements; and
- manage real-time execution data.

#### 8.4.4 Resource Implications

Resources required for the implementation of the above recommendations are at figure 8-1. Upfront redesign investment cost in the Army Program to effect FM improvements, and reallocation of the FY98 resources to fund these improvements amounts to \$11.42M.

Total Resource Implications				
	Personnel Separation Cost(\$M)	Initiative Implementation Cost (\$M)	Steady State Savings (\$M)	Steady State Spaces
Maximize Information Technology	+46	+39	-112	-1,747
Optimize Resource Management	+8	+1	-18	-283
Enhance Workforce Effectiveness	+10	+57	-25	-383
Improve Funds Management	+10	+2	-25	-392
Provide Tools	+2	+7	-4	-61
TOTAL	+76	+106	-184	-2,866

Figure 8-1. Total Resource Implications

### 8-5 Summary

The FM FAA provides an analysis of the processes, organizations, procedures and policies that comprise resource management in the Army and identifies those influences on the national level and within DoD that impact on the ability of the Army to manage its financial resources. It identifies major areas needing improvement in the areas of technology, the workforce, FM organizational structure and funds management and offers specific solutions intended to improve business processes and effect a better financial environment.

There were no recommended issues carried forward for consideration during the October 1997 review. There was no parallel Umbrella Group assessment of this process area.

## Acronym List

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### A

AA	Administrative Assistant
AAA	Army Audit Agency
AAE	Army Acquisition Executive
AAESA	Army Acquisition Executive Support Agency
AASA	Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
ABC	Activity Based Costing
ABCS	Army Battle Command System
AC	Active Component
ACAMIS	Army Commercial Activities Management Information System
ACC	Army Commander's Conference
ACC	Army Component Command
ACCP	Army Correspondence Course Program
ACE	Analysis Correlation Element
ACES	Army Continuing Education System
ACH	Army Community Hospital
ACS	Advanced Concepts and Requirements
ACS	Aerial Common Sensor
ACSIM	Assistant Chief of Staff, Installation Management
ADCON	Administrative Control
ADO	Army Digitization Office
ADP	Automated Data Processing
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
ADTLP	Army-wide Doctrinal and Training Literature Program
AEPG	Analysis and Experimentation Planning Group
AFARS	Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFH	Army Family Housing
AFMED	Air Force Medical Command
AGR	Active Guard Reserve
AHC	Army Housing Corporation
AI	Air Interdiction
ALMC	Army Logistics Management College
ALO	Authorized Levels of Organization
AMC	Army Materiel Command
AMEDD	Army Medical Department
AMEDD	Army Medical Department Center and School
AMOPES	Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System
AMSAA	Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity
AMSC	Army Management Staff College
AMSCO	Army Management Structure Code
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APEG	Analysis and Experimentation Planning Group
APF	Appropriated Fund
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
APPC	Army Publications and Printing Command

AR	Army Regulation
ARFOR	Army Forces
ARL	Aerial Reconnaissance Light
ARL	Army Research Laboratory
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARO	Army Research Office
ARPERCEN	Army Reserve Personnel Center
ARSTAF	Army Staff
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
ASA	Army Security Agency
ASA(ALT)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology
ASA(CW)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works
ASA(FM&C)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller
ASA(IL&E)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and Environment
ASA(I&E)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment
ASA(M&RA)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
ASA(RDA)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition
ASAS	All Source Analysis System
ASAS-RWS	All Source Analysis System – Remote Work Station
ASC	Army Signal Command
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
ASD(HA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
ASL	Authorized Stockage List
AT	Annual Training
ATDL	Army Training Digital Library
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
ATRRS	Army Training Requirements and Resources System
ATSC	Army Training Support Center
AVCSA(PD)	Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army for Program Development
AWC	Army War College
AWE	Advanced Warfighting Experiment
AWOL	Absent Without Official Leave

## B

BASOPS	Base Operations
BCTP	Battle Command Training Program
BDA	Battlefield Damage Assessment
BEQ	Bachelor Enlisted Quarters
BMM	Borrowed Military Manpower
BOC	BASOPS Corporation
BOD	Board of Directors
BOQ	Bachelor Officer Quarters
BOS	Battlefield Operating System
BPR	Business Process Reengineering
BSTF	Base Shop Test Facility
BV	Battlespace Visualization

**C**

C2	Command and Control
C3S	Command, Control and Communications Systems
C4	Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
CA	Combat Arms
CA	Commercial Activities
CAA	Concepts Analysis Agency
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CAL	Center for Army Leadership
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CAS	Close Air Support
CASCOM	Combined Arms Support Command
CATS	Combined Army Training Strategy
CBRS	Concept-Based Requirements System
CCB	Change Control Board
CD	Combat Development
CEAC	U.S. Army Cost & Economic Center
CECOM	Communications-Electronics Command
CENTCOM	Central Command
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CEWI	Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence
CFO	Chief Financial Officer
CFSC	Community and Family Support Center
CG	Commanding General
CGS	Common Ground Station
CGS-P	Common Ground Station - Prototype
CGSC	Command & General Staff College
CHAMPUS	Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services
CHPPM	Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine
CI	Civilian Internee
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIC	Criminal Investigation Command
CIDC	Criminal Investigation Command
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CINCACOM	Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Command
CINCMEDCOM	Command-in-Chief Medical Command
CIPO	Criminal Investigative Policy and Oversight
CIVPER	Civilian Personnel
CLS	Contracted Logistical Support
CMISE	Corps Military Intelligence Support Element
COC	Council of Colonels
COE	Chief of Engineers
CofS	Chief of Staff
COMPO	Component
COMPO 1	Active Army
COMPO 2	Army National Guard
COMPO 3	Army Reserve
CONOPS	Contingency Operations

CONUS	Continental United States Army
CONUSA	Continental US Army
COO	Chief Operating Officer
CORM	Commission on Roles and Missions
CRC	Crime Records Center
CS	Combat Support
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
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CSS	Combat Service Support
CSTTAR	Combat Synthetic Test and Training Assessment Range
CTC	Combat Training Center
CW	Civil Works

## D

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DCSBOS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations Support
DCSINT	Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
DCSLOG	Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
DCST	Deputy Chief of Staff for Training
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DENCOM	Dental Command
DENTAC	Dental Activity
DEPMEDS	Deployable Medical System
DEPSECDEF	Deputy Secretary of Defense
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DISE	Deployable Intelligence Support Element
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMO	Directed Military Overhire
DOD	Department of Defense
DOIM	Director of Information Management
DOJ	Department of Justice

DOL	Department of Labor
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DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DPTM	Director of Plans, Training and Mobilization
DPW	Directorate of Public Works
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DTLOMS	Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel and Soldier Systems
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**E**

EAC	Echelons Above Corps
EAD	Echelons Above Division
EC	Electronic Commerce
EDATE	Effective Date
EDI	Electronic Data Interchange
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
EPW/CI	Enemy Prisoner of War/Confinement and Internment
ESM	Equip, Supply and Maintain
ESSM	Equip, Supply, Service and Maintain
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
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FIU	Field Investigative Unit
FM	Field Manual
FM	Financial Management
FOA	Field Operating Agencies
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FTE	Full Time Equivalent
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GAO	Government Accounting Office
GBCS-L	Ground Based Common Sensor - Light
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
Gen	General Hospital
GIN	Government In Nature
GO	General Officer
GOCO	Government Owned, Contractor Operated
GOSC	General Officer Steering Committee
GRCS	Guardrail Common Sensor
GS	General Support
GSU	Garrison Support Unit
GTA	Graphic Training Aids
GUARDPERCEN	Guard Personnel Center

**H**

HQ	Headquarters
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
HQSV-W	Headquarters Services—Washington

**I**

IAW	In Accordance With
ID	Identification
IDT	Individual Development Plan
IET	Initial Entry Training
IEW	Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
IEWTPT	Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer
IEWTTP	Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactics Techniques and Procedures
IFTE	Integrated Family of Test Equipment
IG	Inspector General
IM	Information Management
IMA	Information Mission Area
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ISEC	Information Systems Engineering Command
ISM	Integrated Sustainment Maintenance
ISMA	Information System Management Activity
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ISSC	Information System Software Command

**J**

JAG	Judge Advocate General
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JROTC	Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps
JSTARSMTI	Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar System Moving Target Indicator
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JTUAV	Joint Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
JWCA	Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment

## K

KEI	Key Enabling Investments
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## L

LIWA	Land Information Warfare Activity
LRC	Lesser Regional Contingency

## M

MACOM	Major Army Command
MAE	Medium Altitude Endurance
MANSCEN	Maneuver Support Center
MARC	Manpower Requirements Criteria
MASH	Mobile Army Support Hospital
MCA	Military Construction, Army
MCC	Movement Control Center
MDEP	Management Decision Package
MDW	Military District of Washington
MEDCOM	Medical Command
MEPCOM	Military Entrance Processing Command
METL	Mission Essential Task List
METT-T	Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops Available - Time
MI	Military Intelligence
MILCON	Military Construction
MILSATCOM	Military Satellite Communication
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MMC	Materiel Management Center
MOB	Mobilization
MOBLAS	Mobilization Level Application Software
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MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
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MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
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MTP	Mission Training Plans
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MWR	Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

**N**

NAF	Nonappropriated Fund
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NCA	National Command Authority
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NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NCOES	Noncommissioned Officer Educational System
NET	New Equipment Training
NFIP	National Foreign Intelligence Program
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OSA(FM&C)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller
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O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OMA	Operations and Maintenance, Army
OMAR	Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OMD	Operations Maintenance, Defense
OMNG	Operations and Maintenance, National Guard
OOTW	Operations Other Than War

OPA	Officer Personnel Account
OPCON	Operational Control
OPFOR	Opposition Forces
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
OPMG	Office of the Provost Marshall General
OPMS	Officer Personnel Management System
OPTEC	Operational Test and Evaluation Command
OPTEMPO	Operating Tempo
ORE	Operational Readiness Exercise
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OST	Order/Ship Time
OTB	Operational Training Base
OTSG	Office of the Surgeon General

## P

P&ES-W	Personnel and Employment Services-Washington
PA	Public Affairs
PAE	Program Analysis and Evaluation
PAM	Pamphlet
PAO	Public Affairs Office
PAT	Process Action Team
PBD	Program Budget Decision
PEG	Program Evaluation Group
PEO	Program Executive Officer
PERINSCOM	Personnel Information System Command
PERSCOM	Personnel Command
PERSTEMPO	Personnel Tempo
PLL	Prescribed Load List
PM	Program Manager
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PPBS	Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System
PPBS	Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
PPP	Power Projection Platform
PSP	Power Support Platform
PSS	Personnel Service Support
PSU	Protective Service Unit

## Q

QOL	Quality of Life
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## R

R&D	Research and Development
R&S	Reconnaissance and Surveillance
RBS	Readiness Based Sparing
RC	Reserve Component
RCF	Regional Confinement Facility

RDA	Research, Development and Acquisition
RDAlSA	Research, Development, Acquisition Information Systems Agency
RDEC	Research, Development and Engineering Center
RDT&E	Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
RG	Readiness Group
RISTA	Reconnaissance Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition
RM	Resource Management
RMC	Regional Medical Center
ROC	Regionalizing, Outsourcing and Consolidating
ROI	Return on Investment
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
RSC	Regional Support Command
RSOC	Regional SIGINT Operations Center
RTB	Regional Training Brigade
RTD	Resident Training Detachment
RTT	Regional Training Team

## S

S&BMS-W	Space and Building Management Services - Washington
S&SO	Stability & Support Operations
S&T	Science and Technology
SAG	Senior Advisory Group
SAM	Single Agency Manager
SARSS-O	Standard Army Retail Supply System - Objective
SCE	Service Cryptologic Executive
SD	Special Duty
SECARMY	Secretary of the Army
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SES	Senior Executive Service
SG	Surgeon General
SGS	Secretary General Staff
SIDPERS	Standard Installation/Division Personnel System
SIGCEN	US Army Signal Center
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SIM	Simulation
SINGARS	Single Channel Ground-Airborne Radio System
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOMA	Signal Organization and Mission Realignment
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SOT	Support to Organizational Training
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SPOE	Seaport of Embarkation
SSA	Staff Support Agencies
SSDC	Space and Strategic Defense Command
SSI	Soldier Support Institute
SSO	Stability and Support Operations
STAMIS	Standard Army Information System
STARC	State Area Command

STO	Science and Technology Objective
STRAC	Standards in Training Commission
STRICOM	Simulations Training and Instrumentation Command
SWC	Special Warfare Center

**T**

T&E	Test and Evaluation
TA	Tuition Assistance
TAA	Total Army Analysis
TAADS-R	The Army Authorization Document System—Revised
TADSS	Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations
TAG	The Adjutant General
TAM	Training Assessment Model
TAP	The Army Plan
TAQ	Total Army Quality
TASS	Total Army School System
TBD	To Be Determined
TCS	Tactical Control Station
TD	Training Development
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TDY	Temporary Duty
TECOM	Test and Evaluation Command
TEMO	Training, Exercise and Military Operations
TEXCOM	Test and Experimentation Command
TJAG	The Judge Advocate General
TOA	Total Obligation Authority
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force Deployment List
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TRANSCOM	Transportation Command
TRAVISS	Training and Visual Information Support System
TRM	Training Resource Management
TSA	Troop Support Agency
TSB	Training Support Brigade
TSBn	Training Support Battalion
TSC	Training Support Center
TSD	Training Support Division
TSG	The Surgeon General
TSM	TRADOC Systems Manager
TSP	Training Support Plan
TTB	Transportation Terminal Brigade
TTHS	Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students
TTP	Tactical Training Packages

**U**

UAD	Updated Authorization Document
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UFR	Unfinanced Requirement
UMMCA	Unspecified Minor Military Construction, Army
USA	US Army
USACE	US Army Corps of Engineers
USACIDC	US Army Criminal Investigation Command
USACIL	US Army Crime Lab
USACRC	US Army Crime Records Center
USAF	US Air Force
USAFAC	US Army Finance and Accounting Center
USAFISA	US Army Force Integration Support Agency
USAICS	US Army Intelligence Center and School
USAMEDCOM	US Army Medical Command
USAMPS	US Army Military Police School
USAR	US Army Reserve
USAREC	US Army Recruiting Command
USAREUR	US Army Europe
USARPAC	US Army Pacific
USARSO	US Army South
USASOC	US Army Special Operations Command
USC	US Code
USCG	US Coast Guard
USDB	US Disciplinary Barracks
USMA	US Military Academy
USMC	US Marine Corps
USMED	US Medical Command
USN	US Navy

## V

VA	Veterans Affairs
VCSA	Vice Chief of Staff, Army
VETCOM	Veterinary Command
VI	Visual Information
VM	Velocity Management
VV&A	Verification, Validation, and Accreditation

## W

WARSIM 2000	Warfighters' Simulation 2000
WOCS	Warrant Officer Candidate School

## Y

YTP	Yearly Training Program
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## Acronym List

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### A

AA	Administrative Assistant
AAA	Army Audit Agency
AAE	Army Acquisition Executive
AAESA	Army Acquisition Executive Support Agency
AASA	Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
ABC	Activity Based Costing
ABCS	Army Battle Command System
AC	Active Component
ACAMIS	Army Commercial Activities Management Information System
ACC	Army Commander's Conference
ACC	Army Component Command
ACCP	Army Correspondence Course Program
ACE	Analysis Correlation Element
ACES	Army Continuing Education System
ACH	Army Community Hospital
ACS	Advanced Concepts and Requirements
ACS	Aerial Common Sensor
ACSIM	Assistant Chief of Staff, Installation Management
ADCON	Administrative Control
ADO	Army Digitization Office
ADP	Automated Data Processing
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
ADTLF	Army-wide Doctrinal and Training Literature Program
AEPG	Analysis and Experimentation Planning Group
AFARS	Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFH	Army Family Housing
AFMED	Air Force Medical Command
AGR	Active Guard Reserve
AHC	Army Housing Corporation
AI	Air Interdiction
ALMC	Army Logistics Management College
ALO	Authorized Levels of Organization
AMC	Army Materiel Command
AMEDD	Army Medical Department
AMEDD	Army Medical Department Center and School
AMOPES	Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System
AMSAA	Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity
AMSC	Army Management Staff College
AMSCO	Army Management Structure Code
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APEG	Analysis and Experimentation Planning Group
APF	Appropriated Fund
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
APPC	Army Publications and Printing Command



AR	Army Regulation
ARFOR	Army Forces
ARL	Aerial Reconnaissance Light
ARL	Army Research Laboratory
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARO	Army Research Office
ARPERCEN	Army Reserve Personnel Center
ARSTAF	Army Staff
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
ASA	Army Security Agency
ASA(ALT)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology
ASA(CW)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works
ASA(FM&C)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller
ASA(IL&E)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and Environment
ASA(I&E)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment
ASA(M&RA)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
ASA(RDA)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition
ASAS	All Source Analysis System
ASAS-RWS	All Source Analysis System – Remote Work Station
ASC	Army Signal Command
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
ASD(HA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
ASL	Authorized Stockage List
AT	Annual Training
ATDL	Army Training Digital Library
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
ATRRS	Army Training Requirements and Resources System
ATSC	Army Training Support Center
AVCSA(PD)	Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army for Program Development
AWC	Army War College
AWE	Advanced Warfighting Experiment
AWOL	Absent Without Official Leave

**B**

BASOPS	Base Operations
BCTP	Battle Command Training Program
BDA	Battlefield Damage Assessment
BEQ	Bachelor Enlisted Quarters
BMM	Borrowed Military Manpower
BOC	BASOPS Corporation
BOD	Board of Directors
BOQ	Bachelor Officer Quarters
BOS	Battlefield Operating System
BPR	Business Process Reengineering
BSTF	Base Shop Test Facility
BV	Battlespace Visualization

**C**

C2	Command and Control
C3S	Command, Control and Communications Systems
C4	Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
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OPM	Office of Personnel Management
OPMG	Office of the Provost Marshall General
OPMS	Officer Personnel Management System
OPTEC	Operational Test and Evaluation Command
OPTEMPO	Operating Tempo
ORE	Operational Readiness Exercise
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OST	Order/Ship Time
OTB	Operational Training Base
OTSG	Office of the Surgeon General

**P**

P&ES-W	Personnel and Employment Services-Washington
PA	Public Affairs
PAE	Program Analysis and Evaluation
PAM	Pamphlet
PAO	Public Affairs Office
PAT	Process Action Team
PBD	Program Budget Decision
PEG	Program Evaluation Group
PEO	Program Executive Officer
PERINSCOM	Personnel Information System Command
PERSCOM	Personnel Command
PERSTEMPO	Personnel Tempo
PLL	Prescribed Load List
PM	Program Manager
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PPBES	Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System
PPBS	Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
PPP	Power Projection Platform
PSP	Power Support Platform
PSS	Personnel Service Support
PSU	Protective Service Unit

**Q**

QOL	Quality of Life
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**R**

R&D	Research and Development
R&S	Reconnaissance and Surveillance
RBS	Readiness Based Sparing
RC	Reserve Component
RCF	Regional Confinement Facility



RDA	Research, Development and Acquisition
RDAISA	Research, Development, Acquisition Information Systems Agency
RDEC	Research, Development and Engineering Center
RDT&E	Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
RG	Readiness Group
RISTA	Reconnaissance Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition
RM	Resource Management
RMC	Regional Medical Center
ROC	Regionalizing, Outsourcing and Consolidating
ROI	Return on Investment
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
RSC	Regional Support Command
RSOC	Regional SIGINT Operations Center
RTB	Regional Training Brigade
RTD	Resident Training Detachment
RTT	Regional Training Team

## S

S&BMS-W	Space and Building Management Services - Washington
S&SO	Stability & Support Operations
S&T	Science and Technology
SAG	Senior Advisory Group
SAM	Single Agency Manager
SARSS-O	Standard Army Retail Supply System - Objective
SCE	Service Cryptologic Executive
SD	Special Duty
SECARMY	Secretary of the Army
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SES	Senior Executive Service
SG	Surgeon General
SGS	Secretary General Staff
SIDPERS	Standard Installation/Division Personnel System
SIGCEN	US Army Signal Center
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SIM	Simulation
SINGARS	Single Channel Ground-Airborne Radio System
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOMA	Signal Organization and Mission Realignment
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SOT	Support to Organizational Training
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SPOE	Seaport of Embarkation
SSA	Staff Support Agencies
SSDC	Space and Strategic Defense Command
SSI	Soldier Support Institute
SSO	Stability and Support Operations
STAMIS	Standard Army Information System
STARC	State Area Command

STO	Science and Technology Objective
STRAC	Standards in Training Commission
STRICOM	Simulations Training and Instrumentation Command
SWC	Special Warfare Center

**T**

T&E	Test and Evaluation
TA	Tuition Assistance
TAA	Total Army Analysis
TAADS-R	The Army Authorization Document System—Revised
TADSS	Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations
TAG	The Adjutant General
TAM	Training Assessment Model
TAP	The Army Plan
TAQ	Total Army Quality
TASS	Total Army School System
TBD	To Be Determined
TCS	Tactical Control Station
TD	Training Development
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TDY	Temporary Duty
TECOM	Test and Evaluation Command
TEMO	Training, Exercise and Military Operations
TEXCOM	Test and Experimentation Command
TJAG	The Judge Advocate General
TOA	Total Obligation Authority
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force Deployment List
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TRANSCOM	Transportation Command
TRAVISS	Training and Visual Information Support System
TRM	Training Resource Management
TSA	Troop Support Agency
TSB	Training Support Brigade
TSBn	Training Support Battalion
TSC	Training Support Center
TSD	Training Support Division
TSG	The Surgeon General
TSM	TRADOC Systems Manager
TSP	Training Support Plan
TTB	Transportation Terminal Brigade
TTHS	Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students
TTP	Tactical Training Packages

**U**

UAD	Updated Authorization Document
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UFR	Unfinanced Requirement
UMMCA	Unspecified Minor Military Construction, Army
USA	US Army
USACE	US Army Corps of Engineers
USACIDC	US Army Criminal Investigation Command
USACIL	US Army Crime Lab
USACRC	US Army Crime Records Center
USAF	US Air Force
USAFAC	US Army Finance and Accounting Center
USAFISA	US Army Force Integration Support Agency
USAICS	US Army Intelligence Center and School
USAMEDCOM	US Army Medical Command
USAMPS	US Army Military Police School
USAR	US Army Reserve
USAREC	US Army Recruiting Command
USAREUR	US Army Europe
USARPAC	US Army Pacific
USARSO	US Army South
USASOC	US Army Special Operations Command
USC	US Code
USCG	US Coast Guard
USDB	US Disciplinary Barracks
USMA	US Military Academy
USMC	US Marine Corps
USMED	US Medical Command
USN	US Navy

## V

VA	Veterans Affairs
VCSA	Vice Chief of Staff, Army
VETCOM	Veterinary Command
VI	Visual Information
VM	Velocity Management
VV&A	Verification, Validation, and Accreditation

## W

WARSIM 2000	Warfighters' Simulation 2000
WOCS	Warrant Officer Candidate School

## Y

YTP	Yearly Training Program
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